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GLOSSARY OF INDIAN TERMS
Adawlat - A court of justice.
Ameer - A nobleman.
Bazar - Daily market, or market place.
Bhaindaries - Securities.
Chauth - Blackmail or tribute (usually of ^ of the revenue) levied 
by the Marathas on countries which they overran but did 
not administer. The right to levy chauth was acquired from 
the Mughal Emperor by Peshwa Baji Rao in 1736.
Crore- One hundred lacs or ten millions.
Dacoits - Gang robbers.
Darakhdars - Officials of the Peshwa charged with the audit of the 
accounts of the saranjams.
Desai - Headman of a district.
Desh - Country, district. Maratha Country southwards of Poona.
Diwan - Native minister of the revenue department, and Chief Justice 
in civil cases within his jurisdiction. Receiver-General 
of a province. Finance minister.
Diwani - Right to collect and administer the land revenues of 
Bengal.
Durbar - The court, hall of audience.
Enam - Present, gift, reward, gratuity, favour. Grant of land
held rent-free and in hereditary and perpetual occupation. 
Assignments of the Government's share of the produce of a
Vportion of land, for the support of religious establishments.
Fadnavis - A public officer of the Maratha Government through whom
all orders and grants were issued and to whom all accounts 
were sent.
Gadi « Throne.
Hoojrah - Messenger.
Jagir - An assignment of the Government's share of the produce of 
a portion of land to an individual. The assignment was 
usually for life, and lapsed on the holder's death to the 
State, although it was often renewed to his heir on the 
payment of a fine. A Jagir could also be assigned for the 
support of any public establishment, particularly of military 
nature.
Jagirdar - Holder of a Jagir.
Jihad - A holy war by Mohammedans against infidels.
Jizya - Capitation tax or poll-tax imposed on the Hindus of 
Rajasthan by Emperor Aurangzeb.
Kachhwaha - A native of the state of Jaipur (Amber).
Khalsa - The exchequer; as applied to lands it refers to the
property reserved to the State not made over in Jagir or 
Enam to any other parties.
Khanate - A country or province ruled by a Khan or Prince.
Khillat - A robe of honour with which Princes conferred dignity.
Killadar - Warder of a castle, Commander of a fort.
Maharaja - A sovereign prince; applied in courtesy to all Rajas.
Masnad - The place of sitting, a seat; a throne or chair of State.
The large cushion used by Indian Princes in place of a 
throne.
Nawab - A viceroy or governor of a province under the Mughal 
Government.
Nazzer - An offering. A present made to a superior.
Nazzeranah - Anything given as a present, particularly as an
acknowledgement for grant of lands, public office, etc.
Pant Pritinidhi - Office created by Raja Ram during his exile at
Gingi on the Coromandel Coast during the 1680's. Superior 
in status to the Peshwaship.
Pant Sachev - General Accountant and Auditor of the Maratha State.
Patil - The headman of a village who has general control and 
management of village affairs.
Pindaris - Organised banditti or marauders whose haunts lay in the 
valley of the Narbada. First heard of during the war 
between Aurangzeb and the Marathas.
Raj - A kingdom, a rule, sovereignty.
Raja - A King, Prince.
Rana - A title held by Hindu princes of central and northern 
India.
Rani - A Hindu queen.
Rathor - A native of the state of Jodhpur (Marwar).
Saddar Diwani Adawlat - High Court of Civil Jurisdiction.
Sanad - A patent, charter or written authority for holding either 
land or office.
vii
Saranjam - Lands assigned to military chieftains for the maintenance 
of troops. They were not personal jagirs.
Sardar - Chieftain, Captain, headman.
Sati - Literally, 'good woman'. The rite of widow-burning practised 
especially among the Rajputs: A Hindu wife who consummated 
a life of duty by burning herself on the funeral pile of 
her husband.
Senapati - Commander-in-Chief of the Maratha army.
Shastri - Literally, a 'learned man', 'one versed in knowledge'.
Shia - The most important sect in Islam which began as a
legitimist group advocating the claims of Ali (the son-in- 
law of the Prophet), to the Caliphate. It rapidly developed 
into a religious movement differing on a number of points 
from orthodox Islam.
Sibhandis - Irregular native soldiers employed in the service of the 
revenues and police establishment.
Subadar - Governor of a province, Viceroy.
Sunni - The name of the dominant majority group in Islam, usually
regarded as orthodox, who revere equally the four successors 
of Mohammed.
Talook - Dependency. A division of a province; an estate, a proprie­
tary land usually smaller than a zemindari.
Turrufs - Village units.
Tynaut Zaubtahs - The instrument or deed which fixed the value of 
saranjams and the conditions of tenure.
viii
Vakil - One deputed to act for another. Ambassador, agent sent on 
a special commission, or residing at Court.
Vasant Panchemi - Spring festival of the Hindus held on 14 February. 
Vizier - Chief minister or Prime minister.
Wurshaushans - Annual stipends.
Wuttuns - Hereditary lands.
Zemindari - Propreitary tenure of land. Lands held by a Zemindar or 
proprietor.
Zillah - District, division.
INTRODUCTION
In their examination of the grand conflict about the 
motives of British political expansion in Africa under Queen Victoria, 
Robinson, Gallagher and Denny come to the conclusion that the origin 
of British political expansion in tropical Africa during the nine­
teenth century
is to be found first in the nationalist crises 
in Africa it self,... and only secondarily in the 
interlocking of these crises in Africa with 
rivalries in Europe. Together the two drove 
Britain step by step to regain by territorial 
claims and occupation that security which could 
no longer be had by influence alone. The compell­
ing conditions for British advances in tropical 
Africa [they argue] were first called into being, 
not by the German victory of 1871, nor by Leopold's 
interest in the Congo, nor by the petty rivalry of 
missionaries and merchants, nor by a rising imperi­
alist spirit, nor even by the French occupation of 
Tunis in 1881 - but by the collapse of the Khedivial 
regime in Egypt. 1.
My thesis attempts to assess the extent to which comparable situations 
were responsible for British political expansion in India between 
1811 and 1844. Put in another way, my thesis sets out to investigate 
the extent to which the decay of political systems in the Indian 
States provided a stimulus for British intervention in their affairs 
during the period under review. I shall also attempt to estimate
R. Robinson, J. Gallagher and A. Denny, Africa and the Victorians, 
(London, 1961), p.465. (Emphasis mine.)
how far local peculiarities in each State influenced the type of 
political relationship established with it.
The importance of such an investigation is underscored
by two considerations: First, although in accounting for British
political expansion in India during the first half of the nineteenth
century historians have generally acknowledged political unrest in
2the native States as a factor, they have not examined this factor in 
sufficient detail to indicate its full impact on British policy.
Second, the existing accounts of British political expansion in 
India during this period do not show in sufficient relief the corre­
lation between the political unrest in, and the political structure 
of, the native States.
In trying to estimate how far weaknesses in the political 
structure of the Indian States as well as local peculiarities helped 
to determine the timing, and the nature, of British political expansion 
in India between 1811 and 1844, I shall concentrate on three areas - 
Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Afghanistan.
See Harriet Martineau, The History of British rule in India, (London, 
1857) p.159; Percival Spear, India. A Modern History, (Michigan, 
1961) p.215; Major Ross-of-Bladensburg, Rulers of India. Marquess 
Hastings, (Oxford, 1900) p.60; Percival Spear (ed.), The Oxford 
History of India, Third edition, (Oxford, 1958) pp.574-575;
Sir W.W. Hunter, Rulers of India. The Marquess of Dalhousie,
(Oxford, 1895) p.13; W.H. Hutton, The Marquess Wellesley, (Oxford, 
1915) p.109; Sir Alfred Lyall, The Rise and Expansion of the British 
Dominion in India, (London, 1914) pp.290-291; G.D. Oswell, Sketches 
of Rulers of India, (Oxford, 1908) Vol.iii, p.12.
3.
Until the last two decades of the seventeenth century, the 
East India Company relied mainly on the Mughal regime for the protec­
tion of its trade. For seventy years after the establishment of its 
factory at Surat (1612), the Company guided its policy by the advice of 
Thomas Roe, its Ambassador at the Imperial Court from 1615-1619.
It is the beggaring of the Portugal, [Thomas Roe 
warned] notwithstanding his many rich residencies 
and territories, that he keeps soldiers that spend 
it, yet his garrisons are mean. He never profited 
by the Indies, since he defended them. Observe 
this well. It hath been also the error of the 
Dutch, who seek plantation here by the sword.
They turn a wonderful stock, they prowl in all 
places, they possess some of the best; yet their 
dead payes consume all their gain. Let this be 
received as a rule that if you will profit, seek 
it at sea, and in quiet trade; for without contro­
versy, it is an error to affect garrisons and land 
wars in India. 3.
I.
Nevertheless, as the decay of the Mughal Empire opened the
floodgates of disorder, it became impossible for the Company to rely
any longer on the Mughal regime for the protection of its widely
dispersed factories. The circumstances of the time demanded that the
4Company should manage its commerce with its sword in its hand. In 
fact by 1684 it was already clear to the Court of Directors that the 
time was approaching when they could not venture to 'trade boldly 
nor leave great stocks ... where we have not the security of a fort.'^
Quoted in P. E. Roberts, History of British India under the Company 
and the Crown, Third Edition (London, 1952), pp.36-37. (Emphasis 
mine.)
4 Ibid., p.43. Gerald Aungier to the Court of Directors.
5 Quoted in Lucy S. Sutherland, The East India Company in Eighteenth- 
Century Politics, (Oxford, 1952) p.3 .
The death of Emperor Aurangzeb in 1707 increased the confusion and
insecurity in India. In Bengal the Company took advantage of the event
to strengthen Fort William while there was 'an interregnum, and no one
6likely to take notice of what' it was doing.
The crisis came in 1756 with the accession of Suraj-ud-Daula 
to the nawabship of Bengal. His aversion to the growing influence of 
the Company culminated in the tragedy of the Black Hole of Calcutta. 
This tragedy gave Robert Clive an opportunity to settle 'the Company's 
estate in those parts [i.e., in Bengal] in a better and more lasting 
condition that ever.'^ Robert Clive readily entered into a plot to 
supplant Suraj-ud-Daula by a ruler who would become a protege of the 
East India Company. His victory on the plains of Plassey (June 1757) 
enabled him to elevate Mir Jaffir to the nawabship in place of Suraj- 
ud-Daula. For a time the Company found it convenient to maintain the 
fiction of the Nawab's independence. In 1765, however, Robert Clive 
accepted the Diwani or the fiscal administration of Bengal from the 
Emperor Shah Alum.
The Directors were still reluctant to mingle politics with 
trade. Therefore in accepting the Diwani they tried to repudiate the 
political responsibilities of the office.
Quoted in P. E. Roberts, History of British India, p.61 .
Quoted in Sir Alfred Lyall, The Rise and Expansion of the British 
Dominion in India (London, 1914), p.130 .
We conceive [they wrote in a despatch] the office 
of Dewan should be exercised only in superintending 
the collection and disposal of the revenues. This 
we conceive to be the whole office of Dewan. The 
administration of justice, the appointments to 
offices, Zemindaries, in short, whatever comes 
under the denomination of civil administration, 
we understand, is to remain in the hands of the 
Nawab or his ministers. 8.
Nevertheless, the failure of Clive's reforms and of the Dual Government 
which resulted from the above policy compelled the Court of Directors 
in the end to assume full administrative responsibility in Bengal.
In 1772 they proclaimed their decision to 'stand forth as Dewan' and 
appointed Warren Hastings as Governor of Bengal. In 1773 the Regulating 
Act established a Supreme Council at Calcutta with responsibility for 
the general administration of the Company's affairs in India. Thus by 
1772 the East India Company had been drawn into Indian politics as a 
result of the decay of the Mughal regime.
The assumption of political power in Bengal assured the 
security of British commerce there but not on the Coromandel and 
Malabar coasts. On these coasts, the insecurity caused by the collapse 
of the Mughal regime became aggravated by European rivalry. British 
factories and commerce in those areas therefore stood exposed not only 
to the caprice of native rulers but also to the intrigues of European 
rivals. The Peace of Paris (February, 1763) established British
Quoted in P. Mukherji, Indian Constitutional Documents 1600-1918, 
Second Edition (Calcutta, 1918), Vol.1, p.xi. Despatch from Court 
of Directors, 17 May 1768. (Emphasis mine.)
ascendancy on the Coromandel coast by limiting the number of French 
troops to be maintained there. But although the Peace ended the direct 
confrontation between the British and the French in India, it did not 
guarantee the British security against the covert and subtle form of 
challenge upon which the French embarked for the rest of the eighteenth 
century. French military officers entered the service of native States 
and used their influence to incite the native rulers against the British 
and to promote the interests of their country. Therefore during the 
second half of the eighteenth century it became the primary object of 
the Government of India to substitute British influence for that of 
the French in the native States and to secure the expulsion of all 
French nationals from India.
The policy of intervention inspired by the French threat 
led to serious embroilment with the Nizam of Hyderabad, the Raja of 
Mysore and the Chiefs of the Maratha Confederacy. The first Maratha 
war (1775-1782) and the Anglo-Mysorean war (1779-1784) which resulted 
from British intervention in the affairs of those States evoked the 
condemnation of Warren Hastings' foreign policy by the Directors of 
the East India Company. In 1784 an Act of Parliament interdicted the 
Government of India from declaring war or entering into treaties that 
might lead to wars without the authority of the Court of Directors or 
of the Secret Committee. The only exception to this rule was in cases 
where the wars were absolutely vital to the security of British interests. 
By and large, this enactment remained a dead letter. Even the pacific 
Lord Cornwallis who was sent to India to inaugurate the new era of
non-intervention in the affairs of native States could not help contra­
vening it. The outbreak of the French revolution forced him into war 
with Tipu Sultan of Mysore, a partisan of the French. For the purpose 
of this war, Lord Cornwallis negotiated a Triple Alliance with the 
Nizam and the Peshwa in July 1790.
II.
During Lord Wellesley's Governor-Generalship (1798-1805) the 
quest for security against the French threat assumed the form of an 
unabashed quest for expansionism. The policy of non-intervention 
was completely abandoned. Oudh, the Carnatic and Mysore were firmly 
brought under the control of the Government of India. After the 
defeat and death of Tipu Sultan in 1799, Mysore became a diminutive 
State and was restored to the rule of its former Hindu dynasty. The 
new State entered into a subsidiary alliance with the Government of 
India. The Carnatic was annexed on the grounds of alleged treacherous 
correspondence between Omdut-ul-Omrah and Tipu Sultan during the late 
war between the British and Tipu. The protests of Ali Hussein, successor 
of Omdut-ul-Omrah, were silenced. He was set aside in favour of his 
cousin Azim-ul-Daula who acquiesced and received a pension for himself 
and his family. Oudh, to all intents and purposes, became a vassal 
State of the Government of India.
Through his system of Subsidiary Alliances, Lord Wellesley 
established British dominance over the two most powerful southern
States - Hyderabad and the Maratha Empire. By 1802 these States, 
which were potential allies of France, had agreed to regard the enemies 
of the British as their enemies. They had also agreed to submit their 
differences with other States to the arbitration of the Government of 
India, and had promised not to employ any European national in their 
service without the consent of the Government of India. The Nizam 
and the Peshwa had in addition resigned the conduct of their foreign 
policy to the control of the Government of India. Above all, they 
had ceded part of their territory as subsidy for the maintenance of 
British troops to be stationed in their territories. These troops 
which were ostensibly meant for the protection of the allied States 
from foreign aggression were in fact intended to overawe them.
At long last it seemed as though the Government of India had 
evolved a system for safeguarding its external as well as its internal 
security without establishing its direct rule over the entire Indian 
subcontinent. But the British dream of maintaining peace and stability 
in India through the exercise of indirect influence was doomed to 
disappointment. Between 1811 and 1844 serious political crises in 
Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Afghanistan placed the whole question of 
British security in jeopardy once more. The result was that the 
Government of India felt itself forced to intervene in these States 
with a view to establishing tighter political control over them than 
was originally intended.
I shall now proceed to examine the causes which underlay 
political instability in the States of Maharashtra, Rajasthan and 
Afghanistan and attempt to show why the Government of India felt 
itself compelled to intervene in those States. I shall also examine 
the consequences of this intervention.
Chapter 1
THE PESHWA, THE SOUTHERN JAGIRDARS AND THE AGREEMENT OF PANDHARPUR
Undoubtedly, imperialism played a major role in British 
political expansion in India during the first half of the nineteenth 
century, especially during the Governor-Generalship of Lord Wellesley 
(1798-1805) and of Lord Dalhousie (1848-1856).^ In the intervening 
period, however, British expansion owed a great deal to another 
equally potent, if not more potent, factor. This factor was the 
collapse of stable politics in the native States and the resultant 
political instability. In several cases, it was this instability 
which provided the initial impetus for British intervention in the 
native States. Indeed, in Maharashtra, it was the collapse of the 
authority of the Poona Government, more than any other factor, which 
provided the main stimulus for British intervention in 1811.
Under Lord Wellesley, British imperialism was largely the result 
of trade and the Anglo-French rivalry for commercial empire in the 
East. Under Lord Dalhousie, it was inspired by financial and 
humanitarian considerations. See P. E. Roberts, India under 
Wellesley, (Gorakhpur, 1961) p.1; Sir Alfred Lyall, The Rise and 
Expansion of the British Dominion in India, (London, 1914) pp.246, 
269, 290-291; C. Colin Davies, An Historical Atlas of the Indian 
Peninsula, Second edition, (London, 1959) p.58; T. Rice Holmes,
A History of the Indian Mutiny, Fifth edition, (London, 1904) 
pp.17, 34, 36; Percival Spear (ed.), The Oxford History of India, 
Third edition, (Oxford, 1958) pp.550-551; Percival Spear, India. A 
Modern History, (Michigan, 1961) pp.215-216, 220; Edward Thompson 
and G. T. Garratt, Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India, 
(London, 1934) pp.267,273; P. E. Roberts, History of British India 
under the Company and the Crown, Third edition, (London, 1952) 
pp.350-351.
The State of Maharashtra formed the hub of the Maratha 
Confederacy which was a loosely coordinated system of States. These 
States accepted the nominal suzerainty of the Peshwas who controlled 
the territories of Maharashtra from their seat at Poona. At the begin­
ning of the nineteenth century, the territories controlled by Peshwa 
Baji Rao II were bounded on the north by Kandeish, on the south by 
Mysore, on the west by the Arabian Sea and on the east by Hyderabad.
These territories included part of the coastal plain of the Konkan, 
the mountainous Ghats, the tableland of the Desh and the northern 
river basins of the Carnatic. To the north and north-east of Maharashtra 
lay the possessions of the Confederate Chiefs. These territories had 
been conquered by the captains of Shahu Raja (hereditary ruler of the 
Maratha State) in the decades which followed the death of the Emperor 
Aurangzeb (1707), and they formed enclaves in Mughal territory. Of 
the Confederate Chiefs the Gaikwad ruled over Gujerat, and the Bhonsla 
over Berar. Sindhia and Holkar controlled principalities in Malwa. 
Although virtually independent, the Confederate Chiefs regarded them­
selves as vassals of the Peshwa and looked upon him as the symbol of 
Maratha unity.
By 1802 this once powerful Confederacy was in the throes of 
a civil war. The Peshwas who were originally the Prime Ministers of 
the Rajas of Satara had usurped power and become the dominant authority 
in the Maratha State since the death of Shahu Raja in 1750. This 
usurpation of power from the Rajas of Satara weakened the allegiance
of the Confederate Chiefs to the Maratha Government at Poona. The 
Bhonsla and the Gaikwad, for instance, looked upon the Peshwas as 
their equals, if not their inferiors; and they were therefore reluc­
tant to acknowledge them as suzerains. The first four Peshwas were 
powerful enough to impose obedience upon the Confederate Chiefs. But 
as a result of the prolonged civil wars which convulsed Maharashtra 
after the death of Peshwa Narrayan Rao in 1773, the Peshwa1s Government 
at Poona found it difficult to assert its authority over Sindhia,
Holkar, the Bhonsla or the Gaikwad.
It was not only the Confederate Chiefs who defied the Peshwa1s
authority. Within Maharashtra itself the feudal chiefs known as the
2Southern Jagirdars attempted to assert their independence of the Poona 
Government by carrying defiance of authority to the point of encroaching 
upon the Peshwa's personal estates. In the six years preceding the 
signing of the Treaty of Bassein, the Peshwa's authority reached its 
lowest ebb. Baji Rao was neither able to command the obedience of the 
Southern Jagirdars nor punish their insubordination. It was this crisis 
in Maharashtra which compelled Peshwa Baji Rao to accept the subsidiary 
Treaty of Bassein (December 1802).
The Southern Jagirdars were so called because their estates were 
located in southern Maharashtra - between Satara and the river 
Kistna, and in the Maratha Carnatic (south of the Kistna).
The effect of the treaty was to sunder the tenuous ties 
which bound the Confederate Chiefs to the Peshwa as subordinates. 
Henceforth they were recognised as independent in their relations with 
the Poona Government. The Peshwa agreed to submit his disputes with 
them to the arbitration of the Government of India. Thus the treaty 
dissolved the Maratha Confederacy and subjected the Peshwa's foreign 
policy to the control of the Government of India. As opposed to the 
Confederate Chiefs, however, the relations between the Peshwa and the
3feudal chiefs of Maharashtra fell outside the scope of the treaty.
From 1804 the Peshwa sought to re-assert his authority over these 
chiefs with the assistance of the Government of India. He wished to 
recover the lands which the Southern Jagirdars had usurped and to punish 
them for their insolence and disobedience. To strengthen his authority, 
the Peshwa wanted to raise a strong army under his direct authority 
and correspondingly reduce the military power of the Jagirdars. In 
fact Baji Rao preferred to dispossess nearly all of the Southern 
Jagirdars and re-assign their lands to others whom he could control.
For this purpose, he invoked Article 9 of the Treaty of Bassein which
Article 17 of the treaty declared that the Honourable Company 
'have no manner of concern with any of His Highness' children, 
relations, subjects, or servants, with respect to whom His Highness 
is absolute'. C. U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements 
and Sanads relating to India and neighbouring Countries, Third 
Edition (Calcutta, 1892), Vol. VI, p. 58 .
obliged the Government of India to defend the integrity of his 
4possessions.
The Government of India was at first inclined to regard the 
Peshwa's disputes with the Southern Jagirdars as a domestic matter 
which did not concern the British. But it soon realised how intimately 
connected the disputes were with the security of its possessions in 
south India. A complete victory for the Peshwa over the Jagirdars 
would have meant the creation of a powerful State contiguous to the 
northern frontiers of British possessions, a State, moreover, which in 
the recent past had looked upon itself as the dominant power in the 
subcontinent. A victory for the Jagirdars, of course, would have been 
equally undesirable. It would have meant the dissolution of the political 
system created through the Treaty of Bassein. It would also have meant 
the creation of turbulent, and possibly hostile, neighbours for the 
Government of India as well as for its allies like the Raja of Mysore 
or the Nizam. The creation of a powerful State under the control of 
Baji Rao Peshwa, or the emergence of a number of independent chiefs in
4
Article 9 of the treaty stated in part: 'The subsidiary force will, 
at all times, be ready to execute services of importance, such as 
the protection of the person of His Highness, his heirs, and 
successors, the overawing and chastisement of rebels, or exciters 
of disturbance in His Highness' dominions, and the due correction 
of his subjects or dependants, who may withhold payment of the 
Sircar's just claims ...'
For the maintenance of the subsidiary force, which was stationed 
within Maharashtra (at Seroor), the Peshwa ceded territories worth 
Rs. 26,00,000 per annum. The subsidiary force consisted of 6,000 
regular infantry. (See C. U. Aitchison, op. cit.3 Vol.VI, pp.55,59-60.)
the southern Maratha districts, would have proved equally detrimental 
to British interests. The policy of the Government of India therefore 
was to intervene in the disputes and attempt to create a condition of 
equipoise between the Peshwa and the Southern Jagirdars. This policy 
was based on the assumption that such a state of equipoise would enable 
the British to exercise overall control over Maharashtra in the interest 
of stability in South India.
i. The origin of the Southern Jagirdars, their resources and
relationship to the Peshwa.
Some of the Southern Jagirdars like the Pant Pratididhi and 
the Pant Sachev were ancient Jagirdars who owed their jagirs to the 
Rajas of Satara. But the majority of the Southern Jagirdars were the 
creation of the Peshwas. Shivaji (1627-1680), the founder of the 
Maratha State, strongly disapproved of the assignment of lands in 
jagir for the support of military or civil officers."* This was one 
way in which he endeavoured to curb the separatist tendencies which 
from the beginning posed obstacles to Maratha unity. None of the men 
who distinguished themselves in his service - Moropant Pingle, Abaji 
Sondev or Datto Annaji - succeeded in founding baronial families or
The only assignments of land which Shivaji permitted were for the 
endowment of temples and charities, which being public Trusts 
managed by non-military officials, were in no way dangerous to 
the State.
bequeathing large landed estates as did Shahu's ministers in the first
half of the eighteenth century. All officers of Shivaji, from the
Senapati down to the lowest sepoy or servant drew a fixed salary from
the public treasury and granaries. Shivaji did not also permit public 
offices to become hereditary in particular families.
This situation changed within a few decades of Shivaji's 
death. The execution of Sambhaji by the Emperor Aurangzeb and the 
subsequent exile of the Maratha durbar threw the Maratha State into 
confusion. The exigencies of the time and especially the task of 
re-conquering Maharashtra from the Mughals gave prominence to military 
prowess. Promises of grants of jagirs were held out to able soldiers 
as an inducement to expel the Mughals and even to extend Maratha 
influence further afield. In this way the Gaikwads, the Bhonslas 
and the Powars set themselves up virtually as sovereigns of Gujerat, 
Berar and Malwa respectively; and after the rise to power of the 
Peshwas, they defied or obeyed the Poona Government as suited their 
£
purposes. Under these circumstances, it became necessary for the 
Peshwas to devise means of counterbalancing the power of these Chiefs
Even before the death of Shahu Raja, the jealousy aroused by the 
Peshwa's growing ascendancy over the Raja portended the future 
course of events. For instance, in 1731, this jealousy resulted 
in a civil war between Peshwa Baji Rao Bullal and Senapati Trimbak 
Rao Dabhade in which the latter was killed. Again in 1743 a 
similar civil war nearly broke out between the Peshwa Balaji Baji 
Rao (Nana Saheb) and Raghuji Bhonsla. Soon after Shahu's death 
in December 1749, the Peshwa again had to face a strong rebellion 
of Yashvantrao Dabhade and Damaji Gaikwad.
whose turbulence threatened the very existence of the Poona Government. 
The Peshwas also had to overawe the ancient Jagirdars who resented the 
authority of the new Government at Poona. The Peshwas found the answer 
in the creation of a new social group of Brahmin landholders who owed 
their position entirely to themselves. As such, this group of land­
holders possessed a vested interest in the Poona regime. Moreover, 
they were bound to the Peshwas by ties of religion and caste. By the 
closing years of the eighteenth century, however, the new landholders 
or Southern Jagirdars had become a source of weakness rather than of 
strength to the Peshwa1s Government.
Prominent among the Southern Jagirdars of the early years of 
the nineteenth century were the Patwardhans, Rastia, Gokhale, Appa Desai 
and the Desai of Kittur. Though generally so called, these landholders 
were strictly speaking not Jagirdars as they did not hold their estates 
known as saranjams by feudal tenure. On the contrary, they were merely 
entrusted with the administration of their estates on behalf of the 
Peshwa; and they were expected to apply the revenues accruing from them 
to the maintenance of a body of troops of fixed numbers, description 
and pay.^ For this service, these Chiefs (or Jagirdars as they were
See G. S. Sardesai (ed.), Poona Residency Correspondence, (Bombay, 
1950) Vol.xii, p.81 .
All payments were made under the inspection and control of Darakhdars, 
officers appointed directly by the Peshwa and accountable to him 
for the annual audit of the accounts of the saranjams. In certain 
cases, some of the relatives and ministerial officers of the 
Jagirdars also received fixed allowances.
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commonly called) received fixed annual allowances. Their troops 
could be mustered as often as the Peshwa wished; and the pay of any 
absentees was to be refunded by them. No men were to be adjudged fit 
unless they were of a certain description and mounted on horses of 
certain value. All the expenses of the saranjamy troops were to be
g
defrayed from the assigned revenue. Between them, the Patwardhans, 
Gokhale, Rastia, Appa Desai and the Desai of Kittur, not to mention 
the smaller Jagirdars, maintained an army that was about twice as 
strong as that under the Peshwa's direct control. Put in another 
way, at the beginning of the nineteenth century these Jagirdars 
controlled more power in the Maratha State than the Peshwa's Government 
at Poona.
The Patwardhans were the descendants of Hari Bhat, a Konkan 
Brahmin priest. His three sons Govind Rao Hari, Ramchander Hari and 
Trimbak Hari became military officers in the service of the Poona 
Government. In 1764 Peshwa Madhu Rao I granted a saranjam in the name 
of Govind Rao, and from it personal allowances were fixed for his 
nephews Parashuram Bhau and Neelkunt Rao. In return for these allow­
ances, they were required to contribute 2,400 and 1,000 troops
9respectively out of the total of 8,000 due from Govind Rao. On the 
death of Govind Rao, a new Tynaut Zaubtah was issued in the name of
8 P.R. C., Vol.xii, p.87
P. R.C., Vol.xii, p.829
Wauman Rao, his son; and after Wauman's death, in the name of Chintaman 
Rao, grandson of Wauman Rao.
The saranjam of the Patwardhan family which lay north of the
Kistna was divided into four distinct, but unequal, parts at the
beginning of the nineteenth century. Chintaman Rao, the nominal chief
of the Patwardhan family, resided at Sangli near the confluence of the
Varna and the Kistna, and to the north-west of Miraj. His estate formed
a third of the lands owned by the Patwardhan family. He was 'a capricious
and irritable chieftain', 'too haughty and unruly'.^ Trimbak Rao
Neelkunt lived at Kurrundwad south of the Kistna and south west of Miraj.
Narrayan Rao Gangadhar lived at Miraj.^ Appa Saheb who was commonly
regarded as the head of the Patwardhan family was, like Chintaman Rao,
also of a turbulent disposition. Besides his jagir at Tasgaon, he
12possessed certain districts in Savanur. The value of the saranjam
K. Ballhatchet, Social Policy and Social change in Western India 
1817-1830 (London, 1957), p.52 .
In 1782 Miraj passed into the hands of Chintaman Rao, then only a 
child of six. He was therefore placed under the guardianship of 
his uncle Gangadhar Rao or Balia Saheb who usurped Miraj and other 
places during the minority of his ward. These places were confirmed 
to Narrayan Rao Gangadhar, son of Balia Saheb, in about 1809 by a 
sanad from the Peshwa. Thus Narrayan Rao did not derive his lands 
from the original tripartite division of Govind Rao's saranjam.
(See Aitchison, Treaties and Sanads, Third Edition (Calcutta, 1892), 
Vol.vii, p.187 .
Appa Saheb inherited his lands in Savanur from his father, Parashuram 
Bhau. During the third Mysorean war, Parashuram Bhau received orders 
from the Peshwa to raise a large body of troops in excess of his 
saranjamy quota; and on the conclusion of the war, Parashuram Bhau 
was given the conquered countries including Savanur in payment of 
the expenses he had incurred in maintaining those troops.
20.
of the Patwardhans was fixed at Rs.25,20,568. But the revenue from
the lands assigned to them appeared never to have exceeded Rs.24,00,000. 
Therefore the number of troops due from them was subsequently reduced 
from the original number of 8,000 first to 6,597 and again to 5,850, 
after the occupation of part of their saranjamy lands by Sindhia in 1800.^
Madhu Rao Rastia was Jagirdar of Wai. The first grant of
saranjamy lands to his family was made in about 1757 when Anand Rao
Bheekaji received lands to the value of Rs.10,00,000. Of this amount
nine lacs were for the support of 3,000 horse. In 1811 the saranjamy
lands of Madhu Rao Rastia were valued at Rs.10,41,008. His quota of
16troops was 3,302 horsemen. Madhu Rao was a man of insignificant 
17talents.
Bapuji Gokhale inherited part of his saranjam from his uncle, 
Dhoondoo.Pant, who was originally an officer in the service of
14
13
14
15
16
17
Aitchison, Treaties and Sanads, Third Edition (Calcutta, 1892), 
Vol.vii, p.187 .
P.R.C.a Vol.xii, p.84 .
P. R. C., Vol.xii, p.84. The revenues and troops were divided among the 
four Patwardhan chiefs as follows:
Revenue Horse Revenue
Chintaman Rao 1,800 7,13,623
Appa Saheb 2,000 7,54,319
Trimbak Rao 750 2,35,238
Narrayan Rao 1,300 4,50,762
P.R.C.a Vol.xii, p.84 .
P.R.C., Vol.xii}., p.210 .
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Parashuram Bhau. Dhoondoo Pant later entered the service of the Peshwa
and received the districts of Noulgoond and Gudduk as saranjam for the
maintenance of half of his troops. The other half was paid from the 
18treasury. These lands lay near the western frontier of Hyderabad south of
the Malpurba and north of the Tungabhadra. When Dhoondoo Pant was killed
at the beginning of Colonel Wellesley's campaign against the freebooter
Dhondiah Waugh (1800), Bapuji Gokhale inherited his uncle's saranjam.
This was later increased by the Peshwa on the recommendation of the
Government of India. By 1811 Gokhale's saranjamy lands were worth only
seven lacs of Rupees although he was entitled to lands worth Rs.11,21,500.
The troops which he was required to maintain numbered 2,200 cavalry and 
192,500 infantry. Gokhale was 'a steady, brave and respectable chief
20and one of the ablest men in the State of Poona' .
Appa Desai was hereditary Desai of Nipani, and was first 
employed in the service of the Raja of Kolhapur. Later he entered the 
service of Sindhia. In 1803 he entered the Peshwa's service and received 
a saranjam worth Rs.10,00,000. His quota of troops comprised 2,000
21horse and 500 foot. His own country was worth about Rs.60,000 a year.
Appa Desai was 'violent, oppressive and unruly, but active, energetic
22and much dreaded by his neighbours'.
18 P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.85.
^  P*R* C* * Vol.xii, p.85.
20 P.R.C., Vol.xiii, p.209.
^  P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.86.
^  P.R.C., Vol.xiii, p.209.
The lands of the Desai of Kittur lay south of the Malpurba.
His territories were ceded by Tipu Sultan of Mysore to the Marathas to
whom he was for a long time tributary. He only became a military chief
in the service of the Peshwa in about 1810 when he received a saranjam
in the name of his son. His saranjam was worth only Rs.1,49,900 for
which he was required to maintain 473 horsemen. The revenue yielded
23by his own country was about four lacs of Rupees.
As the Peshwa1s authority decayed, their enormous financial
and military resources enabled the Southern Jagirdars to defy his
Government and to hold his person in contempt. Peshwa Baji Rao was,
however, too 'tenacious of authority' to tolerate such insubordination.
As a man, he was courteous, dignified in his manners and generally
speaking, humane; but he could also be 'vindictive in the extreme.'
He never forgot an injury and spared 'no machinations to ruin the object
24of his resentment'. Peshwa Baji Rao was no stranger to adversity.
He was born on January 10 1775. His father was Raghunath Rao (brother 
of Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao) who acted as Regent during the minority of 
his nephew Madhu Rao, and again during the minority of Peshwa Narrayan 
Rao, brother of Madhu Rao. Baji Rao spent much of his early life
23 P.R.C.a Vol.xii, p.86 .
24 P.R.C., Vol.xii, pp.466-467; see also T. E. Colebrooke, Life of 
the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone (two volumes, London 1884), 
Vol.1, pp.287-289.
sharing his father's exile at Kopargaon. In October 1792, he was
confined at Anandvalli near Nasik with his mother and brothers,
Chimnaji Appa and Amrit Rao (the adopted son of his father). After
his mother's death in 1794, he and his brothers were transferred to the
2 6hill fort of Shivner in Junnar. There Nana Fadnavis kept him under 
close watch to frustrate his communications with his childless cousin 
Peshwa Savai Madhu Rao. After several vicissitudes, Baji Rao eventually 
became Peshwa at the end of 1796. Between 1804 and 1811 he struggled 
hard to re-assert his authority in Maharashtra.
ii. The crisis in the Maratha State and the policy of Non­
intervention, 1804—1811.
By the beginning of 1804, the Peshwa's Government had practically
The civil war in the Maratha State was triggered off by the suspicion 
that Raghunath Rao was responsible for the death of Peshwa Narrayan 
Rao in 1773. By Article 6 of the Treaty of Salbai (1782) which 
ended the First Maratha war, Raghunath Rao was permitted to choose 
a place of residence outside Poona. He chose Kopargaon on the Godavery.
Nana Fadnavis was a shrewd statesman and a great Maratha patriot.
He played the leading role in the Ministry (Regency Council) set up 
in 1773 following the death of Peshwa Narrayan Rao. On the accession 
of Baji Rao to the Peshwaship in 1796, Nana Fadnavis's fortunes 
declined. He was imprisoned for nearly a year in Ahmednagar fort; 
but in October 1798, he was released and asked to resume control of 
Baji Rao's administration. Nana's death on 13 March 1800 marked the 
'end of all the wisdom and moderation of the Mahratha government'.
See Grant Duff, History of the Mahrathas, Vol.ii, p.350; H.H. Dodwell 
(ed.), Cambridge History of India, (Cambridge, 1929) Vol.v, p.372 .
ceased to exist. In a letter to the Governor-General, General Wellesley
observed:
In fact, my Lord, the Peshwah's government is at 
present only a name. His Highness has not settled 
even the country along the Beemah, 5 miles from 
Poonah. It is at this moment a dreary waste, 
overrun by thieves: and his Highness is incapable 
of conducting his government himself: he gives 
no confidence or power to any body, and he has no 
person about him able to conduct the common 
business of the country. 27
Four months later, General Wellesley again commented on the state of the 
Peshwa1s Government in a letter to Colonel Close:
It now appears that the Peshwah is not supported 
by a single Mahratha sirdar or horseman, that he 
does not enjoy any revenue, and that he has no 
means whatsoever of supporting his own authority. 
The records at Poonah will show that he lately 
applied to me to take measures to catch thieves 
who had taken refuge in the jungles; and it now 
appears that, in order to enable the Peshwah to 
carry on his government at all, the country must 
be conquered again by the British troops. 28
It was this extreme weakness of the Peshwa's Government that forced him 
to swallow his pride and accept the subsidiary Treaty of Bassein in 
December 1802. By the turn of the eighteenth century, he had lost his
27
28
Sydney Owen (ed.), A Selection from the Wellington Despatches, 
(Oxford, 1880) pp.364-65, General Arthur Wellesley to Lord 
Wellesley, 15 January 1804. (Emphasis mine.)
Ibid., pp.393-94, General Wellesley to Colonel Close, 12 May 1804. 
(Empha sis mine.)
authority over the Confederate Chiefs as well as the Jagirdars of
Maharashtra who were under his immediate authority. The treaty of
Bassein placed the Confederate Chiefs beyond the scope of his authority;
but it committed the Government of India to assist him to re-establish
29his authority over Maharashtra. Accordingly after the war with the 
Confederate Chiefs which followed the signing of the Treaty, the Peshwa 
invoked British aid in subjugating the disobedient Jagirdars.
On 1 March 1804 Peshwa Baji Rao sent his Minister, Sadashiv
Mankeshwar, to General Arthur Wellesley to complain about the conduct
of the Patwardhans 'who had refused to attend to his requisition and
30had returned to the south contrary to positive orders'. The Minister
stated that it was his Highness' wish to reward Gokhale and Appa Desai
who had served in the late war 'with the lands held by the chiefs of
the family of Pursheram Bhow, by Prittee Niddee, and by Rastia; and he
asked whether the principle of rewarding those who did serve, and of
31punishing those who did not, was not fair?' The Minister further 
told General Wellesley that the Peshwa expected to accomplish his object 
with the assistance of the Government of India. He then gave General 
Wellesley 'the choice of two plans, either to begin with the family of
See above p.14, footnote no.4 .
P. C. Gupta, Ba.ji Rao II and the East India Company 1796-1818, 
(London, 1939) p. 80 .
Sydney J. Owen, Wellington Despatches, p.380 .
Pursheram Bhow, or with Rastia and Prittee Niddee; and to deceive, in
32the mean time, that party whose destruction might be delayed1.
General Wellesley tried to dissuade the Peshwa from such a
course of action. He referred to the weakness of the Peshwa's Government
and expressed the fear that the whole of the Southern Jagirdars might
unite in common hostility to the Poona Government. The General pointed
out that the disorders and confusion which would result from such a
civil war might tempt a foreign enemy to interfere in the Maratha State.
He advised the Peshwa that it would be better for him to forget the
bitterness and humiliations of the last civil war and to 'endeavour,
by pardon and conciliation, to settle his government and country, than
to enter on any system of revenge so extensive as that proposed, and
33so dangerous and so imprudent'. In any case, General Wellesley told 
the Minister that the Peshwa's request for British assistance could not 
be granted without orders from the Governor-General.
On 7 March 1804 General Wellesley reported the Peshwa's 
policy to the Governor-General; and suggested that in its own interest, 
the Government of India should intervene to settle the disputes between 
the Peshwa and the Jagirdars.
There is no doubt whatever [General Wellesley 
observed] that the Peshwah's government cannot 
exist on its present footing. Unless the British
32 Ibid., p.380
33 Ibid., p.380
government interfere in same manner respecting 
the southern jaghiredars, there will be a contest 
in the southern part of the Empire, which will, 
in its consequences, affect Mysore and the Company's 
territories. They will be obliged to interfere in 
the end, probably with less effect than they can 
at present, and in the meantime all the benefit 
of the services of the southern chiefs and their 
troops is entirely lost. 34.
Arthur Wellesley suggested four alternative lines of action: First, 
to assist the Peshwa in the destruction of the Southern Jagirdars; 
second, to observe absolute neutrality in the disputes between the 
Peshwa and the Jagirdars; third, to interfere to oblige the Jagirdars 
to perform their customary service under British guarantee of their 
lands as long as they faithfully served the Peshwa; fourth, to convert 
the Jagirdars at once into independent States under the protection and 
guarantee of the Government of India.
General Wellesley then proceeded to examine the merit of each
of his propositions. He felt that if the first was adopted and the
settlement of the country was subsequently left in the hands of the
Peshwa, the new political order which would emerge in the Maratha
State would 'not be so advantageous to the British government as that
35which exists at present'. If the second was adopted, he feared 
that it would result in a long contest of doubtful result. The
Ibid., p.382. (Emphasis mine.) The Company's territories (Kanara) 
which bordered on Southern Maharashtra were obtained from Mysore 
as a result of the Anglo-Mysorean wars of 1790 and 1799.
35 Ibid., p.391 .
resources of the country would be destroyed; communications between 
Mysore and Poona would be disrupted; vast bodies of freebooters might 
gather in the southern provinces of the Maratha State and in close 
proximity to British territories. These developments would ultimately 
oblige the Government of India to interfere to safeguard the security 
and peace of its own territories as well as those of the Raja of Mysore. 
The fourth might best ensure the security of British territories but 
it would be tantamount to an unjust expropriation. General Wellesley 
therefore thought that the third proposition would be the best course 
of action for the Government of India to take.
The Governor-General approved of General Wellesley's suggestion
and empowered him to arbitrate the disputes between the Peshwa and the
Southern Jagirdars. On 8 July 1804 Mr. Strachey was appointed arbitrator
and instructed to start with Appa Saheb commonly regarded as head of
36the Patwardhan family. Under the terms proposed by the Government
Ibid., pp.403-404. The terms offered were as follows:
i. There was to be mutual forgiveness and pardon of all injuries 
on both sides. The Government of India was to guarantee the 
security of the persons of Appa Saheb, his brothers, relations 
and adherents so long as they served the Peshwa faithfully and 
refrained from all intrigues with his enemies.
ii. Appa Saheb, his brothers, etc., were to hold the lands mentioned 
in their Sanads under the guarantee of the Government of India 
as long as their conduct towards the Peshwa was proper. The 
lands to be so guaranteed were to be settled by arbitration with 
due regard to the claims of the Peshwa and the counter claims 
of Appa Saheb.
iii. In view of the ruin which his lands had suffered from the civil 
wars, Appa Saheb was not to be required to furnish at any time 
more than two-thirds of his stipulated saranjamy force. This
of India, Appa Saheb was to restore all the lands he had usurped.
In return, his quota of saranjamy troops was to be reduced; and the 
Government of India was to guarantee the security of his lands, his 
person and those of his brothers, relations and partisans. Mr. Strachey 
was instructed to allow the Jagirdars to settle their disputes directly 
with the Peshwa if they preferred that to his mediation. Rastia and 
Appa Saheb welcomed British mediation and agreed to go to Poona; Chin- 
taman Rao, however, spurned Mr. Strachey1s proposals. During the next 
few months, the war with Holkar assumed alarming dimensions. As a 
result the settlement with the Jagirdars was suspended. When the subject 
was renewed by the Peshwa after the war with Holkar, the Resident at 
Poona was instructed to refrain from interference in the disputes. This 
was in line with the policy of non-intervention or 'ring-fence', which 
was rehabilitated by Lord Cornwallis who succeeded Lord Wellesley as 
Governor-General in July 1805.
Irrespective of British policy, however, Peshwa Baji Rao was 
determined to press on with his policy of dispossessing the Southern 
Jagirdars. His efforts, however, proved indecisive and hampered the
reduced quota was, however, to be produced whenever it was 
demanded. One-third of it was to be permanently stationed 
at Poona under the command of a member of the Patwardhan 
family, the security of whose person was to be guaranteed 
by the Government of India.
iv. Appa Saheb and his relations were to restore to the Peshwa 
all lands which they held without authority.
restoration of stability in the Maratha State. Between 1806 and 1811
rebellions and disorders prevailed everywhere. At the beginning of
1806 fighting broke out between the troops of the late Killadar of
Savanur and troops of the Peshwa's agent. The former were assisted by
37some of the chiefs south of the Kistna. In the same year, the Pant 
Pratinidhi who had escaped from his prison in the fort of Mhasvad 
declared himself a servant of the Raja of Satara and under no obligation 
to obey the Peshwa. In the name of the Raja, he embarked upon a career 
of plunder and devastation. In March 1806 he was defeated by Gokhale 
who had not yet rebelled against Baji Rao's authority. The Pratinidhi 
was brought to Poona and imprisoned. A small portion of his extensive 
jagir was reserved for his maintenance, and the rest sequestrated.
By 1811 the Peshwa's efforts had been partially rewarded. 
Besides the Pratinidhi's estates, Peshwa Baji Rao had succeeded in 
seizing several of the estates of the weaker Jagirdars. Encouraged by 
these successes, his policy towards Rastia and the Patwardhans became 
more and more vindictive. The prospect of a long civil war in districts 
which lay in close proximity to British territories began to worry the 
Government of India. In fact a stage had been reached in the affairs 
of the Maratha State which the Government of India could not safely 
ignore, and British intervention in some form or the other in the 
affairs of Maharashtra seemed inevitable.
P. C. Gupta, Baji Rao II and the East India Company, p.87
iii. British intervention and the Treaty of Pandharpur.
After the failure of Mr. Strachey's mission in 1804, the 
problem of the Southern Jagirdars did not engage the serious attention 
of the Government of India again till 1811 when Mountstuart Elphinstone 
assumed duty as British Resident at Poona. Born on 6 October 1779 to 
General Lord Elphinstone, eleventh baron in the peerage of Scotland, 
Mountstuart Elphinstone arrived in Bengal in 1796 as a writer at the 
age of sixteen. In 1801 at the age of twenty-two, he was transferred 
to the Political Department or Diplomatic Service and appointed to 
Poona as Assistant to the Resident, Colonel Barry Close. He served in 
this capacity till December 1803 when he was transferred from Poona to 
Nagpur. He was with General Wellesley at Assaye and earned the following 
r ecommendat ion:
He is well versed in the languages, has experience 
and a knowledge of the interests of the Mahratta 
powers, and their relations with each other, and 
with the British Government and its allies. 38.
Mountstuart Elphinstone was thus suitably qualified for the post of 
Resident at Poona. He proved to be a shrewd diplomat with a perceptive 
mind.
G. W. Forrest (ed.), Selections from the Minutes and other Official 
Writings of the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, (London, 1884) 
p.20, General Wellesley to the Governor-General, December 1803.
Also J. S. Cotton, Rulers of India, Mountstuart Elphinstone, 
(Oxford, 1896) pp.17,44 .
During the first three months of Elphinstone's stay at Poona,
Baji Rao importuned him with complaints against nearly all of the
Southern Jagirdars. He complained about Appa Saheb's retention of
the fort of Hoobly contrary to his agreement with Mr. Russell, Mount-
39stuart Elphinstone's predecessor. The Peshwa considered the conduct
of Appa Saheb as proof of his recalcitrance for which the least
40punishment should be the confiscation of his saranjam.
The Peshwa's Minister, Sadashiv Mankeshwar, recounted all
the instances of Appa Saheb's disobedience since Baji Rao became
Peshwa. These included Appa Saheb's appropriation of certain districts
in Savanur which he surrendered only after being threatened with an
41attack by the subsidiary force. Appa Saheb was also alleged to
Appa Saheb had after a long negotiation promised Mr. Russell (then 
Acting Resident at Poona) to restore fourteen districts which he 
held without Sanads in Savanur and elsewhere. At the time of 
Mr. Russell's departure from Poona, he had actually surrendered 
thirteen. But nearly four months after he made the promise, he 
still retained possession of the fourteenth district, namely 
Hoobly, with no intention of giving it up. On the contrary, he 
moved the Governor's family from Tasgaon to Hoobly to join him.
In a defiant letter which he sent in reply to Elphinstone's note 
calling on him to fulfil his promise, Appa Saheb stated that he 
would surrender the fort only 'when an order and guns and infantry 
and other requisites come from the Government'. (G. S. Sardesai,
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.4 .
40 G. S. Sardesai, P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.8 .
41 The Minister alleged that Appa Saheb had begged the Peshwa to entrust 
him with the settlement of the province of Savanur. He had 
deliberately protracted the war and occupied part of the conquered 
province for ten months while his troops lived in free quarters in 
the Peshwa's country. He had seized the officers of the former 
Governor and ignored repeated orders to send them to Poona. He
33.
have disobeyed orders to march his troops against the Pindaris when
43they threatened the Peshwa's territories.
42
The Peshwa also complained against the insolence of Madhu
Rao Rastia. Rastia had promised to surrender certain districts which
he held without Sanads on condition of the payment of a certain sum by
the Peshwa. Baji Rao alleged that though he had advanced the sum of
Rs.2,50,000 and offered to remit his claims to the accumulated revenues
of the districts concerned, yet Rastia still refused to surrender the
44fort of Bedaumy, the most important of the districts in question.
As for Gokhale, he had retained the whole of the extensive 
jagir of the Pratinidhi (valued at Rs.18,00,000) since he occupied it 
in 1805. He had neither accounted for the revenues nor obeyed repeated 
orders to hand over the jagir to another officer. Baji Rao demanded 
the surrender of the territory and an account of the whole of the 
revenues collected from it. He indicated that he was ready to deposit 
at the British Residency the sum of Rs.37,00,000 claimed by Gokhale as
had appropriated all the public and private property which fell 
into his hands; and had retained possession of the districts which 
he had subdued till threatened with a joint attack by the Peshwa's 
troops and the subsidiary force. Appa Saheb then promised Mr. 
Russell that he would surrender the districts and account for the 
revenues collected in ten days.
42
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The Pindaris were a band of freebooters whose haunts lay in the 
valley of the Narbada.
G. S. Sardesai, P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.13 .
P.R.C. , Vol.xii, pp.8-9, 32-33.
reimbursement for the expenses he incurred in taking possession of the
jagir. The Peshwa further complained that Gokhale had refused to permit
his agents to enter the Pratinidhi's fort of Purchetgur. Instead,
45Gokhale had persuaded the garrison to surrender it to himself.
After these complaints, Baji Rao outlined his policy to
Mountstuart Elphinstone. He regarded the Southern Jagirdars as rebels
and traitors and stated his desire to dismiss them all from his service.
His Minister told Elphinstone that the enmity between the Patwardhan
family and the Peshwa was implacable. He alleged that Appa Saheb had
always disobeyed the Peshwa and that the Poona Government derived no
benefit from his saranjamy troops. Therefore the Peshwa wished to
transfer his lands to other Sardars. Baji Rao was also determined to
deprive Gokhale of his entire jagir and to devote its revenues to the
maintenance of a body of troops to be paid directly from his treasury
47and to be commanded by officers chosen by himself. He requested
Elphinstone to send at least two battalions of the subsidiary force to
assist his troops at Belgaum to recover Hoobly and to intimidate the
48other Jagirdars into submitting to his demands.
45 P.R.C., Vol.xii, pp.25,31.
46 P.R.C.a Vol.xii, p.9. Mountstuart Elphinstone to the Governor- 
General, 13 April 1811.
47 P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.25. Elphinstone to the Hon. the Vice-President,
16 June 1811.
48 P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.14. Elphinstone to the Vice-President in Council,
9 May 1811.
The Government of India was not inclined to encourage the 
Peshwa's policy because it was fraught with danger to the security of 
British territories in south India. The security of these territories 
had been a matter of concern to the Government of India ever since 1800, 
that is, even before the Treaty of Bassein was signed. In that year, 
General Wellesley drew attention to the political instability in the 
southern Maratha country and recommended that
in order to insure the tranquillity of our own 
territories, it will be necessary that we should 
take some steps to remedy the deficiency in the 
government of our neighbours, which has endangered 
it, and has been the cause of the expense which 
has been incurred in the assembling of the troops 
under my command. 49.
In General Wellesley's view, the best way of ensuring the tranquillity 
of British territories in south India was to maintain the integrity of 
the estates of the Patwardhan family and to use them as a bulwark against 
inroads from the Maratha State. He regarded the Patwardhan family as 
the best friends which the Government of India had in the Maratha State.
He recalled the services of Parashuram Bhau in the army under his command 
during the third Mysorean war, as well as those of his sons and relatives 
during the campaign against Dhoondia Waugh. He did not therefore consider 
it prudent for the Government of India to connive at their destruction.
Sydney J. Owen (ed.), Wellington Despatches, p.192. Letter dated 
27 July 1800. (Emphasis mine.)
The Putwurdhun family, [he pointed out] connected.,... 
as they are with the British government, are certainly 
the most respectable of all the Peshwah's subjects 
properly so called. They a re the support of the 
system of order which exists on the Company's 
frontier, and on the frontier of Mysore; and they 
are a check to the nest of freebooters kept by the 
Rajah of Kolapoor, and to the numerous polygars who 
inhabit the countries watered by the Kistna, Malpoorba, 
and Gutpurba. 50.
Thus, even long before the Peshwa unfolded his plans of crushing 
the Patwardhans to the British Authorities, they had been considering the 
contrary policy of preserving the Patwardhans as a bulwark for their own 
territories in southern India as well as those of their allies.
For this reason and in the interest of general tranquillity in 
India, Elphinstone tried to prevail upon the Peshwa to abandon his 
policy of destroying the Southern Jagirdars. He did not dispute the 
Peshwa's right to insist on the recovery of Hoobly and its revenue which 
Appa Saheb had already promised to refund. But he thought that these 
objectives could be attained without the use of force. He tried to 
extenuate Appa Saheb's misconduct and urged the Peshwa to forget the 
indignities which he had suffered at the hands of the Patwardhan family 
in the past. Elphinstone pleaded that it would be unwise for the Peshwa 
to destroy the ancient families in the Maratha State. He was of the 
opinion that violence towards Appa Saheb would harden resistance by the 
other Jagirdars. The Resident offered to write to warn Appa Saheb
Ibid., p.375. General Wellesley to Lieutenant-Colonel Close,
23 February 1804. (Emphasis mine.)
G. S. Sardesai (ed.), P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.14. Elphinstone to the 
Vice-President in Council, 9 May 1811.
that unless he evacuated Hoobly before the Peshwa's troops moved from
Belgaum, the subsidiary force would be used to assist in expelling him.
52In that case, the Peshwa's expenses would be charged to him. As for 
the use of the subsidiary force to intimidate the other Jagirdars, the 
Resident declined to consider the request until he was satisfied 
with the justice of His Highness's claims against them. He also wished 
to convince himself that all peaceful avenues of settlement had been 
exhausted.
With regard to the Peshwa's decision to dismiss the Jagirdars
from his service and create an army under his own direct authority,
Elphinstone expressed strong disapproval. Particularly, he did not
wish the Peshwa and the allies to lose the services of Gokhale. The
increasing raids of the Pindaris into the Deccan necessitated that
the allies should maintain their armies in an efficient state for the
defence of their territories. It was clear to the Resident that this
53would be difficult under the Peshwa's proposed scheme. As the 
proposed army was to be paid directly from the treasury, Elphinstone
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.15 .
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.25 . Elphinstone to the Honourable the Vice- 
President, 16 June 1811. Elphinstone commented:
'The Paishwa's plan of maintaining an army to be paid from his 
treasury, certainly at first sight presents many advantages, but 
when they are examined, none will be found to compensate for the 
loss of such a force as Gokla's. From the careless and indolent 
character that pervades every department of the Paishwa's Govern­
ment, it is highly improbable that the proposed branch of the army 
will ever be diligently attended to.'
concluded that there would be no permanent endowment for its main­
tenance. He feared that the pay of the troops would fall into arrears 
and lead to false musters. Besides, the commanders of the proposed 
army were likely to be selected from among court favourites and might 
prove to be unfit for their duties. In short, Elphinstone feared that 
under the proposed scheme, the burden of defending the Peshwa1s State 
might fall almost entirely on British troops. For these reasons
Elphinstone was opposed to 'the sacrifice of any part of his [i.e.,the
54Peshwa's] efficient army'.
Elphinstone was left in no doubt that Baji Rao was determined 
to assert his sovereignty over the Jagirdars. He became convinced that 
the longer the Jagirdars resisted the Peshwa's demands, the more 
relentless Baji Rao would become in his decision to seize their entire 
saranjams. He was equally convinced that the Peshwa would continue 
to press his right to the service of the subsidiary force in carrying 
out his policy. Therefore he thought that it would be expedient to 
use the subsidiary force to compel Appa Saheb to fulfil his promise 
to Mr. Russell, in the hope that this would intimidate the others and 
facilitate their quiet submission to the Peshwa. Such a quiet sub­
mission, the Resident thought, would gratify the Peshwa's pride and 
incline him to listen to an intercession on behalf of the Southern 
Jagirdars. Unfortunately, the orders of the Government of India to
W T
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P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.26 .54
&
Mr. Russell about the use of the subsidiary force were so explicit 
that the Resident did not consider himself at liberty to employ it for 
such a purpose without authority from the Governor-General. Accordingly, 
he sought permission from the Government of India to employ the force 
as a last resort to compel Appa Saheb to fulfil an agreement which was
55concluded through the mediation of the Government of India.
In July 1811 the Government of India laid down certain 
principles for the guidance of Mountstuart Elphinstone in handling the 
disputes between the Peshwa and the Jagirdars. It recognised the 
predicament of the Peshwa and sympathised with his desire to possess 
an army under his direct command. It realised that the possession of 
such an army would reduce his dependence on the service of his feudal 
chiefs whose individual resources and power often placed them beyond 
his control. Nevertheless, for the sake of the security of its 
territories which adjoined those of the Southern Jagirdars, the 
Government of India was opposed to the Peshwa's policy of raising a 
new army through the seizure of the estates of the Southern Jagirdars.
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.17 . Elphinstone to the Vice-President in 
Council, 9 May 1811. The required permission was given at the end 
of May. But the Resident decided to postpone action against Appa 
Saheb till the Government of India decided on a general policy to 
be pursued towards the entire body of Jagirdars. In this way, 
the Resident thought that the subsidiary force might be used to 
subdue the entire body of the Jagirdars in one single operation 
and thus save effort and expenditure.
To reduce [the Vice-President in Council told 
Elphinstone] but not to extinguish the power of 
the Jagheerdars, to recover from them their usurpa­
tions and the just demands of the State are wise 
and legitimate purposes and the aid of the British 
Government by which alone he can hope to attain 
them, cannot perhaps in due season be withheld,
But the measures to be adopted would require a 
degree of deliberation, prudence and moderation, 
with which the violence and precipitation of the 
proceedings meditated by the Paishwa are entirely 
inconsistent and from the prosecution of which the 
British Government has a right to withhold him. 56
Thus by July 1811 the Government of India had come to recognise 
that its intervention in the political crisis in the Maratha State was 
inevitable. The intervention was necessitated by the need to strengthen 
the Poona Government as well as the need to maintain the tranquillity 
of British territories in south India. Nevertheless, the Government 
of India wanted to play for more time. It not only wished to bring 
about a settlement on its own terms, but it also wished to choose a 
time that suited its own convenience for the intervention. For the 
moment its attention was engrossed by events outside I n d i a . I t  did 
not therefore wish the Peshwa's disputes with his Jagirdars to be 
seriously agitated at this period. For this reason it censured
P.R.C., Vol.xii, pp.42-43. N. B. Edmonstone to Mountstuart 
Elphinstone, 12 July 1811. (Emphasis mine.)
Between March and September 1811 Lord Minto, the Governor-General, 
was away from India on his expedition against Java.
Elphinstone for applying directly to the Poona Durbar for details of
58the Peshwa's claims on the Southern Jagirdars.
This desire to postpone British intervention in the crisis 
in the Maratha State was reiterated from time to time. Elphinstone was 
particularly reminded that in advising the Peshwa about his disputes 
with his Jagirdars, he should take care to
recommend those measures of cautious moderation, 
equity and justice which may preclude the necessity 
of having recourse to coercion, and the hazard of 
committing the British Government to the prosecu­
tion of military operations in support of his 
Highness's rights, and...rather discourage this 
course and advise (him to desist from) the immediate 
advancement of claims however just, which [he] may 
have reason to believe cannot be satisfied without 
the employment of a military force. 59
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.43 . Elphinstone was told: 'It was not the 
wish of Government that for a knowledge of these points, an appli­
cation should be made to the Durbar. Such an application must 
naturally be construed to imply that the British Government is 
prepared to enforce his Highness's claims and must suggest the 
supposition that a statement of them is demanded with a view to 
enforce them; and this effect of the application appears to have 
been present to your mind, as you observe that no application could 
be more welcome to his Highness's Government. On a reference however 
to the instructions of the 9th of February you will observe that 
Government was particularly anxious to avoid the predicament above 
described and accordingly after an explanation of the mode in which 
agreeably to the spirit of the alliance any claims on the part of 
the Paishwa involving the employment of the subsidiary force should 
be brought forward, it is added that it was not the wish of Govern­
ment that it should be suggested to the Paishwa to bring forward 
any demands or propose any arrangements of the nature antecedently 
described for the reasons thereinafter stated.' (Emphasis mine.)
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.46 . N. B. Edmonstone to Mountstuart Elphinstone, 
19 July 1811. (Emphasis mine. 'he' in the last but one line of 
quotation reads 'you' in the original.)
In spite, however, of the attempt to postpone British intervention in 
the crisis in southern Maharashtra, the Government of India was forced 
to intervene before long.
The threat posed to the security of the territories of the
British and their allies by the political crisis in the Maratha State
was not only a direct one. There was also an indirect threat. By
incapacitating the Peshwa1s Government, the crisis made the Maratha
State a weak link in the chain of defensive arrangements against the
Pindaris. Since 1809 these freebooters had been intensifying their
60raids into the Deccan. But the Government of India was powerless 
to take offensive measures against them because the Court of Directors 
was averse to such a course of action. The Directors were anxious to 
avoid war with Sindhia and Holkar who were patrons of the Pindaris.
The Government of India therefore had to content itself with taking 
measures to defend its frontiers and encouraging its allies to rely on 
their own exertions to defend theirs. Accordingly, the Resident urged 
the Peshwa to send troops to defend the northern frontier of his State. 
In the middle of August 1811 the Resident informed the Peshwa1s Minister 
that the only part of the common frontier which remained unprotected
At the beginning of 1809 the Pindaris under Ameer Khan invaded 
Berar. Because of Berar1s contiguity with Bengal, Lord Minto 
gave the Raja of Berar military aid to expel them though the 
Raja was not entitled to such aid.
was that of the Peshwa. He then inquired about the Peshwa1s plans 
for the defence of his State.
The Minister stated that His Highness had no other plans than 
to order the Southern Jagirdars to repair to the frontier with their 
contingents. But he complained that with the exception of Gokhale and 
Appa Desai, none of the Jagirdars had shown a willingness to obey the 
Peshwa's orders. The Minister expressed the hope that this new evidence 
of insubordination would convince the Resident of the necessity of 
confiscating their jagirs and devoting their revenues to the maintenance 
of an obedient army. He told Elphinstone further that the Peshwa expected 
the subsidiary force to assist his own force on the frontier if the 
Pindaris proved to be too formidable.
Elphinstone replied that though it was proper for the Peshwa 
to demand the service of the Jagirdars for the protection of his frontier, 
he ought not to rely too much on their support. Rather, he should 
endeavour to raise a force of his own for that purpose. As for the 
request for the assistance of the subsidiary force, the Resident refused 
to consider it. He told the Minister that the protection of the Peshwa's 
frontier was not a service for which the subsidiary force could be 
properly employed. Besides, infantry was useless against the Pindaris.
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.63 . Elphinstone told the Minister that the Raja 
of Berar was employing the whole of his resources against the 
Pindaris, He stated that the Nizam had 17,000 troops with a 
proportion of artillery on his frontier.
What was needed, he pointed out, was a body of light cavalry not for the
purpose of fighting the Pindaris but for chasing them out of his 
62country. He added that the only regiment of cavalry with the subsidiary 
force could not cope with the numerous bodies into which the Pindaris 
would divide. Consequently, he told the Minister that
His Highness must, therefore, of necessity depend 
entirely on his own resources for protection against 
the Pindarries; and...to take effectual measures 
to save his country from the grievous calamities 
to which it would be exposed, if he neglected to 
take the necessary precautions in time. 63
Elphinstone warned that if the Peshwa was reluctant to raise troops
from motives of parsimony, he ought to realise that every rupee he
64saved in this way might in the end cost him a thousand.
At the beginning of October 1811, the Resident revived the
discussion about the defence of the Peshwa1s frontier. He told the
6 5Peshwa that the number of troops which he had sent to the frontier 
was inadequate. He requested that the strength of the Peshwa1s force 
be increased till it was commensurate with that of the force to which 
it was to be opposed. The Resident reiterated that the subsidiary 
force could not be properly employed for the defence of the Peshwa1s
P.R.C.. Vol.xii, p.57 . Elphinstone to the Vice-President, 9 August 
1811.
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.64 . Elphinstone to the Vice-President, 18 August
1811.
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p. 64.
The troops consisted of about 2,000 Horse.
frontier against the Pindaris. He denied that the anticipated Pindari
inroads were formidable enough to justify their being regarded as an
invasion which required the services of the subsidiary force. The
Resident regretted that the Peshwa should have abolished the system
of Sibhandis throughout his dominions and thereby left his villages 
66undefended. He sympathised with the Peshwa's complaints against the 
Jagirdars. But he declared that since it was certain that their services 
could not be secured, the Peshwa had no alternative but to employ some 
other means for the defence of his State.
Peshwa Baji Rao became irritated. He told the Resident that
he had an adequate army for whose maintenance a great portion of his
resources was allotted. But its commanders disregarded his orders;
and instead of assisting him, they obliged him to employ some of his
6 7other troops in watching their movements. He told the Resident that 
if only the subsidiary force were sent to the frontier and the Jagirdars 
induced to send their contingents to supplement his levies, there would 
be nothing to fear from the Pindaris. He regretted that Elphinstone
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.73 . Elphinstone to His Excellency the Vice- 
President, 3 October 1811. The Resident estimated that the Peshwa 
had not a single soldier beyond his own 2,000 Horse, 500 of the 
Vinchur Jagirdar's and two battalions of infantry for the defence 
of his whole frontier. He thought that this made it easy for the 
Pindaris to plunder his open country and sack his villages up to 
Poona almost unopposed if they wished. The strength of the 
Pindaris was estimated at 25,000.
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.73 . Elphinstone to the Vice-President,
3 October 1811.
did not appreciate his point of view. He then remarked in exasperation
that the Southern Jagirdars could remain idle as Elphinstone seemed
to think advisable; and that the subsidiary force could also remain
at Seroor. But he warned that he could not be blamed if the small
68body of troops which he could assemble was overpowered.
The irritation felt by the Peshwa was not without justification.
He considered it unjust and redundant to be asked to incur the additional
expense of raising a new army besides the subsidiary force and his
saranjamy troops. He failed to understand why the Government of India
should indulge the Jagirdars and allow them to deny him the service of
the saranjamy troops under their command. To him, the attitude of the
Government of India was tantamount to a condonement of the rebellion of
the Jagirdars. This was clearly an infringement of Article 9 of the
69Treaty of Bassein.
It became clear to Elphinstone that British intervention in 
the disputes between the Peshwa and the Southern Jagirdars could not 
safely be postponed for too long. The Pindari raids were increasing 
daily, both in frequency and intensity. But until the Peshwa's 
disputes with the Jagirdars were settled, Baji Rao could not be relied 
upon to cooperate with the allies in checking the tide of Pindari
68 P.R.C.j Vol.xii, p.74 . Elphinstone to the Vice-President,
3 October 1811.
See above p.14, footnote no.4 .69
inroads into the Deccan and south India. The distracted state of his 
country was likely to offer free passage to these freebooters. Nor 
would he be able to fulfil his military obligations under the Treaty of 
Bassein in the event of the allies becoming involved in a serious w a r . ^  
Therefore Elphinstone sent a lengthy despatch to the Government of 
India in which he showed why British intervention could no longer be 
withheld.
Elphinstone first reviewed the reasons adduced by General 
Wellesley in favour of British intervention in the disputes between 
the Peshwa and the Jagirdars. He admitted that the harmful consequences 
anticipated by General Wellesley from a policy of neutrality had not 
materialised to any significant degree. But he thought that that happy 
situation was due to a number of fortuitous circumstances. In the first 
place, he believed that the Southern Jagirdars were unaware of the 
policy of non-intervention. He thought it possible that the Peshwa 
might have restrained the Jagirdars by sedulously insinuating that the 
Government of India was ready to punish any outrageous conduct on their 
part.
By the Fourth Supplementary Article to the Treaty of Bassein, the 
Peshwa was bound to provide and furnish a body of 5,000 cavalry 
and 3,000 infantry with due proportion of ordinance and military 
stores in time of war. (See C. U. Aitchison, op.cit., Vol.vi,p.61.)
Secondly, the Resident pointed out that in spite of the
policy of non-intervention, the Resident at Poona found it necessary
to interfere in the affairs of the Maratha State from time to time.
For instance, General Close on several occasions remonstrated with the
Jagirdars whenever their conduct threatened to disturb the public
peace. He did so either through their vakils or by letter. Though
these remonstrances were couched in the most cautious terms, Elphinstone
believed that they must have influenced the conduct of the Jagirdars
a great deal.^ Besides, a British force was kept on the Malpurba
during the war with the Confederate Chiefs to deter the Jagirdars from
72committing any excesses. Finally, Elphinstone attributed the relative 
tranquillity which prevailed in the southern Maratha country during 
this period partly to the disunity among the Jagirdars which precluded 
any concerted action on their part.
In spite of all these favourable circumstances, the Resident 
pointed out that the southern Maratha country was not entirely free 
from the threat of serious disturbances. He reminded the Government 
of India that soon after the Pratinidhi's rebellion, Chintaman Rao 
threatened to join him if the Peshwa took any violent measures against
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.96 . Elphinstone to Chief Secretary Edmonstone,
26 October 1811.
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.97 . General Close from one of his despatches 
to the Government of India dated 27 July 1805 seemed to have held 
the view that but for the presence of British forces on the Malpurba, 
it would have been impossible to have kept the Jagirdars in order.
him. Chintaman Rao eventually did and compelled the Peshwa to suspend 
his attack on the Pratinidhi for some time. Elphinstone believed that 
if the British troops were not fully occupied at the time with other 
duties, the Government of India would have authorised British inter­
vention to restrain both the Pratinidhi and Chintaman Rao. Since then, 
Chintaman Rao had on more than one occasion, attacked the Peshwa's 
estates as well as those of the Jagirdars loyal to the Peshwa. He was 
induced to stop his depredations partly as a result of strong remon­
strances from the Resident. Chintaman Rao, the Resident disclosed, 
had turned his estate into a sanctuary for freebooters pursued by the 
troops of the Peshwa. Elphinstone also revealed that not long ago 
Chintaman Rao had attacked the Peshwa1s district of Belgaum. He had
abandoned the attack only on the approach of a strong detachment of
73the Peshwa1s army.
With regard to the Patwardhans in general, the Resident pointed 
out that they maintained a constant correspondence with Sindhia and 
Holkar while those Chiefs were at war with the Government of India.
They received an agent of Holkar with great respect and allowed another 
to recruit a considerable force which assembled at Meritch (or Miraj).
In short [Elphinstone declared] though the Jagheerdars 
never joined in any confederacy against the allies, 
their conduct often occasioned much uneasiness and 
a considerable British force was always required to 
watch them. 74.
73 P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.97 .
74 P.R,C., Vol.xii, p.98 . (Emphasis mine.)
50.
Elphinstone disclosed that instead of surrendering the lands which 
they had usurped, the Patwardhans continued to encroach on the terri-
75tories of the Peshwa.
The Resident also informed the Government of India that the 
Jagirdars were disinclined to perform any service that did not further 
their own interests. For instance, in the previous year, none answered 
the Peshwa1s summons to march their contingents to protect his frontier 
against the Pindaris. Even Gokhale and Appa Desai who had served the 
Peshwa faithfully since 1803 had recently become infected by the rebel­
lious spirit of the other Jagirdars. As a result, they had joined in 
the civil wars among the Jagirdars and usurped considerable territory 
at the expense of the Peshwa. His Highness could no longer rely upon 
them to perform services which were not favourable to their own interests. 
Finally, the Resident informed the Government of India that the distur­
bances in the southern Maratha country had spread to the Peshwa's 
province of Savanur. He also disclosed that the prevailing disorders 
had resulted in the creation of a considerable body of freebooters in 
the area. These freebooters had on two occasions at least raided the 
territories of British allies, namely, the Nizam and the Raja of
M  7 6Mysore.
^  P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.98 . 
^  P«R.C., Vol.xii, p.98 .
For all these reasons, Elphinstone recommended British
intervention in the Peshwa1s disputes with the Jagirdars. If the
Government of India did not interfere, he thought that one of three
things must happen: either the Peshwa would ultimately succeed in
seizing the estates of the Jagirdars; or the Jagirdars might entirely
renounce their allegiance to the Peshwa; or the state of instability
in the southern Maratha country would remain as it had been in the 
77past nine years.
The Resident believed that given a sufficiently powerful army 
and sufficient time, the Peshwa was capable of crushing the Jagirdars 
ultimately. Even with his small force he had entirely dispossessed 
the Pratinidhi, the Jagirdars of Baramutty and Belgaum, as well as 
Gunpat Rao Paunseh. He had also considerably reduced the jagir of 
Madhu Rao Rastia.
By continuing his present system [the Resident 
warned], the Paishwa may possibly reduce all the 
Jagheerdars without any decided interference on 
our part, in which case he would deprive them of 
their lands and all the bad consequences of the 
first of the plans, contemplated by Lord Wellington, 
would infallibly ensue. 78
It was also possible, the Resident pointed out, that the Jagirdars 
might be able to retain their lands till the Peshwa's claims lapsed
^  Pj^ RjjJC. , Vol.xii, p. 99 .
78 P.R.C. , Vol.xii, p.99 . (Emphasis mine.)
with the passage of time; or the Jagirdars might win their independence
outright after a hard struggle with the Peshwa. The Resident then warned:
Supposing either of these events to take place 
without the intervention of the British Government 
in favour of the Jagheerdars, there would be strong 
reason for apprehending that they would disturb 
the neighbouring countries or form combinations 
with the enemies of the allies. There can certainly 
be no reason for expecting that they would behave 
better in those respects than they have done hitherto, 
and the power of the allies to restrain their 
turbulence would be much less than it ever has been.
The success either of the Paishwa or the Jagheerdars 
might be expected to be preceded by a struggle in 
which the neighbouring possessions of the Company, 
the Nizam, the Raja of Mysore, and the Paishwa 
would run a great chance of suffering materially. 79
Elphinstone did not wish to forecast the future line of conduct 
of the Jagirdars if they were allowed to remain in their current 
situation. But judging by their past conduct, he felt that they would 
behave with greater or less moderation in proportion to the ability 
of the Government of India to restrain them. Consequently, the 
Government of India would have to interfere from time to time to 
prevent great disorders. This intervention might become most urgent 
at a time when it was most inconvenient to do so.
From these premises [the Resident concluded] it 
appears to follow, that it is desirable for the 
British Government to interfere for the purpose 
of making such an arrangement as it may approve,
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.100 . (Emphasis mine.)
and that it is advisable for the British Government 
to choose its own time for interfering, and to 
settle the Jagheerdars on such a footing, as may 
prevent their distracting its attention at any 
future period. 80
The Resident did not anticipate serious opposition from the
Peshwa. But he expected the Jagirdars to be reluctant to give up the
lands they had usurped after having enjoyed undisturbed possession of
them for so long. He hoped, however, that they might be intimidated
by the prospect of allied action against them to accept a settlement.
In any case he felt that the Government of India should not be
discouraged from interfering for fear of combined opposition from the
Jagirdars. It was an obstacle which would increase by being left alone.
If the Peshwa's claims were to be enforced at all, then it would be
better to do so before the Jagirdars deemed themselves to have acquired
81a prescriptive right to refuse to satisfy them.
The Resident did not believe that there would be any large-
scale combination among the Jagirdars for the purpose of resisting a 
82settlement. In his opinion, the only Jagirdars likely to oppose a
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.100 . (Emphasis mine.)
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.101 .
Elphinstone pointed out that Gokhale and Appa Desai were in the 
process of returning to their allegiance and were on bad terms 
with the other Jagirdars. Gokhale had surrendered the Pratinidhi's 
forts while Appa Desai was showing an inclination to account for 
the conquests he had made from Kolhapur. From these two Jagirdars 
the Peshwa only required the surrender of lands recently usurped.
As those lands were insignificant when compared with their lawful 
saranjamy lands, Gokhale and Appa Desai were not likely to be
settlement were the Patwardhans, especially Appa Saheb. If they
resisted, the only Jagirdar likely to join them was Rastia. But the
84Resident believed that Rastia would not want to risk his lands. In 
any case Elphinstone observed:
...the difficulty of reducing the Jagheerdars 
becomes a question of inferior importance, if 
it appears to the Government that they have always 
shown a disposition to turbulence when the armies 
of the allies were engaged in any extensive war.
In that case even, supposing that they would all 
unite to oppose us and that Gokla, Appa Dessaye, 
and the Dessaye of Kittoor were so much disaffected 
as to join them against the Paishwa to their own
irritated by the Peshwa's demand. Besides, if Gokhale resisted 
the Peshwa's demand he would lose the prospect of receiving the 
additional lands promised by the Peshwa. As for Appa Desai, 
resistance would isolate him and leave him to fight his wars with 
the Raja of Kolhapur single handed. The Desai of Kittur was not 
likely to resist either; for though he would lose an annual revenue 
of Rs.45,000 by the settlement, he would recover all that part of 
his saranjam then held by the Patwardhans. (P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.102.)
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.103. Elphinstone estimated that Appa Saheb would 
have to restore lands worth Rs.3,00,000 per annum; Chintaman Rao 
Rs.45,000; Trimbak Rao Rs.10,000. But in return, the Patwardhans 
would regain possession of part of their lands lost to the Raja of 
Kolhapur and the Desai of Kittur. The Peshwa had no claims against 
Narrayan Rao. Elphinstone recommended that if the Patwardhans 
resisted a settlement, their strong forts (Meritch and Koosigul) 
should be captured to smother their rebellion. Meanwhile, the troops 
of the allies could be used to protect their respective countries 
against inroads. He estimated the total force of the Patwardhans 
at about 900 (sic) Horse and 1,700 peons.
Elphinstone pointed out that Rastia had already given up most of 
his usurped lands and was in personal attendance at Poona. More­
over, a rebellion would cost him his lands in Kandeish which formed 
one-third of his saranjam.
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obvious detriment, and supposing that in consequence 
their reduction should become a matter of much 
difficulty, it would still remain to be considered 
whether this combination is not as likely to take 
place at some more inconvenient time, and whether 
it is not expedient to provide against such an event 
by enforcing the Paishwa's just claims when all 
advantages happen to be on the side of the allies. 85
The Resident next considered the extent to which British
interference should be carried. He advised that the purpose of the
intervention should be the preservation rather than the destruction of
the Jagirdars. He agreed with General Wellesley that any attempt to
destroy the Jagirdars would lead to prolonged disturbances. Besides,
the Peshwa's officials had shown that they lacked influence over the
people under their authority. They also manifested little interest in
the prosperity of the country under their control. Both of these
advantages were possessed by the Jagirdars 'and that in a part of the
country [i.e., in the districts contiguous to British territories]
86where they are more required than in any other.' Elphinstone feared 
that the destruction of so many great Jagirdars would throw the country 
into great chaos from which he doubted the capability of the Peshwa's 
own officials to extricate it. Therefore he thought that it must be a 
necessary pre-condition of British interference that the Peshwa should 
abandon that policy and allow the Government of India to guarantee the
85 P.R.C., Vol.xii, pp.104-105. (Emphasis mine) 
^  P»R«C., Vol.xii, p.105.
saranjams of the Jagirdars on condition that they should serve him 
faithfully. Also the Peshwa should agree to satisfy such counter 
claims of the Jagirdars as the Government of India should deem to be 
equitable.^
88Of the Peshwa s claims the Resident felt that the most
important one to enforce was the performance of military service by
the Jagirdars. He pointed out that the Peshwa had no disposable
regular army, and that in the event of war, the burden of defending
89his country would fall on British forces. He considered the Government 
of India to have been fortunate that the subsidiary force had seldom 
been called upon in the past for any such service. He warned that that 
state of affairs could not reasonably be expected to continue indefinitely. 
He hoped that the Peshwa would agree to the terms to be proposed to the
87
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P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.105.
P.R.C., Vol.xii, pp.105-106. Elphinstone felt that only three of 
the Peshwa's claims were worth enforcing thoroughly. These were 
the performance of military service, the restoration of usurped 
lands and revenues and the proper employment of the Peshwa's 
officials called Darakhdars.
The Resident feared that the Peshwa might even be tempted to dis­
charge the 4,000 Horse that he had raised since the last incursion 
of the Pindaris if the season passed without another incursion. He 
disclosed that of the Peshwa's own troops, 2,500 were required to 
protect his southern possessions while 2,000 remained about his 
person. With the inability of Appa Desai to serve (owing to his 
war with Kolhapur), the utmost number of troops that the Peshwa 
could assemble on his frontier consisted of 3,000 new troops with 
the Vinchur Jagirdar's troops forming altogether a body of 4,000 
Hoise, and an additional 1,500 or 2,000 of Gokhale's horse with 2,000 
of the Peshwa's infantry. The Resident hoped that a settlement with 
the Jagirdars would release that part of the Peshwa's army which was 
employed to watch the Jagirdars and so add a force of nearly 10,000 
men to His Highness' army.
Jagirdars and empower the Government of India 'to make such a
91settlement as may appear advisable' to it.
Thus it had become obvious to Elphinstone by October 1811 
that the political situation in southern Maharashtra was too fraught 
with danger to the security of British territories to permit any 
rigorous policy of non-interference. British intervention, the Resident 
in effect argued, had become imperative in order to fulfil Article 9 
of the Treaty of Bassein and to ensure the tranquillity of British 
territories. To ensure its own future security, it was deemed necessary 
for the Government of India to encroach upon the Peshwa's internal
The terms suggested by Elphinstone were: 
i. Mutual oblivion of past injuries.
ii. The remission of pecuniary claims on either side.
iii. The Government of India to guarantee the saranjams of the 
Jagirdars as long as they served the Peshwa faithfully.
iv. All usurped lands to be restored by the Jagirdars.
v. The Jagirdars to perform service in conformity with the terms 
of their Tynaut Zaubtahs and with custom. A third of their 
contingents were to attend the Peshwa at all times under the 
command of a member of their respective families.
vi. The Government of India to guarantee the personal safety of 
the Jagirdars and their relations as long as they served the 
Peshwa faithfully.
vii. All disputes arising in the course of the above arrangements 
to be referred to British arbitration. (See P.R.C., Vol.xii, 
p.108.)
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.108 (Emphasis mine). Elphinstone felt that if 
the Peshwa obstructed a settlement by his intransigence, the Govern­
ment of India would have 'strong reasons for declining to assist His 
Highness against the Jagheerdars, and should be able to put a stop 
to his complaints of our imputed neglect of his interests in this 
particular'. (See P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.109.)
autonomy as the price for aiding him to re-assert his lawful authority
over his subjects. British intervention could no longer be postponed;
for the Peshwa, disappointed in the good faith of the Government of
India, 'was now convinced that he must depend on his own exertions, and
had therefore been increasing his army...and...deliberating on other
more extensive measures for the improvement of his military establish-
92ment1. It was clearly necessary for the Government of India to intervene 
and impose a settlement favourable to its own interests before the Peshwa 
became capable of dealing with the Jagirdars himself.
Persuaded by the cogency of Elphinstone's arguments, the 
Governor-General recorded a minute on 3 April 1812 authorising Elphin­
stone to arbitrate the disputes between the Peshwa and the Jagirdars. 
Elphinstone was empowered to enforce the settlement by means of armed 
force if necessary. Lord Minto had no doubt about the justice of Baji 
Rao's claim to the obedience of the Jagirdars. 'That the Paishwa is 
entitled to their obedience and their services [his Lordship declared]
and that generally speaking they yield him neither service nor obedience,
93are facts which admit of no question'. Lord Minto was equally 
convinced that the obligation of the Government of India to assist the
P«R.C., Vol.xii, p. 141. Elphinstone to the Governor-General,
10 February 1811.
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.151. Minute of the Governor-General, 3 April 1812.
Peshwa in asserting his authority was indisputable. He believed it
to be wrong to argue that Article 9 of the Treaty of Bassein applied to
only prospective acts of rebellion and not to those which existed prior
95to, and at the time of, the conclusion of the Treaty. His Lordship
was of the opinion that to refuse the Peshwa1s request for military aid
to assert his authority over his subjects would 'amount to a denial of
the Paishwa's right to claim the legitimate obedience and service of
the Jagheerdars, and consequently to a guarantee of the condition of
the latter as it existed at the date of the Treaty, neither of which can
96reasonably be supposed to have been intended'.
As to the expediency of British intervention, the Governor- 
General considered it to be self-evident. He agreed with the surmises 
of Elphinstone regarding the possible consequences of allowing the 
disputes to continue. Lord Minto recalled that the essential object 
of the British alliance with the Maratha State was two fold: First, 
to prevent any of its component parts from becoming a source of danger
94
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P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.151. The Governor-General was of the opinion 
that some part of the clause on the employment of the subsidiary 
force (i.e., Article 9 of the Treaty of Bassein; see p.14 above) 
was 'obviously descriptive of the actual state of the Jagheerdars.'
His Lordship felt that such a limited view of the Treaty would absolve 
the Government of India from the obligation of interfering beyond 
the point of dealing with specific acts of disobedience which had 
occurred since 1803. He disagreed with this view which he believed 
to have been held by Lord Wellesley's Government. (P.R.C., Vol.xii, 
p.152.)
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.152. Minute of the Governor-General, 3 April 1812.
to the British; second, to secure the benefit of the cooperation of 
the Maratha State in the maintenance of peace and security in India.
The attainment of this dual objective would be difficult if the Peshwa 
succeeded in crushing the Jagirdars and establishing a strong centralised 
State; or if the Jagirdars succeeded in dismembering the Maratha State 
by making themselves independent. The Governor-General was therefore 
anxious for a settlement in order to anticipate either of these 
contingencies.
As matters stood, it was obvious to the Governor-General how
utterly incapable the Peshwa must be in fulfilling his military commit-
97ments to the allies in time of war. It was also obvious to His 
Lordship that if allowed to remain in their state of insubordination, 
the Jagirdars would constitute a source of danger instead of strength 
to the allies in time of war.
...Our interference [the Governor-General concluded] 
could not be permanently withheld and...under a 
determination to withhold that interference as 
long as possible, it must be called for at a time 
when many disadvantages and possibly considerable 
dangers would attend it.
But it is not on this ground alone that I found 
my opinion of the inexpediency of allowing affairs 
to remain in their present state. The alliance, 
is in the same condition of inefficiency as it
By the Treaty of Bassein, the Peshwa was bound to furnish a force 
of 10,000 Horse and 6,000 infantry in time of war. This was 
later amended by the 4th Supplementary Article to the Treaty of 
Bassein which reduced the number to 5,000 cavalry and 3,000 
infantry.
practically was at the period of the war with 
[the] confederate Mahratta Chiefs and from the 
same cause [i.e., the weakness of the Poona 
Government caused by the rebellion of the 
Jagirdars]...
It is on this special ground that I conceive our 
interference between the Paishwa and his Jagheerdars 
with a view to place them in a state of due sub­
mission to his authority and thereby to give strength 
and efficiency to his Government to be more than 
expedient, to be essentially necessary to the 
preservation of an important branch of our political 
interests in India,... 98
Armed with these sentiments of the Governor-General, the 
Resident had a meeting with the Peshwa on 3 July 1812. Baji Rao 
reiterated his policy of dispossessing the Jagirdars and applying the 
revenues from their jagirs to the maintenance of an army under his 
direct control. Elphinstone pointed out the futility of this policy. 
He reminded the Peshwa that ten or twelve years persistence in it had 
resulted in the crushing of only one great Jagirdar and even that with 
the help of another. He emphatically told the Peshwa that the Govern­
ment of India would never give him aid for such a purpose. He also
stated that the exigencies of the time called for a speedy solution
99of the disputes in order to strengthen his Highness1 Government.
Peshwa Baji Rao at last told Elphinstone that his own 
inclination was to resume the jagirs of the Jagirdars. But in
98 P.R.C., Vol.xii, pp.153-154. Minute of the Governor-General,
3 April 1812. (Emphasis mine.)
99 P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.177. Elphinstone to the Governor-General,
4 July 1812.
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deference to the Resident's advice, he was willing to abandon that 
plan if the Jagirdars would serve him faithfully. He became excited 
when the Resident told him that the Government of India would assist 
him 'in any moderate and practicable plan which he might propose for 
the settlement of his dominions'; and punish the Jagirdars 'if after 
an arrangement was made, they should attempt to recur to their habits 
of disobedience'.^^ However, there occurred 'a visible alteration in 
His Highness' temper and an entire change in his language and sentiments' 
when Elphinstone asked if he would authorise him 'to pledge the faith 
of the British Government to their security'. Baji Rao saw in this
proposal a veiled attack on his internal autonomy. He therefore told 
Elphinstone that it was incompatible with the dignity of his Government 
to negotiate with his own subjects in that manner. He then assumed an 
angry mood and renewed his complaints against their past misconduct.
In extenuation of their insubordination, Elphinstone urged
the assistance which the Jagirdars gave him in ending Holkar's usurpation
of his Government. But Baji Rao expressed surprise that the Resident
'should speak in favour of the Jagheerdars or interfere to prevent his
punishing them'. Striking his breast, he declared that 'their perfidy
102was stamped there, and that the impression was indelible'. He became
100 P*R*C., Vol.xii, p.178.
101 P.R.C*, Vol.xii, p.179. 
P.R.C. , Vol.xii, p. 179.
more and more averse to any settlement in proportion as his resentment 
against the Jagirdars grew. There was, however, little he could do 
without the aid of British troops. In the end, he acquiesced in the 
broad outline of Elphinstone1s proposals. On 6 July 1812 Elphinstone 
discussed the terms of the proposed settlement with the Peshwa's 
Minister.
Under the terms of what became subsequently known as the 
'Agreement of Pandharpur', the Peshwa agreed to overlook the past conduct 
of the Jagirdars. He agreed to bring forth no pecuniary claims against 
them without the consent of the Government of India. He also agreed 
that the Jagirdars should continue to hold their saranjamy lands as 
long as they served him faithfully. They were, however, to restore all 
lands and revenues which they had usurped. The Jagirdars were to serve 
according to the conditions under which their saranjams were granted and 
to attend with their contingents whenever summoned by the Peshwa. The 
Peshwa promised to allow them to return to their jagirs when their 
presence was no longer necessary in Poona, or when the Government of 
India considered that the state of affairs no longer required their 
presence. The Peshwa's Government was not to interfere with the 
Government of India in its negotiation with the Jagirdars. Nor was it 
to violate any engagement into which the Government of India might 
enter with them on the basis of the above terms. Finally, the Peshwa 
was to maintain two battalions of regular infantry 'to be employed
in the settlement and protection of his country'. 103
On 12 July 1812 the Peshwa left Poona for Pandharpur. The
next day Elphinstone followed him. During the journey, the Resident
sent letters to the Jagirdars requiring them to be in attendance upon
the Peshwa at Pandharpur within a fixed time. He warned them that
failure to attend would be regarded as an act of rebellion. In his
letters, the Resident expressed his Government's concern about the
disturbed state of the southern Maratha country which had long persisted
104to the mutual injury of the Peshwa and the Jagirdars. He promised
that the Government of India would guarantee the fulfilment of the terms 
of the Agreement of Pandharpur towards all those who submitted. On the 
other hand, the Resident warned that the Government of India would exert 
itself to crush anyone who obstructed the execution of the Agreement.
On 22 July Chintaman Rao informed Elphinstone of his 'unqualified
acquiescence' in the terms offered to h i m . ^  His vakil who delivered
the message also brought an order of surrender for the district of 
106Seralleh. The vakil announced that his master would be in attendance
103 The Peshwa's Minister in vain opposed this stipulation. (For the 
terms of the Agreement of Pandharpur, see P.R.C., Vol.xii, pp.188-189.)
104 P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.195. Letter from Elphinstone to Chintaman Rao,
19 July 1812.
P« R«C. , Vol.xii, p.201. Elphinstone to the Governor-General,
26 July 1812.
106 Seralleh was the largest of the districts usurped by Chintaman Rao.
Its annual revenue was estimated at Rs.60,000.
upon the Peshwa as requested by Elphinstone. Appa Saheb was the only 
Jagirdar who tried to resist. However, a strong letter from Elphin­
stone and an order to the subsidiary force to advance, secured his 
submission. On 31 July Appa Saheb informed the Resident that he would 
be in attendance at Pandharpur. By 2 August he had crossed the Kistna
and was about thirty miles away from Pandharpur. He was accompanied
108by Narrayan Rao and the son of the Jagirdar of Kurrundwad.
The prospect of having the rebellious Jagirdars under his 
authority again filled Baji Rao with a sense of triumph. On 1 August 
1812 he had a meeting with Elphinstone at which he expressed his 
gratitude to the Government of India. But his expressions of gratitude 
were not unqualified, an indication that he was not entirely satisfied 
with the manner in which the Government of India had dealt with the 
affairs of his State. Although he promised to treat the incoming 
Jagirdars with kindness and try to efface all memory of past differences 
with them from his mind, he candidly told Elphinstone that he could not
P.R.C., Vol.xii, pp.203-204. Elphinstone to the Governor-General,
27 July 1812. Appa Saheb1s reply to Elphinstone stated that he 
was incapacitated by ill-health from proceeding to Pandharpur. He 
added that 'he had too much to say on the other subjects which 
[Elphinstone] had mentioned to be included in a letter, but that 
his vakil would communicate his sentiments regarding them verbally'.
The Jagirdar of Kurrundwad was unable to be present in person as 
a result of the palsy which afflicted him. Elphinstone was 
satisfied with the attendance of his son on his behalf.
In the Agreement of Pandharpur, the Government of India 
ultimately found a solution to the political crisis which had existed 
in the Maratha State for nearly two decades. The rebellion of the 
Southern Jagirdars against Baji Rao's authority underscored the decay 
of the political system established by Shivaji. The system of assigning 
hereditary estates for the support of military commanders and their large 
armies represented a backsliding from Shivaji's system of centralised 
government. By substituting saranjams for cash payments from the State 
treasury, the Peshwas placed nearly all of southern Maharashtra under 
the direct control of powerful military chieftains. Tempted by the 
prolonged civil wars in the Maratha Confederacy, and with large armies 
and enormous revenues at their disposal, these military chieftains or 
Southern Jagirdars attempted to convert their hereditary estates into 
independent principalities. They denied the Peshwa their customary 
service, treated his orders and person with contempt and even encroached 
upon his personal estates. The danger of losing his sovereignty within 
Maharashtra and the Confederacy left Peshwa Baji Rao with no choice but 
to solicit British alliance which he had so often spurned in the past.
The price demanded by the Government of India for its aid 
in restoring the Peshwa to his authority in Maharashtra was the dissolution 
of the Maratha Confederacy. In return, the Government of India, by the
conceal his dislike for the Jagirdars.
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.212. Elphinstone to the Governor-General, 
2 August 1812.
Treaty of Bassein, guaranteed the Peshwa's internal autonomy within 
Maharashtra and recognised his absolute sovereignty over his subjects 
in that State. It also bound itself to give him military aid for 
chastising his rebellious subjects. Apparently, the Government of India 
did not fully realise the practical difficulties and risks of this 
commitment till sometime after Baji Rao's return to Poona from Bassein. 
When it did, it became less enthusiastic about its promise to oblige 
the Peshwa with the services of British troops for ending the rebellion 
of the Southern Jagirdars. The Government of India showed a reluctance 
to risk a rupture with the Jagirdars whose collective power was a force 
to be reckoned with. Under the convenient cloak of the policy of 'non­
intervention' , it sought to evade its treaty obligation to the Peshwa.
It instructed the British Resident at Poona to treat the Peshwa's 
disputes with the Southern Jagirdars as a domestic matter for the Poona 
Government.
By 1811, however, it had become no longer safe for the 
Government of India to continue to treat the crisis in Maharashtra as 
an internal matter for the Peshwa's Government. Baji Rao's inflexible 
resolution to subjugate the Jagirdars at all costs, and the equal 
determination of the Southern Jagirdars to maintain the status quo 
precluded hopes of a peaceful settlement. On the contrary, the attitude 
of the parties to the disputes foreshadowed an interminable contest in 
southern Maharashtra. Because of the contiguity of Kanara, Mysore and 
Hyderabad with southern Maharashtra, it was reasonable for the Government 
of India to feel apprehensive lest parts of these allied territories
which lay in the vicinity of the scene of conflict should suffer injury 
from the turmoil. To avert this contingency and to make the Peshwa 
capable of fulfilling his military commitments to the allies in future, 
the Government of India found it imperative to intervene and resolve 
the disputes between Baji Rao Peshwa and the Southern Jagirdars.
The Agreement of Pandharpur marked a serious encroachment 
on the internal autonomy of Baji Rao. Clause six placed almost unlimited 
power in the hands of the Government of India; while clause seven, 
being irrelevant to the disputes in question, was an unjustified imposi­
t i o n . ^  The Agreement not only imposed a barrier between the Peshwa 
and the Southern Jagirdars, but it also enabled the Government of India 
to control Baji Rao's relations with his vassals. The Government of 
India thus took advantage of the weakness of the Poona Government to 
encroach upon its authority over its subjects. The problem of the
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.189. Clause six of the Agreement of Pandharpur 
stated: 'The Paishwa's Government will not depart from any of the 
engagements into which the British Government may enter, in 
conformity to the preceding articles, nor is any other authority 
to interfere with the British Government in the present negotiation'.
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.189. Clause seven stated: 'It is part of this 
arrangement that the Paishwa shall maintain two complete Battalions 
of regular Infantry to be employed in the settlement and protection 
of his country.'
The Peshwa's Government resisted this clause in vain. Thus the 
Peshwa became responsible for the maintenance of three separate 
armies - all ostensibly in his service. These were the saranjamy 
troops of his Jagirdars, the subsidiary force and the two battalions 
later known as Major Ford's brigade.
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Southern Jagirdars opened Baji Rao's eyes to the fundamental 
incompatibility between British interests and his; and although he was 
obliged to acquiesce in the Agreement of Pandharpur, it laid the seeds 
of a bitter conflict which erupted into the open shortly afterwards 
and led to the annexation of Maharashtra by the Government of India 
in 1818.
THE TREATY OF BASSEIN, THE PESHWA1S FOREIGN POLICY AND THE ANNEXATION
OF MAHARASHTRA
At the time of the signing of the Treaty of Bassein the author­
ity of the Peshwa within the Maratha Confederacy had been badly undermined 
by the prolonged civil wars which raged in the Maratha State between 1773 
and 1802. By the end of this period, the Peshwa had become a political 
nonentity defied alike by the Confederate Chiefs and by the Jagirdars 
within Maharashtra itself. The possibility of Baji Rao regaining control 
over the Confederate Chiefs after a decade of civil wars seemed remote.
He had virtually no army of his own, nor had he the sympathy and loyalty 
of the majority of his subjects. Without the assistance of a powerful 
army which only the Government of India could furnish, it was unlikely 
that Baji Rao could ever regain his authority as head of the Maratha 
Confederacy.
For reasons which are not difficult to discern, the Government 
of India was not inclined to assist Baji Rao to recover his authority 
over the Confederate Chiefs. The armies of Sindhia and Holkar were the 
best and most efficient possessed by any native State. Commanded by 
French officers, they were capable of holding their own against the 
British forces. But this reason apart, the Government of India could 
hardly be expected to rescue the only power that was capable of 
challenging it for hegemony in India. Nevertheless, the Government of 
India could not remain indifferent to the political situation in the
Chapter 2
Maratha Confederacy. Baji Rao's impotence stood in marked contrast to 
the strength of his over mighty vassals. It was therefore obvious 
that prolonged strife and anarchy must ensue if the Peshwa persisted 
in his pretensions to sovereignty over numerous territories reluctant 
to acknowledge his authority. In the interest of peace in India, the 
Government of India wanted Baji Rao to concede independence to his 
great vassals as a fait accompli and content himself with sovereignty 
over Maharashtra. Such was the underlying principle of the Treaty of 
Bassein.
The Treaty, in effect, sought to dissolve the ties between 
the Peshwa and the Maratha Chiefs outside Maharashtra. It sought to 
obliterate all surviving traces of the community of interest which 
once existed between the Poona Government and the Confederate Chiefs.
It was the aim of the Treaty to limit the Peshwa1s exercise of sovereign 
power to Maharashtra and to extinguish or at least to circumscribe his 
influence elsewhere in the Deccan and in north India. In this way, 
the Governmeit of India hoped to undermine the Peshwa's position as 
a rallying point for the Maratha Chiefs and to encourage the latter 
to look upon themselves as independent sovereigns in their own right.
It was also the aim of the Treaty to put an end to the levying of 
chauth on British allies by ill-disciplined Maratha armies and thus 
remove the risk of the Government of India going to war with the 
Marathas in defence of its allies. In due course, the Government of 
India hoped to be able to end the power of blackmail which the Maratha 
Chiefs had long exercised over their weaker neighbours in the name of
the Peshwa and of their Confederacy. To promote these objects, the 
Treaty obliged the Peshwa to subject all correspondence with his former 
feudal Chiefs outside Maharashtra to the surveillance of the Government 
of India. The Peshwa was also obliged to seek the enforcement of his 
recognised rights and claims on the Maratha Chiefs through British 
arbitration.
The Government of India at first trusted to the Peshwa1s 
good faith for the achievement of the political equilibrium envisaged 
by the Treaty, but its expectations were soon belied. The Peshwa could 
not forgive the Government of India for the diminution in his authority 
caused by the Treaty of Bassein and the Agreement of Pandharpur. 
Consequently, in proportion as his Government recovered its vigour and 
authority, he cherished dreams of reviving the Maratha Empire and 
restoring the Peshwaship to the position of authority and pre-eminence 
which it once enjoyed. He was encouraged by the attitude of the 
Confederate Chiefs who, while welcoming de facto independence, nevertheless, 
were loath to repudiate the nominal suzerainty of the Peshwa who was the 
embodiment of Maratha nationality and glory. Encouraged by this disposition 
the Peshwa insisted that the Treaty of Bassein guaranteed all his rights.
He maintained the view that the Confederate Chiefs were his vassals and 
that no treaties could absolve them from allegiance to him. Through a 
subtle use of his traditional rights of investiture, he tried to assert 
his sovereignty over the Confederate Chiefs. For the same purpose he 
tried to re-establish a sphere of influence in Hindustan and the Deccan
through the revival of obsolete territorial claims. The climax finally 
came with his open assertion of sovereignty over the Gaikwad.
The Government of India could not accept the Peshwa's inter­
pretation of the Treaty of Bassein. It could ill-afford to sacrifice 
the political advantages gained under the Treaty. Much less could it 
afford to tolerate the resurgence of the loose Maratha Confederacy with 
its extravagant claims and concomitant political disorders. Therefore 
as far as it was concerned, the Peshwa's rights guaranteed by the 
Treaty were pecuniary rather than political. It regarded the political 
rights claimed by the Peshwa as subversive of the fundamental purpose 
of the Treaty. The persistence of the Peshwa in his scheme and the 
collusion between him and the Confederate Chiefs convinced the Govern­
ment of India that no treaties, however solemn, could break the 
attachment of the Maratha Chiefs to the Peshwa. Therefore the Government 
of India gave up its policy of peaceful co-existence with the Maratha 
State and resolved upon its annexation to safeguard its security.
i. The Peshwa*s claims of sovereign rights in Hindustan and
the Deccan.
Before Baji Rao fled to Bassein in December 1802 Colonel Close, 
Resident at Poona, apparently led him to believe that the Government 
of India would assist him to recover his authority not only in
Maharashtra but also as head of the Maratha Confederacy.^ Therefore 
the terms of the Treaty of Bassein as regards his relations with the 
Maratha Chiefs outside Maharashtra came as a shock to him. As circum­
stances at the time made it impossible for him to reject the Treaty,
Baji Rao accepted it. But headstrong as he was, he resolved to frustrate 
the operation of the Treaty as far as the dissolution of the Maratha 
Confederacy was concerned. For nine years after the signing of the 
Treaty, however, he bided his time and concentrated on the internal 
affairs of Maharashtra. He realised that the recovery of his authority 
within Maharashtra was a necessary step in his ambition to restore the 
power of the Marathas to its old footing. From 1811, he showed a 
disposition to thwart the British policy of severing the ties between 
him and his vassals in Hindustan and elsewhere. He did this through a 
number of expedients.
One of the ways in which he tried to upset the Treaty of Bassein 
was to encourage overtures from Holkar's Government for a khillat of 
investiture. The conferring of a khillat of investiture by the Peshwa
G. S. Sardesai (ed.), Poona Residency Correspondence, (Bombay, 1953) 
Vol.xiii, p.196.
Moro Dikshit, the Peshwa1s Minister, alleged that the Peshwa had told 
him that while at Poona, Colonel Close had assured him that the 
Government of India would compel all the Confederate Chiefs as well 
as the Peshwa1s other dependants to return to their allegiance, after 
the Treaty was signed. As a result, the Peshwa rejected all overtures 
from Holkar who, even after he had taken Poona, acknowledged the Peshwa 
as his master. He alleged that after the Peshwa had rejected Holkar's 
overtures and alienated all his vassals, Colonel Close went back on 
his words and offered different terms.
was a significant ceremony. For the Peshwa, it was a symbolic mani­
festation of his sovereignty. For the recipient, it not only signified 
his acknowledgement of the Peshwa's sovereignty, but it also set the 
seal of legality on his succession to political office. A recognition 
of his right to invest the Maratha Chiefs with a Khillat of office 
would therefore have been a great tactical victory for Baji Rao.
A few months after Elphinstone's assumption of duty at Poona,
the Peshwa called his attention to several applications which he had
received from Holkar's Government for a khillat of investiture. In
April 1811, Sakharam Pandit and Kandu Pandit, the vakils of Holkar,
pressed Elphinstone to prevail upon the Peshwa to grant a khillat of
investiture to their master. Holkar himself, shortly afterwards,
applied to the Peshwa through Elphinstone for a khillat for himself
2and an honorary dress for his son Malhar Rao. On the instructions of 
the Government of India Elphinstone informed Holkar that his request 
was superfluous since he had for many years possessed all the attributes 
of an independent sovereign and had been always recognised as such by 
the other powers of India. He therefore required no khillat of investiture
P.R.C.a Vol.xii, pp.7, 17, 18.
Jaswant Rao's succession to the Holkar estate had not been regularised 
by investiture from the Peshwa who continued to regard him as his 
mortal enemy. The Peshwa demanded Rs.80,00,000 as the fee for 
Holkar's investiture. The grant of an honorary dress to Malhar Rao 
would signify his recognition as heir-apparent of the Holkar estate.
from any State. Holkar's Government refused to accept this view. 
Without denying their master's de facto independence, Holkar's vakils 
argued that their master was as much the servant of the Peshwa as any 
of His Highness' personal guard. To this view Elphinstone 'found it
4impossible to prevent their recurring...from time to time'. The 
vakils of Holkar in the end entered into secret negotiations with the 
Peshwa to grant a khillat to Holkar. Although the negotiations were 
terminated when Elphinstone heard about them, Holkar's Government 
never abandoned its efforts to procure the investiture of Malhar Rao 
by the Peshwa."*
Another way in which the Peshwa sought to undo the effect of 
the Treaty of Bassein with regard to the Maratha Confederacy, was to 
advance claims (some of them obsolete) to certain territories and 
rights outside Maharashtra. These claims were made in Hindustan and 
the Deccan. One of the territories to be first claimed by the Peshwa 
was Garha Kota in the central Indian district of Saugor. The Raja 
who was a tributary of the Poona Government had assisted Ameer Khan,
P.R.C.a Vol.xii, pp.35-36. Elphinstone to Chief Secretary Edmonstone
22 June 1811.
4 P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.35 .
In 1814 Elphinstone reported to the Government of India that Holkar's 
Government had become more insistent than ever before on the 
subject of khillat and that he continued to receive letters from both 
Malhar Rao and Ameer Khan about it. As late as October 1817 the 
subject was still being agitated by Holkar's Government. (See P.R.C. 
Vol.xii, p.318; Vol.xiii, pp.217-218.
one of the predatory chiefs of central India, during his invasion of 
Berar in 1809. For his part in the attack on Berar which Baji Rao 
considered as part of his dominions, the Peshwa1s army under Daulat 
Rao Sindhia seized his country. In August 1811 the Peshwa1s Govern­
ment informed Elphinstone that his Highness intended to accept an offer 
by Sindhia to hand over Garha Kota to him. The Peshwa claimed sovereignty 
over it on the basis of chauth which it owed to his Government. By 
virtue of this, he claimed the right to dispossess the Raja and resume 
his country. Against the advice of Elphinstone, the Peshwa1s Government 
sent orders to Sindhia asking him to hand over the territory to Baloji 
Kunjar, the Peshwa's vakil at his Court.^ After a long and bitter 
wrangle with Elphinstone, the Peshwa's Minister complied with the 
British demand for a revocation of the orders sent to Sindhia1s Government.
After the Garha Kota episode the Peshwa tried another expedient 
in his endeavour to re-establish a sphere of influence in central and 
northern India. He told Elphinstone that he wanted to farm the tribute 
of Jhansi as well as that of Dhar, Seepree, Kolauras, Dewree, Malharghur
g
and Machalpur to trusted agents of his own. These places were in the 
hands of rebels or usurpers who either withheld payment of the tribute 
or paid it irregularly. Although Elphinstone was satisfied that 'the
P.R.C., Vol.xii, pp.59-60. Elphinstone to the Vice-President,
18 August 1811.
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.60 .
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p. 133. Edmonstone to Elphinstone, 3 January 1812; 
p.460, Elphinstone to Secretary Adam, 24 December 1815.
Paishwa's rights [sic] to several of the places claimed could not be
9denied1, the Government of India, nevertheless, refused to allow these 
areas to come under the control of the Peshwa's agents for the sake 
of peace in central and northern India. For a similar reason, the 
Government of India rejected the Peshwa's claim to sovereignty over 
Mandvee.^ ^
Thwarted in his plans in northern and central India, Baji 
Rao turned his efforts towards areas nearer home. He tried to claim 
sovereignty over Kolhapur and Sawantwadi which originally formed part 
of Shivaji's kingdom. But here as elsewhere his efforts were in vain.
The Kolhapur State came into existence in 1731 as a result 
of the partition of Shivaji's kingdom between the descendants of his
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.461.
^  P.R.C., Vol.xii, pp.121,122,134. In November 1811 the Peshwa 
complained against the imprisonment of the Diwan of the Raja of 
Mandvee and the declared intention of the Bombay Government to occupy 
the entire territory of the Raja worth Rs.2,50,000 per annum. The 
Peshwa alleged that by the Treaty of Bassein he had only ceded the 
tribute of Rs.65,000 due to him from the State of Mandvee without 
prejudice to his sovereignty. The Government of India replied that 
from the schedule attached to the Treaty, Mandvee itself and not 
merely the Peshwa's tribute from that State appeared to have been 
ceded. But even supposing the cession to have been limited to the 
tribute, it was obvious that with the tribute, he must be deemed to 
have relinquished all rights of paramountcy over the Raja who paid 
it and to have transferred them to the Government of India.
elder son Sambhaji and those of his younger son Rajaram. From 1772
the Raja of Kolhapur, Shivaji III, became involved in war with the
other Maratha Chiefs notably, the Patwardhans, Appa Desai and the Raja
of Sawantwadi. The cause of the war with the Patwardhans was the
12disputed ownership of two districts, Chikodi and Manowli. In 1803 
these districts fell into the hands of the Peshwa who subsequently 
assigned them as saranjamy lands to Appa Desai. Thus Appa Desai 
inherited the Patwardhans1 war with Kolhapur.
11 Following the fall of Raigad, Rajaram, Shivaji1s younger son 
succeeded to the Rajaship of the Maratha State. His elder brother 
Sambhaji (Shivaji1s elder son and successor) had been executed by 
the Mughals. His nephew Shahu, son of Sambhaji, was a captive in 
the Mughal camp. After the death of Rajaram, his widow Tara Bai 
placed her son Shivaji in power and disputed the claims of Shahu 
when he returned from captivity in 1707. Shahu succeeded in assert­
ing his title to the Rajaship; but for four years after his coronation, 
he was engaged in a civil war with his aunt and cousin. In 1712 
Shivaji died and was succeeded by his half brother Sambhaji son of 
Rajaram's younger widow. The struggle for primacy in the Maratha 
State raged till April 1731 when a treaty was signed recognising 
Kolhapur as a distinct and independent State under Sambhaji. The 
new State included the whole of the country lying south of the 
confluence of the Kistna and the Warna 'as far as the junction of 
the Tungabhadra and Krisha, including all the forts and posts within 
the said boundary'. (See Aitchison, Treaties and Sanads, Third 
Edition (Calcutta, 1892), Vol.vii, p.181.)
12 In 1796 as part of his plan to revenge himself on Parashuram Bhau 
and to topple his administration (under Chimnaji Appa), Nana 
Fadnavis encouraged the Raja of Kolhapur to occupy Manowli and 
Chikodi then in the possession of Parashuram Bhau. After his 
release from confinement in August 1798, Parashuram Bhau entered 
on war with Kolhapur during which he was killed in September 1799.
The Peshwa's army continued the war and recovered Chikodi and 
Manowli.
For the next eight years, the struggle for Chikodi and Manowli
caused sporadic outbreaks of hostilities between Appa Desai and the
Raja of Kolhapur. Towards the end of 1811 a series of victories for
Appa Desai endangered the integrity of the Kolhapur State. To avert
the incorporation of that State into the Poona State, the Government of
India intervened with an offer of its mediation in June 1812. The Peshwa
reluctantly agreed. Shortly afterwards, however, he became suspicious
when Elphinstone informed him that the Government of India proposed to
make its own demands on the Raja simultaneously with the arbitration
of His Highness' claims. Elphinstone hinted that the Government of
India intended to demand the cession of certain coastal forts in the
Raja's country which would protect its trade from future attacks by
13the pirates of Kolhapur.
The Peshwa denied the right of the Raja of Kolhapur to make 
any cessions of territory without his authority. He claimed sovereignty 
over that State and requested Elphinstone to submit his Government's 
claims for examination. He even offered to pay the sum of Rs.50,00,000
Under the administration of Sambhaji's widow, great disorders occurred 
both on land and on sea. The prevalence of piracy on the coast of 
Kolhapur led the Government of India to send an expedition against 
Kolhapur in 1765. The result was a commercial treaty whose terms 
were never observed. In 1792 the Government of India prepared to 
mount another expedition against Kolhapur. The young Raja signed 
another treaty by which he engaged to give compensation for losses 
suffered by British merchants since 1785 and to permit the establish­
ment of factories at Malwan and Kolhapur. (C. U. Aitchison, op.cit., 
Vol.vii, p.182.)
claimed from the Raja by the Government of India. He also undertook to 
indemnify the Government of India for all British ships and cargoes
14plundered in future by the pirates of Kolhapur. As a result of 
Elphinstone1s rejection of his mediation, the Peshwa tried to obstruct 
British arbitration of his claims on Kolhapur. He entered into secret 
negotiations with the Raja and urged him to resist any demands calculated 
to give the British any special privileges in his country. He sent a 
vakil to Kolhapur in the name of Gokhale to urge the Raja to break off 
his negotiations with the Government of India or at least to avoid all 
written engagements. He even threatened the Raja with his displeasure 
if he obliged the British.^
Despite these obstructions, the Government of India succeeded
in arbitrating the Peshwa's claims and concluding a treaty with Kolhapur
on 1 October 1812. By the Treaty, the Peshwa was required to restore
to the Raja all conquests made within the preceding four years which
did not form part of the districts of Chikodi and Manowli. The Raja
16was also guaranteed against aggression from all powers. The Peshwa 
determined to frustrate the execution of this treaty. Five months
P.R.C., Vol.xii, pp.167-168. Elphinstone to the Governor-General,
23 June 1812.
P.R.C., pp.225-226. Elphinstone to the Governor-General, 13 October
1812.
Aitchison, Treaties and Sanads, Third Edition (Calcutta, 1892), 
Vol.vii, pp.199-200; see also P.R.C., Vol.xii, pp.250, 253.
after the Treaty was signed, he still held on to seventeen turrufs
which he ultimately conceded belonged to the Raja of Kolhapur. Before
their restoration Appa Desai plundered them of every article of property
and carried off cattle from all of them.^ Meanwhile, the Peshwa's
Ministers continued to search their archives for further evidence to
1 g
support the Peshwa's claims to sovereignty over Kolhapur. The treaty 
was not finally executed till some fourteen months later.
These reverses did not discourage the Peshwa from persisting 
in his ambition to defy the Treaty of Bassein and revive the Maratha 
Confederacy. His next attempt after his defeat over Kolhapur was to 
claim sovereignty over Sawantwadi. After the negotiation of the Treaty 
with Kolhapur, the Rani of Sawantwadi attacked the fort of Barratghur 
held by the Raja of Kolhapur. In fulfilment of its treaty obligation 
to Kolhapur, the Government of India offered to mediate in the dispute 
between the two States. The Rani, however, refused to accept British 
arbitration, and consequently British troops under Lieutenant-Colonel 
Dowse invaded Sawantwadi. A treaty was subsequently imposed on the 
Rani's Government. Shortly afterwards the British troops were expelled 
from Sawantwadi. The Peshwa feared that reprisal action by the Govern­
ment of India might result in the annexation of Sawantwadi and therefore
P.R.C., Vol.xii, pp.248, 250. Elphinstone to the Governor-General,
10 April 1813.
P.R.C., Vol.xii, pp.256-259. Elphinstone to the Governor-General,
17 May 1813.
claimed sovereignty over that State. As in the case of Kolhapur, he
offered to mediate in the dispute between the Rani and the Government
of India, Elphinstone rejected the Peshwa's offer on the grounds that
His Highness' claim of sovereignty over Sawantwadi made him an interested
party and therefore unfit to be a mediator. For a time the Peshwa
20allowed the matter to rest but he did not abandon his claim.
If the Peshwa was determined to revive the Maratha Empire, 
the Government of India was equally determined not to permit any changes 
in the settlement effected by the Treaty of Bassein and the recent 
Agreement of Pandharpur. By these treaties, the Maratha Confederacy had 
been replaced by a number of independent and quasi-independent States 
which lay within the sphere of British influence. It was unthinkable 
therefore for the Government of India to sacrifice this advantage for 
the perpetuation of a political system which was organised on the basis 
of plunder and which had been the cause of dangerous disorders and 
much anxiety in the past. Nor could the Government of India tolerate 
Baji Rao's claims to sovereignty over scattered areas as well as to 
rights which he lacked the necessary power to enforce. Therefore it 
either denied those claims outright or, where they were too well-founded
P.R.C., Vol.xii, pp.294-295. Elphinstone to the Governor-General,
25 September 1813.
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.295. In 1816 the Peshwa's Minister Anand Rao 
presented a paper to Elphinstone in which the Rani was alleged to 
have sought the Peshwa's intercession for the recovery of Barratghur, 
Narsinghur, Vingoorla and part of the turruf of Massura of which she 
alleged she had been wrongfully dispossessed by the British.
to be denied, preferred to have them realised through the agency of the 
Government of India.
Elphinstone failed to see that the controversy over Holkar's 
request for a khillat of investiture for himself and an honorary dress 
for his son, was crucial to the Peshwa's claim of sovereignty over the 
Confederate Chiefs. He regarded the investiture of Holkar or of his son 
by the Peshwa as a mere matter of ceremony. As such, he considered 
Holkar's application as an internal matter for the Peshwa's Government. 
Moreover, he saw no precedent in the records of the Residency to justify 
a denial of the Peshwa's nominal sovereignty implied by his performance 
of investiture. The Resident therefore feared that the Peshwa might 
'regard any attempt to alter the language and ceremonies in use between 
him and his former vassals as a direct attack on his rank and consequence'
The Government of India, however, took a different view. It 
considered it imprudent under any circumstances, to allow Baji Rao to 
exercise even nominal sovereignty over Sindhia, Holkar and the Bhonsla, 
since those Chiefs evidently shared his ambition to revive the Maratha 
Confederacy. The Government of India therefore deemed it desirable to 
make the break of ties between them and Baji Rao complete; and it lost 
no time in pointing out to Elphinstone that the view taken by him with 
regard to Holkar's application for investiture by the Peshwa was erroneous
P.R.C., Vol.xii, pp.122-123. Elphinstone to the Vice-President,
24 November 1811. The records showed that only the exercise of 
actual authority over the Confederate Chiefs by the Peshwa had 
been disputed and restrained in the past.
It was in fact tantamount to an 'implied recognition of the continued
22existence of the ancient relations of the Marhattah co-estates.'
The Government of India called the Resident's attention to a letter
dated 19 March 1807 which was sent to Colonel Close while he was
Resident at Poona. The letter contained the grounds on which the
Maratha Confederacy was deemed to have been dissolved by the Treaties
23of Bassein, Deogaon and Surji-Anjangaon. It pointed out that by 
his acceptance of those treaties, the Peshwa had implicitly renounced 
the allegiance of the Maratha Chiefs outside the State of Maharashtra.
On the principle above described [the Government 
of India declared] it will be obvious to you that 
the question of conferring a Khilaut of investiture 
on Holkar (or on his son Mulhar Row as his successor, 
a point which it seems the Durbar of Holkar has much 
at heart) cannot properly be classed among those 
internal concerns of the Peishwa's Government in 
which you have in your answer to Holkar's letter, 
disclaimed a right of interference. On the 
contrary it forms one of those questions of external 
negotiation which the Peishwa by the 17th article
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.21. -’Chief Secretary Edmonstone to Elphinstone, 
31 May 1811.
P.R.C., Vol.xii, pp.21-22. According to Colonel Close's despatch 
of 24 February 1807 he emphatically maintained at a conference 
with the Peshwa's Minister that by the arrangements of the Treaty 
of Bassein Sindhia and Holkar were to be recognised as heads of 
independent Governments. In his despatch of 26 August 1807 Colonel 
Close again reported that the Peshwa's Ministers at a meeting with 
him had agreed that 'no measure should ever be adopted in reference 
to the former state of things in Hindustan'.
The Treaties of Deogaon and Surji Anjangaon were signed on 15 
December 1803 and 30 December 1803 respectively, with the Bhonsla 
and Sindhia after their defeat in the second Anglo-Maratha war.
of the treaty of Bassein has renounced the right 
of conducting without the participation and 
concurrence of the British Government. 24
The Government of India instructed Elphinstone to find a 
suitable occasion to remind the Peshwa of this principle established 
by the Treaty of Bassein. It also told the Resident that in his 
dealings with the Peshwa's Government he should always maintain the 
position that the Maratha Confederacy had ceased to exist. The 
Resident was required to remind the Maratha Chiefs also of the impli­
cations of the Treaty, since Holkar's solicitude for investiture by 
the Peshwa and his willingness to pay a nazzeranah for it presupposed 
that the Maratha Confederacy still existed. The Government of India 
rejected the plea of Charles Metcalfe and Elphinstone that it should 
reconsider its decision to avoid offending Holkar and the Peshwa. It 
stated that it was aware of the designs of the Marathas to maintain 
their Confederacy which it was the object of the Treaty of Bassein to 
destroy. Therefore it considered it expedient to oppose Holkar's 
application for investiture by the Peshwa. The Government of India 
explained that it was not opposed to Malhar Rao's investiture so far 
as its significance did not extend beyond his recognition as the 
legitimate heir and successor of his father. But, it continued:
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.22. N. B. Edmonstone, Chief Secretary to 
Elphinstone, 31 May 1811. Article 17 of the Treaty of Bassein 
provided that the Peshwa should not commence or pursue any 
negotiations with any other State whatever without giving previous 
notice and entering into mutual consultation with the Government 
of India.
Considered, however, as a practical recognition 
of the existence of that form of constitution 
of which the dissolution was a primary object 
of our policy both in the formation of the 
treaty of Bassein and in the arrangements which 
succeeded the last Marhatta war, our consent to 
the investiture is opposed by considerations 
which in the scale of general policy outweigh 
the partial motives to our acquiescence and the 
objections to our refusal of it. 25
To remove the impression that the Government of India wished to obstruct 
the succession of Malhar Rao, the Governor-General suggested a public 
declaration of his Government's recognition of Malhar Rao as heir and 
successor of his father Jaswant Rao Holkar.
The Peshwa's acceptance of Garha Kota was seen by the 
Government of India as another shrewd attempt to maintain his tradi­
tional relations with Sindhia and the Bhonsla. As such, the trans­
action had wide ramifications. It became necessary therefore for the 
Resident to use all the expedients in his power to frustrate the trans­
action. He protested against the Peshwa's acceptance of the territory 
without the prior consent of the Government of India as a breach of 
Article 17 of the Treaty of Bassein. He admitted that Garha Kota in 
the past owed chauth to the Peshwa but denied that the territory ipso 
facto belonged to the Peshwa. He reminded the Peshwa that the Raja of 
Berar was not his subject but an independent Prince. Therefore the
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.51. Edmonstone to C. J. Metcalfe, Resident at 
Delhi, 2 August 1811. Reply to Metcalfe's letter of 13 July 1811. 
(Emphasis mine.)
Poona Government could not interest itself in his quarrel with the
Raja of Garha Kota and Ameer Khan. For a similar reason, the Peshwa
could not share in the conquests of Sindhia since he was an independent
ruler whose quarrels, whether just or unjust, did not concern him.
But even if his title to Garha Kota was valid, his negotiations with
Sindhia for its restoration fell within the scope of Article 17 of
the Treaty of Bassein. It was therefore subject to the prior consent
2 6of the Government of India.
Elphinstone pleaded with the Peshwa to leave the territory
alone. It was too remote from the seat of his Government he argued,
and might even be found to be unproductive. He insinuated that Sindhia
might after all refuse to surrender it in which case the Peshwa1s
dignity would be compromised. If he succeeded in getting possession
27of it from Sindhia, the Raja of Berar might wrest it from him. He 
implored the Peshwa to refrain from reviving obsolete claims which could 
only result in the creation of that very state of confusion and instability 
which it must be the aim of the allies to avert. The Resident finally 
demanded the revocation of the orders of acceptance sent to Sindhia1s 
Government, and advised the Peshwa to desist from claiming the allegiance
P.R.C., Vol.xii, pp.61-62. Elphinstone to the Vice-President,
18 August 1811.
Though Elphinstone did not doubt the authenticity of a letter from 
the Raja of Berar in which he acknowledged the Peshwa1s title to 
Garha Kota and promised to refrain from attacking it, he nevertheless 
alleged that the Raja secretly coveted it and was plotting to seize 
it.
of Sindhia, Holkar and the Bhonsla. He warned the Peshwa that
the whole system of Maratta politics was founded 
on the existing state of affairs and that if His 
Highness should disturb it, he would not only 
overturn all his relations to the Maratta chiefs, 
but materially affect his connection with the 
British Government. 28
In approving of Elphinstone's handling of the Garha Kota 
affair, the Government of India remarked that the Peshwa conformed 
to Article 17 of the Treaty of Bassein by informing the Resident about 
the offer from Sindhia. He, however, contravened it by pursuing the 
negotiation against the Resident's advice.
The Peishwah,...[the Government of India pointed 
out] appears to have lost sight of the true spirit 
and intent of the treaty in a more general sense, 
by adopting as the basis of his proceedings the 
annulled relations of the Marhatta federation 
which have been distinctly dissolved by the treaty 
of Bassein, since compatibly with its provisions 
and obligations they cannot exist. 29
Elphinstone was asked to take every opportunity to remind the Peshwa 
of the essence of his alliance with the British. He was particularly 
to remind the Peshwa that the alliance did not oblige the Government 
of India to guarantee the enforcement of his territorial claims based
2 8 P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.78. Elphinstone to the Vice-President, 13 
October 1811. (Emphasis mine.)
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.68. N. B. Edmonstone to Elphinstone, 13 
September 1811. (Emphasis mine.)
29
on his old position as the head of the Maratha Confederacy. The
Government of India's guarantee of his rights did not include additional
territories or rights acquired without its consent. The Peshwa was
to be told further that he could not expect British support for the
enforcement of claims which he did not mention at the time of the
conclusion of the Treaty of Bassein and which he had allowed to remain
30dormant for a period of nine years. The Government of India warned 
Elphinstone that in view of the Peshwa's anxiety to exercise privileges 
not compatible with the principles of the Treaty of Bassein, he should 
be careful in his communications with the Poona Government to avoid
31any expressions that tended to countenance the Peshwa s pretensions.
With regard to the Peshwa's proposal about farming his tribute 
of certain districts held by rebels and usurpers in central India, the 
Government of India could not dismiss it altogether. Elphinstone 
admitted that the Peshwa's right to most of the places was well founded.
30 P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.69.
31 P.R.C., Vol.xii, pp.69-70. Elphinstone had told the Peshwa's 
Minister that the Peshwa would have been justified in declaring 
war on Ameer Khan for his attempts to disturb the peace of the 
Deccan. Under those conditions he would have been equally 
justified in going to war with the Raja of Garha Kota too if the 
Raja had assisted Ameer Khan. The Government of India pointed 
out: 'This statement might be construed to imply the Peishwa's 
right to enter upon a war under his own conception of the urgency 
of the occasion. It is apparently giving him a voice in the 
question of peace or war on an occasion on which Government does 
not admit his right to judge and to determine. It is a point of 
foreign policy from the cognizance of which except in communication 
with and under the guidance of his ally he is excluded.'
But even so, the Government of India did not wish any of those areas
to come under the orders of agents directly responsible to Baji Rao
Peshwa. Therefore it asked the Peshwa to leave the enforcement of
his rights in those areas in the hands of the Governor-General.
This step was necessary because it was revealed that Wittoba Naik
Gaikwad, the prospective farmer of the districts, intended to levy
about two thousand men for the purpose of expelling the rebels and
usurpers who held those districts. In the execution of this plan,
32the Peshwa had secured the cooperation of Sindhia. The Government 
of India could not allow the peace of central India to be disturbed 
by such elements, and therefore refused the Peshwa permission to farm 
those districts.
In the case of Jhansi which lay in close proximity to 
British territories in Bundelkhand, the Government of India asked 
Elphinstone to adopt a suggestion made to General Close in 1807.
This was to the effect that the Peshwa should be discouraged from 
sending a force for the purpose of collecting the tribute. Elphinstone 
was rather to encourage the Peshwa to send a collector and assure him 
that the Government of India would exert its influence to facilitate 
the payment of the tribute. However, if the Peshwa insisted on 
farming the tribute of Jhansi which would be tantamount to dispossessing
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.460. Elphinstone to Mr. Secretary Adam,
24 December 1815.
the Subadar of Jhansi, the Resident was to restrain him. He was to
inform the Peshwa that the Government of India had engagements with
the Subadar under which his territories were guaranteed to him
33personally.
The principle of circumscribing the sovereignty of the 
Peshwa also led to the rejection of his claims of sovereignty over 
Kolhapur and Sawantwadi. As in the other cases it was necessary to 
obviate potential disorders which might arise from feeble efforts 
by the Peshwa1s Government to enforce claims several hundred miles 
away from the seat of his power. Only five months before the Govern­
ment of India intervened in the dispute between the Peshwa and the 
Raja of Kolhapur, it had turned down an appeal for help from the Raja 
But the prospect of the State of Kolhapur passing under the control 
of Appa Desai who was the servant of the Peshwa necessitated British 
intervention. The incorporation of Kolhapur in the Poona State would 
have encouraged the Peshwa in his ambition. On the other hand, it 
was probable that Appa Desai would have retained possession of it. 
This would have emboldened him to defy the Peshwa and led to a ruptur 
which would have affected the tranquillity of British territories 
nearby. As a result, Elphinstone denied the Peshwa's claims to 
sovereignty over Kolhapur and restrained Appa Desai. He rejected
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.133. N. B. Edmonstone to Elphinstone,
3 January 1812.
the Peshwa's offer of compensation on behalf of the Raja for losses 
suffered by the British at the hands of the pirates of Kolhapur in 
the past. Elphinstone also rejected the Peshwa's offer of security 
for future losses. He told the Peshwa that he would gain nothing by 
that undertaking as
the Raja of Kolapore would not in consequence 
be induced to submit to the Paishwa's authority, 
nor would the British Government recognize His 
Highness's sovereignty over Kolapore; so that he 
would merely pay 50 lakhs of rupees for the Raja 
without any return whatsoever. 34
In the case of Sawantwadi the same aversion to the extension 
of the Peshwa's authority outside Maharashtra led to British denial 
of his sovereignty over that State. This was done despite the fact 
that Elphinstone's enquiries about the territory's relationship to the 
Peshwa revealed that
while that Government was settled, it was entirely 
subordinate to the Paishwa's, but that it had been 
for a year or two in the hands of usurpers, who 
paid only a nominal obedience to His Highness's 
authority. 35
The divergent views held by the Government of India and the 
Peshwa over the interpretation of the Treaty of Bassein made a rupture
34 P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.168. Elphinstone to the Governor-General,
23 June 1812.
35 P.R.C., Vol.xii, p. 161. Elphinstone to Chief Secretary Edmonstone, 
22 May 1812. (Emphasis mine.)
inevitable. Neither side was prepared to give in to the other. Baji 
Rao's love of power and rank made it hard for him to reconcile himself 
to diminished authority. He was therefore determined to compensate 
for the power he had lost in Maharashtra by the renewal of claims which 
he had allowed to become almost obsolete. The Government of India, on 
the other hand, was loath to recognise these claims. As the basis of 
most of the Peshwa's claims was his right to chauth as head of the 
Maratha Confederacy, their recognition might have established a 
precedent by which Baji Rao could have laid claim to an endless list 
of territories and rights acquired by his predecessors and lost 
subsequently through revolutions.
Moreover, it was evident that Baji Rao would never again be 
able to control the Maratha Confederacy as effectively as did the 
first four Peshwas, even if he had the loyal support of the Jagirdars 
of Maharashtra. The ties between the Peshwa and his non-Maratha 
subjects had become weak. The Confederate Chiefs had become too 
powerful for him. The revival of the Maratha Confederacy might give 
the Confederate Chiefs a chance to interfere again in the affairs of 
Maharashtra and in the Peshwa's relations with other States. In this 
way it might lead to a repetition of the dangerous situation created 
in Maharashtra at the beginning of the nineteenth century by the 
rivalry between Sindhia and Holkar for the control of the Poona 
Government, a situation from which Maharashtra was rescued by British 
intervention. For these reasons the Government of India could not
permit the revival of the Maratha Confederacy with the Peshwa at its 
head. The irreconcilability of the policies of the Government of 
India and those of the Peshwa became exemplified in the Peshwa's dis­
putes with the Gaikwad which led to the annexation of Maharashtra.
ii. The Peshwa's disputes with the Gaikwad and the final rupture
From September 1813 the irritation engendered in the Peshwa'
mind by the Agreement of Pandharpur and by the opposition of the
Government of India to the exercise of his traditional rights and
privileges became increasingly noticeable. This irritation found
expression in a series of complaints made by his administration to the
Government of India. The Peshwa's Minister urged the settlement of
His Highness' disputes with the Nizam in a more 'peremptory and decided
36....manner1 than ever before. He complained against the refusal
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.296. Elphinstone to the Governor-General,
25 September 1813. Elphinstone commented: 'The vehemence with 
which this point is urged on His Highness's part is the more 
remarkable, as he has for many months appeared to be entirely 
satisfied with my assurances, that the requisite enquiry would be 
undertaken as soon as the pressure of many important affairs would 
allow the Government time to attend to it.' (Emphasis mine.)
The Peshwa's claims against the Nizam were pecuniary. They arose 
from his right to chauth. By Articles 13 and 14 of the Treaty 
of Bassein, the Peshwa's claims against the Nizam and the Gaikwad 
were made the subject of British arbitration. Though proofs of 
the Peshwa's claims against the Nizam had first been called for 
during the administration of Sir George Barlow, little had been 
done towards a settlement. In the middle of 1811 the Peshwa's 
officials, in exasperation, tried to levy chauth in the Nizam's 
dominions but they were restrained by the invocation of Article
13 of the Treaty. The Government of India then promised a speedy 
settlement but the Peshwa waited in vain for two years.
of Madhu Rastia (one of the Southern Jagirdars) to serve against the
Pindaris and declared that the Peshwa would not be satisfied with any
punishment but the confiscation of Rastia1s jagir. The Minister also
pressed the Peshwa*s right to the service of the subsidiary force
against the rebellious Jagirdar of Sundoor and declared that the Peshwa
37would not agree to share the cost of the expedition. The Peshwa's
Government further renewed its demand for the evacuation of the fort
38of Ahmednagar by British troops.
Symptomatic of the Peshwa's defiant attitude was his announce­
ment of his intention to send an agent to take charge of his territories
39in Hindustan and to perform the investiture of Malhar Rao. He also
announced his intention not to renew the farming of his rent from
40Ahmedabad to the Gaikwad's Government on the expiry of the lease, and 
called for a speedy settlement of his claims on the Gaikwad.
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.300. Elphinstone to the Earl of Moira,
5 November 1813.
38 P. R. C. ,\foLxii, P.30Q The fort was occupied by British troops during 
the war with Sindhia, the Bhonsla and Holkar (1803-1805). It 
had, however, been retained since by the British. The Peshwa had 
been demanding its restoration since 1811.
39 P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.300.
40 P.R.C. ,\fol.xii, p30&In 1800 the Peshwa farmed his share of the 
revenues of Gujerat for five years to the Gaikwad Anand Rao at 
the rate of Rs.5,00,000 a year. In 1804 Sir Barry Close succeeded 
with great difficulty in obtaining a renewal of the lease for 10 
years at Rs.4,50,000 per annum. This lease was due to expire in 
June 1814.
The Peshwa's claims on the Gaikwad had a special significance
since they involved the vexed question of his claim to sovereignty
over the great Maratha Chiefs. The Gaikwads inherited the State of
Baroda from the family of Khandi Rao Dabhade, (the senapati of Shahu
Raja) whose extensive conquests in Gujerat and Kattiawar were assigned
to him as a jagir. Damaji Gaikwad, a sardar in his service who had
distinguished himself in the conquest of Gujerat, was appointed as
his deputy. In 1721 Khandi Rao and Damaji Gaikwad died within a few
months of each other. The former was succeeded in office by his son
Trimbak Rao and the latter by his nephew Pilaji Gaikwad. In 1731
Trimbak Rao was killed in a civil war against the Peshwa. His infant
son and heir Yeshwant Rao was allowed to succeed to his father's jagir
in Gujerat subject to the payment of half of its revenue to the Peshwa.
When Yeshwant Rao came of age he proved to be unfit for his position
41and consequently the Dabhade family gave way to the Gaikwads.
Under the regime of the Gaikwads, a series of events enabled
the Peshwa to increase his claims against the Government of Baroda
42and to establish his ascendancy in the Baroda State. In fact by
Aitchison, Treaties and Sanads (Calcutta, 1892), Vol.vi, p.75.
i. Damaji Gaikwad (Pilaji's son and successor) supported Tara
Bai in her effort to free the Raja of Satara from the thraldom 
of Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao and came to Poona with an army to 
assist the conspirators. He was made prisoner and released 
only after he had agreed to pay Rs.15,00,000 as arrears of 
tribute from Gujerat. He also agreed to cede half of his 
possessions and to hold the rest under the Peshwa. In 1755 
after the partition of Gujerat, the Peshwa's army in
the time the British signed the Treaty of Baroda with the Gaikwad in 
1802 he was more of a vassal than a Confederate Chief.
At the end of March 1811 a vakil from the Gaikwad1s Court
arrived at Poona to settle the long standing disputes between the
Gaikwad and the Peshwa on the subject of arrears of the Gaikwad's
43tribute and of succession fees. The vakil was also required to
conjunction with the Gaikwad's army conquered the town of 
Ahmedabad and partitioned it. From then on Damaji Gaikwad 
served the Peshwa faithfully. He served with the Maratha 
army at Panipat. In the following year he came to Poona to 
assist Raghunath Rao in a civil war with his nephew Madhu 
Rao for which he was rewarded with a sanad for his share of 
Gujerat.
ii. In 1767 Damaji sent his son Govind Rao with an army to assist 
Raghunath Rao in another rebellion against Madhu Rao. This 
time Raghunath Rao was defeated and Damaji was punished by the 
imposition of annual tribute of Rs.5,25,000 and an annual 
service with 3,000 Horse during peace and 4,000 during war.
iii. The death of Damaji Gaikwad in 1768 precipitated a disputed 
succession between Syaji (his eldest son but by his second 
wife) and Govind Rao (his second son but by his eldest wife). 
Govind Rao who was at Poona when his father died, procured his 
recognition as successor by binding himself to pay a large 
nazzer and Rs.2,54,000 per annum. This raised the Gaikwad's 
tribute to Rs.7,79,000 per annum.
iv. In 1773 Syaji's right was recognised and he supplanted Govind 
Rao. Fateh Singh who carried on Syaji's administration was 
permitted to keep his army in Gujerat to overawe Govind Rao.
In lieu of the service of his troops, he agreed to pay Rs. 
6,75,000 a year. This sum raised the Gaikwad's tribute finally 
to Rs.14,54,000. [See Aitchison, Treaties and Sanads, Third 
Edition (Calcutta 1892), Vol.vi, p.76; P.R.C., Vol.xiii, p.30; 
J. Grant Duff, History of the Mahrattas, Fourth Edition (two 
volumes, London 1878), Vol.ii, pp.9-12.]
The total sum claimed by the Peshwa on this account and others 
amounted to about Rs.3,40,76,790. After an examination of the 
counterclaims of the Gaikwad, Elphinstone estimated the Gaikwad's 
minimum debt at Rs.1,46,29,789. (See P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.281; 
Vol.xiii, p.43.)
negotiate for the renewal of the lease of Ahmedabad. The negotiations 
failed  and led the Peshwa to invoke British  arbitration at the end 
of 1813. At the end of February 1814 Gangadhar Shastri, the Minister  
of the Baroda Government, arrived at Poona to attempt another direct  
negotiation with the Poona Government.
The part of the negotiations that interested the Gaikwad1s
Government and the Government of India was the renewal of the lease
of Ahmedabad. Under the lease, the Bombay Government under whose
supervision the Administration of Baroda was conducted had succeeded
in keeping the turbulent tribes of Gujerat in order. It feared that
a reversion to the former state of divided authority in Gujerat would
disturb the arrangements effected with so much expense and trouble
and cause that rich country to relapse into its former condition of
anarchy. Moreover, in 1807 the Gaikwad1s Government had concluded
decennial engagements with the chieftains of Kattiawar for the payment
of their tribute. These engagements which overlapped the termination
of the lease had been guaranteed by the Government of India and could
44
not be set aside without prejudice to its honour.
All attempts to secure the Peshwa's consent to the renewal 
of the lease, however, proved fu tile . The systematic efforts of the
P .R .C . , V o l .x i i ,  p .304. F. Warden, Chief Secretary (Bombay) to 
Elphinstone, 10 November 1813.
Government of India to whittle  down his power had thoroughly shaken his
confidence in its good faith  and embittered his mind. He therefore
harped on 'the  loss of credit which he would suffer by allowing another
prince to govern his territories and on the chance of its being forgotten
45
that he had any right to govern them h im se lf '. He feared that if  he
continued to grant long leases to the Gaikwad the renewal might in course
of time become automatic, and Ahmedabad might become 'a  tributary
46
province instead of one held in absolute sovereignty '. On 25 June
1814 Elphinstone authorised the surrender of the Peshwa's share of
47
Ahmedabad to his agent.
The discussion of the remaining claims of the Peshwa proved to 
be long and acrimonious because they became entangled in political  
issues. The 8th Article  of the Treaty of Salbai (1782) recognised 
the Peshwa's sovereignty over the Gaikwad. But during the troubled 
times that followed the Treaty, the Peshwa was unable to protect the 
Baroda State. Govind Rao Gaikwad and his Minister were therefore  
compelled to rely on a body of Arab mercenaries to support their  
precarious authority. The war of succession which followed Govind 
Rao's death in September 1800 created an emergency and led his Minister
P .R .C . , V o l .x i i ,  p .309 . Elphinstone to Francis Warden, Chief 
Secretary to Government, 5 January 1814.
P .R .C . , V o l .x i i ,  p .321. Elphinstone to John Adam, 7 May 1814.
P .R .C . , V o l .x i i ,  p .332. Elphinstone to Chief Secretary to the 
Government (Bombay), 25 June 1814.
to seek m ilitary aid from the British  factory at Cambay for the
purpose of freeing himself from the thraldom of the Arabs and subduing
the opposition headed by Malhar Rao and Kanhoji Rao. On 16 June 1802
he signed the Convention of Cambay later reduced to the Treaty of
Baroda. The effect of the Convention of Cambay and of the Treaty of
Baroda was to substitute British ascendancy at Baroda for that of the
48
Peshwa. To soothe the feelings of the Peshwa, however, the 14th 
Article of the Treaty of Bassein by which the Peshwa acknowledged 
the Treaty of Baroda, guaranteed the just rights or claims of the 
Peshwa on the Gaikwad. The Peshwa took the view that this guarantee 
extended to his pecuniary as well as his political rights. Elphinstone, 
on the other hand, took the view that by the establishment of British  
ascendancy at Baroda, the Peshwa had forfeited his political suzerainty
The Convention of Cambay and the Treaty of Baroda gave the 
Government of India wide powers in Baroda, on the basis of which 
it deemed itself  ju stified  in exercising control over the most 
important a ffa irs  of the State. By those engagements the Govern­
ment of India became the guarantee of the Gaikwad1s debts by 
substituting its own Bhaindaries ( i . e . ,  securities) for those of 
the Arabs. It  also became the protector of the Baroda State and 
the guarantee of the succession to the masnad. In a letter to 
Colonel Walker dated 29 July 1802 Anand Rao Gaikwad stated:
' I call upon all my people to support Major Walker in every 
measure that he w ill  take in my administration, as he has helped 
me out of the dangerous situation into which the Arabs had plunged 
me. No one should oppose Major Walker. I f  any mischief-makers 
act against these wishes of mine, Major Walker is empowered to 
punish them. He should not hesitate to enforce his measures even 
in opposition to Raoji Appaji, his sons and relatives, or even 
against any writing of my own which might hereafter be is s u e d .'
(G. S. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, (three volumes, 
Bombay, 1948) V o l .i i i ,  p .4 5 4 .)
To the Treaty of Baroda was added a private engagement with
Raoji Appaji which guaranteed the post of Minister to him. It also
guaranteed British protection for the Minister and his kinsmen. Under
this guarantee, he was succeeded in July 1803 by his son Sitaram in
the office  of Diwan to the Gaikwad. Sitaram refused to be subservient
to the British as his father had been. With the secret encouragement
of the Gaikwad, he persistently opposed the intimate interference of
the British in the affairs  of Baroda. In  1806 the Government of India
ousted the Gaikwad, Anand Rao, and set up a Regency Commission under
49
the superintendence of the British Resident at Baroda. In  May 1813 
Gangadhar Shastri became a member of the Commission and Diwan in place 
of Sitaram.
Gangadhar Shastri was a former clerk in the Peshwa's office  
who accompanied Raoji Appaji to Baroda when he was appointed Diwan to 
the Gaikwad. He first  obtained employment at the British Residency 
as the Native Assistant. He gradually ingratiated himself with the 
Resident through his role as an informant and was subsequently trans­
ferred to the Court of Baroda and appointed Diwan. His subservience 
to the British earned him the hatred of the anti-British court faction.
over the Gaikwad and the right of interference in his internal
affairs.
The Commission included the Diwan, the Fadnavis, the Resident or 
his representative and Fateh Singh who was appointed Regent for 
Anand Rao Gaikwad.
In 1814 this faction sent Govind Rao Bandhuji Gaikwad to Poona to 
so licit  the Peshwa1s aid against the Sh astri's  ascendancy. Bandhuji 
presented a letter purporting to have been written by Fateh Singh 
Gaikwad. This letter repudiated the Shastri1s mission and regretted  
his ascendancy over the Baroda Government.
As a result of this letter the Peshwa refused to recieve the 
Sh astri's  mission when Elphinstone informed him about it . He challenged 
the legality  of the Shastri's  appointment as Diwan, a position which 
he maintained was in his gift  and which he had conferred on Raoji 
A p p aji 's  family. As a result of Elphinstone's protests, the Peshwa 
reluctantly agreed to receive Gangadhar Shastri. He nevertheless 
warned that h is  doing so must not be construed as a recognition of 
the Shastri's  appointment as Diwan.
In June 1814 Elphinstone reported Bandhuji's intrigues to 
the Bombay Government. Five months later, he informed the Peshwa that 
Sitaram had been confined because of h is  attempts to subvert the Baroda 
Administration. This announcement led to a wrangle between the Peshwa 
and Elphinstone. His Highness defended the conduct of Sitaram whom 
he regarded as the legitimate Diwan appointed by himself. He commended 
Sitaram for bringing the situation of affairs  in Baroda to his notice.
He claimed the Gaikwad as his vassal and maintained that it was his
P .R .C . , V o l .x i i ,  p p .308-309. Elphinstone to Francis Warden,
5 January 1814.
o p p r e s s i o n . H e  invited Elphinstone to meet Hoojrahs and other
confidential messengers of the Gaikwad whose testimony would convince
him that the current Government under Gangadhar Shastri was equally
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repugnant to Anand Rao Gaikwad and Fateh Singh. The Peshwa told
the Resident that it was no breach of treaty for him to interfere to
preserve a feudatory State of h is . However, ' i f  the British Government
was resolved to deny his rights over all his sirdars in turn, he had
53
nothing left but to submit to their d e c is io n '.
Elphinstone admitted that the Gaikwad owed tribute and m ilitary  
service to the Peshwa. But he denied that the Peshwa had the right to 
appoint the Gaikwad1s Diwan. He declared that i f  the Peshwa had any 
such right at a ll , he had not exercised it in the case of Sitaram.
Even if  he had done so, the Resident declared, it would not excuse 
Sitaram 's attempt to disturb the Government of Baroda. Elphinstone 
protested against the Peshwa's reception of the messengers from Baroda.
duty to interfere in the affairs of Baroda to save the Gaikwad from
P .R .C . , V o l .x i i ,  p p .343-345. Elphinstone to Mr. Secretary Babington, 
Bombay, 27 October 1814. The Poona Government had received a 
letter from one of the agents sent to take charge of Ahmedabad 
which alleged that Anand Rao Gaikwad was under house arrest and 
that all access to him was denied. Elphinstone denied it . The 
Minister then proposed that a person should be sent with two 
Hoojrahs of the Peshwa to ascertain from the mouth of Anand Rao 
whether he was under restraint or not. Elphinstone refused.
P .R .C . , V o l .x i i ,  p .342. Elphinstone to Chief Secretary Warden,
18 October 1814. •
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.342. (Emphasis mine.)
105.
He accused the Peshwa of secretly encouraging a plot against a
Government with which he was engaged in negotiation under the auspices
of the Government of India . He told the Peshwa that the object of the
14th Article  of the Treaty of Bassein was to secure his acknowledgement
of the Treaty of Baroda. Therefore 'that object was not to be defeated
54
by any phrase incidentally introduced into the preamble'.
The Resident further declared that only such rights of the
Peshwa as were consistent with the Treaty of Baroda could be preserved.
The Peshwa's claim to sovereignty over the Gaikwad was incompatible
w ith  the existence of that Treaty since an admission of his claim would
render the Treaty null and v o id .’*'* He made it clear that the Government
of India did not claim sovereignty over the Gaikwad. It was true, he
admitted, that the Gaikwad was dependent to a certain degree on the
Peshwa. Nevertheless, he had no hesitation in saying that the Gaikwad
was h is  own sovereign as far as his internal affa irs  were concerned.
The Peshwa, he pointed out, should have pressed his claims when the
14th Article  was discussed and not to have omitted them at the time
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only to renew them after a lapse of eleven years.
At the beginning 1815 Bhagvantrao Gaikwad, a son of Govind 
Rao and an illegitim ate brother of Anand Rao Gaikwad, arrived at
54
P .R .C . , V o l .x i i ,  p .344. Elphinstone to Mr. Secretary Babington, 
Bombay, 27 October 1814.
P .R .C . , V o l .x i i ,  p .344.
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.345.
Poona to in itiate  fresh intrigues. The Peshwa received him in full  
Durbar on the occasion of the festival of the Vasant Panchami (14  
February 1815) in the presence of the Shastri and Bapu Mairal, the 
Gaikwad's vakil at Poona. Elphinstone protested against this insult  
and demanded that the Shastri's  mission be dismissed to enable him to 
return to Baroda. The Resident announced the suspension of the negoti­
ations between the Shastri and the Poona Government and declared that 
the Peshwa's hopes of having his claims satisfied must now rest on 
British arbitration. The Government of India, however, would not 
undertake the arbitration as long as the Peshwa maintained his right  
to interfere in the Gaikwad's internal affa irs  and tried to upset the 
very treaty under which British arbitration was offered. The Peshwa 
was therefore to expect no assistance from the Government of India with
regard to his pecuniary claims on the Gaikwad t il l  he had renounced
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his claim to sovereignty over the Baroda State.
In February 1815 the Bombay Government informed Elphinstone 
that Fateh Singh had disowned responsibility  for the activ ities  of 
Bhagvantrao. It therefore requested the consent of the Peshwa to the 
arrest and repatriation of Bhagvantrao and Bandhuji. It  warned that
G .S . Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, V o l .i i i ,  p .457. 
Bhagvantrao delivered to the Peshwa an autograph letter he had 
brought from Anand Rao. At the same time news reached Poona 
that Anand Rao and Fateh Singh were virtual prisoners under 
British guards and were extremely anxious that the Peshwa should 
intervene to secure their freedom.
P .R .C . , V o l .x i i ,  p p .351-352. Elphinstone to Chief Secretary 
Warden, 19 February 1815.
the Peshwa's continued protection of those persons would be regarded
as an unfriendly act towards a State over which he had no control. The
Bombay Government also stated that the Shastri enjoyed the confidence
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of Fateh Singh and demanded that he be allowed to return to Baroda. 
After this the Peshwa's Government adopted a friendly attitude towards 
the Shastri and the private negotiations were resumed.
In April 1815 an agreement was reached between the Peshwa 
and the Shastri for the cession of territory worth R s .7 ,0 0 ,0 0 0  in 
settlement of the Peshwa1s claims. Elphinstone considered the 
arrangement to be advantageous; for though it had the appearance of 
retaining the Peshwa's connection with the Gaikwad in name, it seemed 
to him to be the only equitable arrangement for entirely abolishing  
that relationship in reality .
The Guicawar and the Paishwa [he pointed out] 
would henceforward be absolutely unconnected 
states and the British Government would be 
released from the duty of procuring the annual 
service of the Guicawar's troops and the payment 
of his tribute. 60
The completion of the negotiations was, however, delayed owing to 
Fateh Singh's aversion to the cession of any part of Baroda territory  
and the Peshwa's insistence that the Gaikwad's Horse should serve
P .R .C . , V o l .x i i ,  p .354. F. Warden to Elphinstone, 19 February 
1815.
P.R.C., Vol.xii, p.371. Elphinstone to Chief Secretary Warden,
11 May 1815. (Emphasis mine.)
under him whenever he should take the field  in person. Gangadhar 
Shastri declared that the Gaikwad would be w illing  to acknowledge the 
Peshwa1s sovereignty by receiving investiture from him provided it 
was always conferred on the nearest heir and without a nazzeranah.
But he stated that the expense of the Horse was beyond the means of 
the Gaikwad.
On 10 May 1815 the Bombay Government passed resolutions
censuring Gangadhar Shastri for exceeding his powers and discussing
. 61
the question of the Peshwa s sovereignty over the Gaikwad. In view
of this indiscretion the Bombay Government demanded his return to 
Baroda. Three days before, the Peshwa accompanied by the Shastri 
had left for Nasik from where they proceeded to Pandharpur. There on
19 July 1815 the Shastri was murdered. Elphinstone heard the news of
P .R .C . , V o l .x i i ,  p .369 . Resolutions by the Bombay Government,
10 May 1815. The Resolutions stated that the Shastri was sent to 
Poona 'to  examine into and adjust various demands and papers of 
accounts' subsisting between the two Governments. But 'i t  never 
was in the contemplation either of the Supreme or of this Government 
and certainly beyond the extent of any powers vested in that native  
officer  by his own Government to bring into discussion any question  
on the Rights of Sovereignty which may be claimed by the Poona 
Durbar over that of the Baroda State, much less was he warranted 
in proceeding the length of stating that the Guickwar would 
" acknowledge his sovereignty by receiving investiture from the 
Paishwa provided it were always conferred on the nearest h e ir ",
- an admission which affects the basis upon which the treaty of 
alliance between the Hon'ble Company and the Guickwar has been 
concluded and acknowledged by the treaty of Bassein. It  embraces 
a direct acknowledgement of the right of the Paishwa to interfere  
in the domestic concerns of the Guicawar, and its effects at this 
moment from the disposition recently manifested by the Paishwa to 
encroach upon the rights of the Guicawar, can hardly be calculated  
upon.' (Emphasis m ine.)
the Shastri's death at Ellora and at once wrote to the Peshwa to demand
an investigation and the punishment of the criminals.
Strong circumstantial evidence pointed to Trimbakji Dengle 
as the person responsible for the Shastri's  murder. Trimbakji was a 
Maratha Patil of Nimbgaon-Jali. He first  entered the Peshwa's service 
during his exile  at Bassein. At great personal risk , Trimbakji 
carried messages to the Peshwa's partisans at Poona. Since then he 
had steadily risen in the scale of the Peshwa's favour. The Peshwa 
relied  more and more on Trimbakji for the transaction of many important 
matters of State. By 1815 he had almost superseded Sadashiv Mankeshwar 
as the Peshwa's Prime Minister. Elphinstone took a strong d islike  to 
him from the beginning and only acquiesced in his appointment to avoid 
being charged with interference in the internal affairs  of the Poona 
Government. Commenting on Trim bakji's appointment Elphinstone stated:
He certainly is a very unfit person for such a charge.
He is absolutely illiterate  as not to have learned 
to read, and his manners and understanding are such 
as might be expected from the class to which he 
belongs. He is entirely ignorant of the state of 
India , of the comparative importance of his master's  
State, and of its relation to the British Government 
as fixed by treaty; and to this must be added that 
he bears a bad character, even among the Mahrattas, 
for falsehood and want of fa it h ...f r o m  the character 
of Trimbukjee, I am afraid we must meet with more 
active endeavours to realise  the Peshwa's pretensions, 
and more unreasonable resistance to our advice when 
at variance with our designs, than we have ever 
experienced from the present M inister. 62
T. E. Colebrooke, L ife  of the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, 
(London 1884) V o l .i ,  p p .293-294. (Emphasis m ine.)
The Shastri's  murder presented the Government of India with a 
splendid opportunity for removing Trimbakji permanently from the 
political scene in Poona, and thus ensuring the stability  and efficient  
operation of the alliance with the Peshwa.
The Governor-General assumed that Trimbakji Dengle was
guilty . He accordingly instructed Elphinstone to pronounce him so
63
without any further inquiry. The Resident was asked to warn the 
Peshwa that any attempt to obstruct the cause of justice or connive
64
at the escape of Trimbakji would 'involve him in irretrievable r u in '.
The Governor-General, however, agreed with Elphinstone that the Peshwa's 
honour should be protected by avoiding any investigation into his  
complicity.
The Peshwa was averse to the arrest of Trimbakji before his  
guilt  had been established. He believed Trimbakji to be innocent and 
considered it unjust to convict and punish him on the strength of 
mere rumour. But he promised that if  Elphinstone proved his charge 
he would arrest Trimbakji immediately. Elphinstone, on the other hand, 
insisted on Trim bakji's  arrest as a prerequisite to the establishment 
of his gu ilt . Until that was done he feared that no direct evidence
P .R .C . , V o l .x i i ,  p .430. J. Adam, Secretary to Government, to 
Elphinstone, 10 September 1815.
P .R .C . , V o l .x i i ,  p .381. J. Adam, Secretary to Government, to 
Elphinstone, 15 August 1815.
could be procured. He feared that i f  the identity of the prospective 
witnesses was disclosed beforehand, they might be liquidated. The 
Resident urged the Peshwa to expedite the arrest of Trimbakji to prevent 
him from assembling troops and corresponding with foreign States or 
becoming a freebooter. He warned the Peshwa that he would be held 
responsible for either of these acts by Trimbakji. The Peshwa 
ultimately surrendered Trimbakji. On 26 September 1815 Trimbakji, 
Bhagvantrao and Bandhuji were handed over to a detachment of Colonel 
Smith's corps which took them to Panwell and thence to Tannah.
The surrender of Trimbakji was followed by a lull in the 
acrimonious relations between the Peshwa and the Government of India. 
During this lull the Governor-General wrote to the Peshwa to impress 
upon his mind the main principles of his alliance with the British.
He told the Peshwa that long before the Treaty of Bassein was signed, 
the Maratha Confederacy was moribund. His feudal superiority over 
the Maratha Chiefs had practically lapsed and his legitimate authority  
had become restricted to Maharashtra. It was not to assist him to 
recover his authority as head of the Maratha Confederacy which had 
been 'previously dissolved by the hand of time and the natural course 
of political events' that the Government of India offered its alliance. 
Rather, the aim of the alliance was to assist him to recover his lost 
authority inside Maharashtra. On the basis of the alliance, the 
Governor-General delcared, Sindhia, Holkar, the Bhonsla and the 
Gaikwad had
in every transaction been regarded as separate and 
independent States equally removed from that feudal 
subordinacy which their predecessors once owned 
to [His] Highness's ancestors and deprived, on the 
other hand, of every pretension to mix in the affairs  
of [His] Highness's Government« 65
The Governor-General then urged the Peshwa to reconcile himself to the 
new order of things and renounce the vain hope of reviving the ancient 
Maratha constitution either by overt or covert means.
In  the meantime, the Governor-General informed Elphinstone
that the murder of the Shastri could not be deemed to have affected
the Peshwa's disputes with the Gaikwad since the Government of India
had assumed the Peshwa to be innocent of it . Nevertheless, he felt
that the Peshwa was morally obliged to offer some atonement to the
Gaikwad for the loss sustained by him. He accordingly asked the
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Resident to persuade the Peshwa to do so. The Governor-General
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P .R .C . , V o l .x i i i ,  p . 17. Governor-General to His Highness the 
Peshwa, 20 January 1816. (Emphasis mine. 'H is ' in lines four 
and six of quotation reads 'Your' in o r ig in al .)
The Baroda Government demanded that the murder of the Shastri be 
deemed to have dissolved all links between the Poona and Baroda 
States. It demanded the following as compensation:
i .  The Peshwa's renunciation of all pecuniary claims on the 
Gaikwad past and future.
i i .  The permanent surrender to the Gaikwad of the Talook of Ahmedabad 
in lieu  of the Gaikwad's claim to Baroach; or the farming of 
the Peshwa's possessions in Gujerat to the Government of India  
in the interest of political tranquillity  in Gujerat.
i i i .  In the event of the Peshwa agreeing, the Gaikwad was w illing  
to pay the sum of R s .5 ,0 0 ,0 0 0  for a khillat of investiture on 
the elevation of a legitimate member of the Gaikwad family to 
the Baroda Gadi and to serve with 1 ,000  Horse whenever the 
Maratha Empire was engaged in an important enterprise. ( P .R .C .
instructed Elphinstone to procure a resumption of the negotiations on
the basis of the proposition made by the Shastri for a cession of
territory in settlement of the Peshwa's claims. In the event of failure ,
however, the Resident was to submit the disputes to British arbitration
6 7
as a last resort. Before any steps could be taken by the Resident 
the clouds of the approaching storm began to gather fast.
On 14 June 1816 the Peshwa listed a number of grievances
against Elphinstone and declared his suspicion that the Resident was
planning to destroy his State. He complained that though he had
exceeded the sum of the subsidy demanded by the British for the
subsidiary force yet the interests of everyone else, but h is , were
upheld; that instead of restoring Kattiawar to him as the Government
of India was bound to do by treaty, it had withheld it from him and
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saddled its restoration with unjustified  conditions; that the
V o l .x i i ,  p p .442- 443.) The Governor-General rejected these 
claims as unreasonable. He asked Elphinstone to declare 
to the Gaikwad that the Government of India had accepted the 
unconditional surrender of Trimbakji, Bhagvantrao and Bandhuji 
as constituting an absolution of the Peshwa's Government and 
as sufficient proof of the Peshwa's regret for the Shastri's  
murder. ( P .R .C . , V o l .x i i i ,  pp. 10-11.)
P .R .C . , V o l .x i i i ,  p . 13. J. Adam to Elphinstone, 20 January 1816.
The Government of India regarded the ratification  by the Peshwa of 
the decennial arrangements made by the Gaikwad's Government with 
the chiefs of Kattiawar to be a point of national honour. The 
Peshwa was unwilling to ratify  it because he suspected that the 
Gaikwad had in some cases allowed the petty chiefs to compound 
part of their tribute for a secret payment to himself. Besides, 
Elphinstone's proposal that his Highness' Government should be 
guided entirely by the advice of the Resident at Baroda, or that it  
should commit the whole conduct of its transactions with the petty 
Kattiawar States to the control of that officer was unacceptable 
to the Peshwa.
Government of India had made the settlement of his claims on the Gaikwad 
conditional on his making provision for the Shastri's  children. Finally  
he complained that Elphinstone was constantly annoying him about the 
Southern Jagirdars but would not procure the release of Trimbakji
n 1 69 Dengle.
Three months after these complaints were made, Trimbakji 
Dengle escaped from Tannah and began to prepare an insurrection. 
Until 24 February 1817 Elphinstone did not suspect the Peshwa of 
complicity in Trim bakji's insurrection. But when the Peshwa denied 
knowledge of the existence of any insurrection, contrary to popular 
rumour, the Resident considered the insurrection to have assumed the 
form of 'an  attempt of Trimbuckjee to recover his power by carrying
on war against the British  Government, under the protection of H .H.
,  7 0
the Paishwah .
P .R .C . , V o l .x i i i ,  p p .62-63. Elphinstone to Secretary Adam,
14 June 1816. Elphinstone had been importuning the Peshwa to 
reconsider his confiscation of the jagir of Madhu Rao Rastia for 
failure  to serve when summoned.
P .R .C . , V o l .x i i i ,  p .82. Elphinstone to the Governor-General,
11 March 1817. The Peshwa's Ministers sent Elphinstone a letter 
from the commandant of Gokhale's detachment sent against the 
insurgents. The letter denied that there was any insurrection. 
The Peshwa subsequently sent to request Elphinstone to find out 
the location of the insurgents so that his troops might disperse  
them.
The coincidence of Trim bakji's  insurrection with a projected
British campaign against the P in d a r is ^  created a dangerous situation
for the British . On the one hand, the Government of India was worried
about the uncertainty of the reaction of the Maratha Chiefs of central
India to the campaign against the Pindaris who operated under their
patronage. On the other hand, it was certain that as soon as British
forces began their campaign beyond the Narbada, Baji Rao would throw
o ff all restraints and attempt to free himself from the shackles of
the Treaty of Bassein. Elphinstone therefore proposed three alternative
plans for rendering him harmless: F irst, to transfer the powers of
State to a Minister as at Hyderabad; second, to regard Baji Rao's
conduct as proof of his enmity towards the British and penalise him
by the imposition of a new treaty calculated to weaken him through
extensive cessions of territory; third , to declare war against him,
conquer his country and bestow it on whomsoever the Government of India
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preferred and on whatever conditions it might wish.
In September 1816, the Court of Directors at last authorised action  
against the Pindaris. Early in 1817 the Governor-General, Lord 
Hastings, began preparations to extirpate the predatory system 
in India.
P .R .C . , V o l .x i i i ,  p p .97-100. Elphinstone to the Governor-General, 
21 March 1817.
Elphinstone preferred the third plan. He felt that under it , the 
old form of Government would be preserved and the employment of 
public servants, both c iv il and m ilitary, assured. He believed  
that the establishment of direct British  rule with an English  
Magistrate and the introduction of the Adawlat would not be popular 
with the generality 0 f t h e  people. Nor would a Raja of Satara 
who acted on English maxims, rather than in the time-honoured 
tradition of Sh ivaji, be acceptable to the Maratha gentry.
On 7 April 1817 the Government of India outlined the conditions 
on which it would agree to restore the alliance with Baji Rao to its 
original footing. If  the Peshwa should have arrested or expelled 
Trimbakji by the time of the receipt of the Governor-General1s 
despatch of 7 April 1817, Elphinstone was to consider the alliance  
restored. Otherwise, Elphinstone was to adopt the following measures: 
First , he was to inform the Peshwa that the Governor-General was
The first  plan, he thought, would be impracticable with a ruler 
like Baji Rao whose energy, tenacity of purpose and malignity 
stood in marked contrast to the indolence of the Nizam which had 
almost made him 'a  page1 before British support for his Minister 
actually made him so. Besides, at Hyderabad, British support was 
exerted to retain the authority of the State in the hands in which 
the British found it  rather than transfer it to others. Sadashiv 
Mankeshwar, the only Minister suited at all for the role, lacked 
sufficient courage or ab ilities  and might probably refuse the 
office  for fear of the Peshwa1s vengeance. On the other hand, if  
he accepted the o ffice , the Government of India would be obliged  
to enforce all his measures by sheer intimidation which would not 
deter Baji Rao from intriguing against the Minister as well as 
the Government of India. It would therefore be impossible to 
govern in the Peshwa1s name without reducing him to the condition 
of a pensioner like the Raja of Satara.
Under the second plan, Elphinstone felt that the Government of 
India might increase the subsidiary force and place the Peshwa's 
entire army under British officers whose pay should be independent 
of the Peshwa. Alternatively, the Government of India could take 
the requisite sum for the payment of the army from the Peshwa 
and maintain the army in the name of the Government of India, with 
the Peshwa keeping no more than a fixed number of troops (about 
2 ,0 0 0  besides garrisons) in his service. The Government of India  
might also compel Baji Rao to renounce the allegiance of, and all 
connection with, the Maratha States expressly. He might be asked 
to engage not to keep vakils or communicate with any foreign State 
without the consent of Ministers of the Government of India. He 
might also be asked to subject his internal administration to 
the advice of the Government of India.
satisfied  that he was engaged in a plot against the Government of
India and its a l l ie s . The Government of India could therefore never
again place any confidence in him. Second, Elphinstone was to demand
the surrender of Trimbakji w ithin a fixed time as a prerequisite to
all further discussions. I f  the Peshwa failed to comply, Elphinstone
was to declare war on him and direct the British troops to attack and
conquer his State. Third, the Resident was to warn the Peshwa that
if  he left Poona while discussions were pending, or permitted Trimbakji
to move troops in any part of the Poona State, he would be deemed to
have declared war on the Government of India. In such an eventuality,
Colonel Smith was to be directed to conquer and occupy the Poona State
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in the name of the Government of India.
After the Peshwa had surrendered Trimbakji, the Governor-
General intended to demand certain securities from him as a condition
for renewing the British  alliance with his State. These securities
were to be based on the need to maintain British m ilitary preponderance
w ithin  Maharashtra and to extinguish Baji Rao's means of intriguing
with other powers against the Government of India. To attain the former,
the Governor-General required the Peshwa to engage to maintain, in
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conformity to his existing treaty obligation, a body of 5 ,000  Horse
P .R .C . , V o l .x i i i ,  p p .129-132. J . Adam to Elphinstone, 7 April 1817.
By a Supplementary Article to the Treaty of Bassein, the Peshwa 
was bound to provide 5 ,0 00  cavalry and 3 ,0 00  infantry in time of 
war. As the Peshwa could not be relied upon to furnish this army 
in time of war, the Governor-General considered it just to effect
an arrangement under which the services of the stipulated quota 
of troops would be available to the Government of India at all  
times.
to be commanded by European o fficers . The Peshwa was to be required 
to provide for their regular payment at the rate of Rs.40  per month 
for each horseman exclusive of the pay of the o fficers . The Peshwa's 
establishment of regular infantry ( i . e . ,  the battalions under Major 
Ford) was to be considered adequate though short of the stipulated  
number of 3 ,0 0 0 . Their pay was, however, to be independent of the 
Peshwa's w i l l . ^  The Governor-General considered an addition to the 
subsidiary force unnecessary since by the new engagement, the Government 
of India would have a force which, while remaining nominally in the 
service of the Peshwa, would in effect be under exclusive British  
control.
To render the Peshwa harmless, the Governor-General decided 
to deprive him of all ostensible excuses and pretexts for interfering  
in the affairs  of Hindustan, Bundelkhand and Gujerat. Baji Rao was 
to be required to
renounce for his heirs and successors, all connections 
whatever with the other Mahratta Powers and formally 
to recognize the complete dissolution, both in form 
and substance of the Mahratta Confederacy, including  
of course all the relations still  maintained between 
him as the executive head of the Marhatta Empire, 
and those States. 76
Baji Rao was to be further required to promise to communicate with
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P .R .C . , V o l .x i i i ,  p p .133-134. J. Adam to Elphinstone, 7 April 1817.
76 P.R.C., Vol.iii, p.135. (Emphasis mine.)
those States only through Ministers of the Government of India. The 
Government of India also required the Peshwa to transfer to it
all his rights, claims and pretensions, feudal, 
territorial and pecuniary in Bundelcund, including  
Saugor, Jhansi and the territories of Nauna Govind 
Row and agree to relinquish all connections with  
the Chiefs in that quarter. 77
The Government of India particularly wanted the Peshwa to 
renounce all future demands on the Gaikwad. He was also to agree 
to renew the lease of Ahmedabad in perpetuity to the Gaikwad on the 
same terms as before. He was to consent to the collection of his 
share of the Kattiawar tribute by the Gaikwad according to the 
arrangement made by Colonel Walker, the former Resident at Baroda.
•»
The cession of the fort of Ahmednagar in perpetual sovereignty to
78
the Government of India was also to be demanded. The Governor- 
General concluded his despatch:
Without these considerations the leaving of Bajy 
Row in possession of any degree of power would be 
hazardous to our interests in a high degree. With 
them, and the additional security against his  
future combinations which the second surrender of 
Trimbuckjee into our hands under such circumstances 
would afford, we might leave to him the internal 
administration of his Dominions without much 
apprehension of danger from his secret intrigues 
or open enmity. 79
^  P .R .C . , V o l .i i i ,  p . 135. (Emphasis m ine.)
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P .R .C . , V o l .x i i i ,  p . 135.
79 P.R.C., Vol.xiii, p.136. (Emphasis mine.)
This despatch is very important. It shows that the policy of the 
Government of India towards the Poona State was defensive and stemmed 
from the anxiety of the British to safeguard their internal security. 
The Government of India was even at this stage, still  desirous of 
following a policy of peaceful co-existence with the Poona State.
It had no intention of annexing it yet.
Baji Rao was shocked to learn of the details of the proposed
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treaty. He took strong exception to the stipulations regarding the
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P .R .C . , V o l .x i i i ,  p p .187-193. The 18 Articles of the Treaty
included the following:
i . The Peshwa was never to countenance or protect Trim bakji.
He was to try to seize  and deliver him to the Government of 
India. Until his surrender, Trim bakji's  family were to 
remain hostages in British hands.
i i i .  Baji Rao was not to admit into his territories any subjects 
of any other European or American power without the previous 
consent of the Government of India.
iv . Baji Rao was neither to maintain vakils at foreign courts 
nor permit the residence of agents from any power whatever 
at his court. All communications with any power whatever 
were to be conducted only through the Resident or other 
Minister of the Company residing at his court. He was to 
recognise for himself and for his heirs and successors, the 
dissolution in form and substance of the Maratha Confederacy 
and renounce all connection whatever with the Maratha Powers. 
His rights over all chiefs of the Maratha State between the 
Narbada and the Tungabhadra and the Nizam's western frontier  
were to remain unaffected by the treaty.
v. Baji Rao was to renounce all future demands whatever on the
Gaikwad. His outstanding demands were, however, to remain the 
subject of British arbitration. But he was to consent to 
their being set aside subject to Anand Rao's agreement to the 
payment of an annual sum of R s .4 ,0 0 ,0 0 0 .
Gaikwad and Rastia as well as the demand for the cession of the Konkan. 
He also objected to the words 'heirs  and successors' throughout the
v i . The Peshwa was to agree to the annulment of the 4th Supple­
mentary Article of the Treaty of Bassein and to place at the 
disposal of the Government of India sufficient funds for the 
payment of a force of 5 ,000  cavalry and 3 ,0 00  infantry, and 
the provision of a due proportion of ordinance and m ilitary  
stores.
v i i .  Baji Rao was to cede certain specified portions of his territory  
as well as the tribute of Kattiawar.
x i i .  Baji Rao was to cede the fort of Ahmednagar in perpetuity to
the Company together with the adjoining territory lying within  
a radius of 2 ,0 0 0  yards from the foot of the glacis. He 
was also to permit the residence within his dominions (but 
at no extra cost to his Government) of any number of British  
troops in addition to the subsidiary force and to allow free 
passage through all parts of his dominions to all British  
troops.
x i i i .  The Peshwa was to cede all his rights, interests, or pretensions 
feudal, territorial, or pecuniary, in the Province of Bundel- 
khand, including Saugor, Jhansi and the lands held by Nana 
Govind Rao and to relinquish all connection with the chiefs 
in that area.
xiv . The Peshwa was to cede to the Company all his rights and
territories in Malwa secured to him by the 11th Article  of 
the treaty of Surji-Anjangaon and all rights and pretensions he 
might possess in the country to the north of the Narbada with 
the exception of those he possessed in the province of Gujerat. 
Baji Rao was not to interfere again in the affairs  of Hindustan.
xv. The Peshwa was also to grant his share of Ahmedabad (excluding  
Kattiawar) in perpetuity to the Gaikwad on the same terms and 
at the same rent as before.
xvi. His Highness was to consent to recognise the Agreement of
Pandharpur as binding on the parties to it and as though it 
formed part of the new treaty. He was to agree to be guided 
entirely by the advice of the Government of India with  
regard to the muster of troops and the duration of service  
of the Southern Jagirdars, and to issue no orders to them 
without full consultation with the Government of India . He 
was to restore to the Southern Jagirdars (especially Madhu 
Rao Rastia whose lands were resumed in 1814) any portions 
of their saranjamy lands resumed by him and to permit them 
to hold them as before under the guarantee of the Government 
of India .
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treaty. He pleaded that his maintenance of vakils at foreign courts
as well as the preservation of his nominal sovereignty over the Maratha
powers was essential to his honour. The Peshwa's Government objected
to the murder of the Shastri being attributed to Trimbakji in the
first  article of the treaty. Baji Rao declared that he was st ill  not
convinced of Trim bakji's  guilt and could therefore not assert it in a 
81
public document. He requested an alteration in the fourth article
which required him to renounce his claims as the head of the Maratha
Empire. He pointed out that it was to enable him to reduce the great
82
Maratha Chiefs to obedience that he signed the Treaty of Bassein. 
Elphinstone, however, refused to review the treaty and on 13 June 1817 
the Peshwa reluctantly signed the Treaty of Poona.
The severity of the terms of the Treaty of Poona reflected  
the determination of Lord Hastings' Government to safeguard the peace 
and security of India by freeing it forever from the incubus of the 
Maratha Confederacy. Nevertheless, the harshness of the treaty was 
beyond doubt and made a rupture inevitable. By the treaty, Baji Rao 
lost all his ancestral possessions north of the Narbada with the 
exception of those in Gujerat. But even these passed out of his 
control forever. The Peshwa lost control over his foreign relations  
as well as his internal a ffa irs , and the Poona State virtually  became 
a vassal State of the Government of India.
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P .R .C . , V o l .x i i i ,  p p .195 ,198 . Elphinstone to the Governor-General,
15 June 1817.
O O
P.R.C., Vol.xiii, p.196.
At the beginning of August 1817 Brigadier-General Sir John
Malcolm arrived at Poona to discuss with the Peshwa the disposition
of his forces in the approaching campaign against the P indaris . The
Peshwa, st ill  smarting from the humiliation of the Treaty of Poona, saw
his chance. Under the pretext of cooperating with the Government of
India, he began to recruit a formidable army and to incite  the Maratha
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powers to rise  against the British . At the same time, he conciliated  
his brother and his principal chiefs and began to remove his property 
from Poona. He also began to tamper with the loyalty of the sepoys
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in the British army and succeeded in procuring the defection of a few.
The rupture between Baji Rao and the Government of India
finally  occurred on 5 November 1817 when the Peshwa's troops attacked
85
and burned down the Residency at Poona. On 17 November Poona was
On 15 October 1817 Elphinstone reported that the Peshwa had 
employed almost every single horseman in his State irrespective  
of quality and efficiency . He estimated the strength of the 
Peshwa's forces at 25 ,000  cavalry and about the same number of 
infantry. (P .R .C . , V o l .x i i i ,  p p .219-220. Elphinstone to Governor- 
General, 15 October 1817.)
P .R .C . , V o l .x i i i ,  p p .222-223. Elphinstone to Major Agnew, First  
Assitant C-in-C, 23 October 1817.
In response to the m ilitary preparations of the Peshwa, the Resident 
sent orders to hasten the march of the European Regiment from 
Bombay. He also requested General Smith to send back a light  
Battalion of the subsidiary force from the Narbada (where it had 
gone to participate in the campaign against the Pindaris) to the 
cantonment at Seroor. On 30 October 1817 the European Regiment 
from Bombay arrived at Poona. On 1 November, amid the protests 
of the Peshwa, Elphinstone moved the Brigade from Poona to Kirkee  
because of the threatening position assumed by the Peshwa's troops 
near the British camp and his relentless efforts to seduce the 
Sepoys from their loyalty. Three days later Elphinstone wrote to 
order the light battalion and the 1 ,000  Auxiliary Horse at Seroor
captured by General Smith who had been recalled from the campaign
against the Pindaris. The British flag was hoisted on the Peshwa's
palace and Elphinstone proclaimed as the Chief British Authority in
the Poona State. Lieutenant Robertson was appointed to command the
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city guard and Police.
In December 1817 the Governor-General took a firm decision  
to remove Baji Rao from his masnad. Elphinstone was appointed sole 
Commissioner for the administration of the Poona State. He was instructed  
to adopt the following measures at the end of the war: F irst, the whole 
of the Peshwa's territories (with certain exceptions) were to be occupied 
and annexed to the Company's dominions. Second, Baji Rao and his 
family were to be perpetually excluded from the exercise of all sovereign 
power. Third, Baji Rao was to be banished from the Deccan and kept under 
surveillance. Fourth, the lands of Jagirdars who did not support the 
Peshwa's war against the British were to be taken under British protection.
to march to Poona. They had marched only fifteen  miles when news 
of their approach reached the Peshwa. Alarmed by the news, he 
began to put his army on a war footing. He sent a servant,
Vithoji Naik Gaikwad, to the Residency to demand the return of 
the Bombay Regiment, the reduction of the Native Brigade to its 
original strength and the removal of the British  cantonements to 
a place to be fixed by him. Upon Elphinstone's refusal to comply 
with these demands, the Peshwa left Poona for Parbutty. Less than 
an hour after his departure, the Residency was attacked and burned 
down. This act was followed by the battle of Kirkee which marked 
the beginning of the final rupture between Baji Rao and the British.
P .R .C . , V o l .x i i i ,  p .253. Declaration by the Commanding Officer,
18 November 1817.
Such Jagirdars were to continue to hold their lands on the same terms
as before subject to any modifications which the Government of India
might desire to make in their terms of tenure. F ifth , the lands of
Gokhale and other Jagirdars were to be annexed to British dominions.
Sixth, the Raja of Satara was to be assigned a jagir or a small compact
kingdom. This was deemed necessary to assuage the national feelings
of the Marathas and reconcile them to the change. Seventh, Chimnaji
Appa (brother of Baji R ao ), members of Baji Rao's family who were not
seriously implicated in his 'crimes' and such of the principal officers
of the old regime as could not be employed under the newwere to be
pensioned or provided with jagirs. Finally , Elphinstone was to ask
Brigadier-General Munro to assume the responsibility of introducing
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British  rule into the southern Maratha districts .
On 10 February 1818 Satara was captured and a proclamation
88
issued. Baji Rao's hopes of success against the British were
disappointed by the vigilance of British troops which completely
89
immobilised the armies of Sindhia and the Raja of Berar. In
87
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P .R .C . , V o l .x i i i ,  p p .270-273. J . Adam, Secretary to Government, 
to Elphinstone, 15 December 1817.
The proclamation promised the establishment of the Raja in an 
independent sovereignty. It also promised to protect all Wuttuns 
and enams (hereditary lands), Wurshaushans (annual stipends) and 
all religious and charitable institutions. All religious sects 
were promised toleration. (P .R .C . , V o l .x i i i ,  pp .301-302.)
In a series of skilful manoeuvres, British forces surrounded Sindhia  
in his capital Gwalior and compelled him to agree to the Treaty of 
Gwalior, 5 November 1817. By this treaty, Sindhia agreed to assist  
the Government of India to liquidate the Pindaris. Appa Saheb's
Maharashtra its elf  most of Baji Rao's sardars slowly left him.
Deserted by his principal chiefs, unable to trust his life  to his
remaining adherents and without hope of foreign aid, Baji Rao Peshwa
surrendered near Asserghur when he discovered that he was surrounded
90
on three sides. , On 3 June 1818 he accepted the terms offered by 
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Sir John Malcolm. On 22 August he marched from Mundesoor for
attempts to move to the assistance of the Peshwa were frustrated 
by his arrest and imprisonment on 15 March 1818 at the Residency 
in Nagpur. Holkar 's  army was intercepted on its way to assist the 
Peshwa. On 21 December 1817 his forces were routed in the battle  
of Mehidpur on the Sipra river. On 6 January 1818 Holkar accepted 
a subsidiary treaty.
* Except on the west which led to the wild inhospitable h ills  of 
Northern Kandeish, Baji Rao was surrounded on all sides by British  
troops - General Doveton at Burhampur, Malcolm at Metowla and 
Colonel Russell at Burgham.
The terms included the following:
i .  Baji Rao was to resign for himself and his successors all 
rights, t it le  and claim over the Poona Government or to any 
sovereign power whatever.
i i .  Baji Rao was to proceed immediately with his family and a small 
number of his adherents and attendants to the camp of Brigadier 
General Malcolm. From there he was to be escorted to the city  
of Benares or any other sacred place in Hindustan that the 
Governor-General might select for his residence.
i i i .  Subject to his acceptance of the above terms, Malcolm undertook 
to secure for him and his family a pension of not less than 
R s .8 ,0 0 ,0 0 0  per annum.
iv. Subject to his fulfilment of the Agreement, his requests in 
favour of his principal Jagirdars and others ruined by their 
loyalty to him, as well as of Brahmins of venerable character 
and religious establishments founded and established by his  
family, would be given due consideration.
v . Baji Rao was to accept the above terms and to present himself 
at General Malcolm's camp within twenty-four hours under pain 
of h ostilities  and the termination of all further negotiations.
Bithur where he was destined to end his l ife .
The annexation of Maharashtra marked the culmination of 
British  involvement in the affairs  of the Maratha Empire which began 
in 1802. This involvement stemmed from the dangerous situation created 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century by the political crisis  which 
had rocked the Maratha Empire since 1773. I f  the Government of India  
had been sure that it could turn Baji Rao into a puppet ruler and control 
the Maratha Empire through him, it might perhaps have helped Baji Rao 
to regain his traditional authority over the rebellious Confederate 
Chiefs. But the character of Baji Rao made it unlikely that he would 
be inclined to subserve British interests. Therefore the Government of 
India  resorted to its time-honoured maxim of divide et impera to control 
the Marathas. Taking advantage of the Peshwa's predicament, the Govern­
ment of India  imposed the Treaty of Bassein as the price of restoring  
him to his authority within Maharashtra.
Through the dissolution of the Maratha Confederacy, the 
Government of India hoped to stop the interference of the Maratha 
Chiefs of central India in the affa irs  of Maharashtra as well as their 
rivalry  for control over the Peshwa's Government. It also hoped to 
prevent the Maratha Chiefs from interfering in the affairs  of other
Baji Rao objected to Benares or Allahabad as a place of residence  
for him.
native States in the name of their Confederacy. On the other hand, 
the Government of India sought to curb the disorders which might arise  
from allowing Baji Rao to make ineffectual efforts to command the 
obedience of his numerous subjects outside Maharashtra. The refusal 
of Baji Rao to acquiesce in the dissolution of the Maratha Confederacy 
cost him his sovereignty.
For a time the Government of India relied on threats,
remonstrances and harsh treaties to coerce Baji Rao. By the end of
1817, however, it had become apparent that the ties between the Peshwa
and the Maratha Chiefs could not be severed by remonstrances or
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treaties. The continued existence of the office  of Peshwa was 
therefore seen as a threat to the security of the British Empire in  
India.
The state of our relations to the Peshwa [warned 
Elphinstone in November 1815] has always been 
much influenced by his Highness's personal character, 
and it might be interesting to speculate on the 
form they might assume if  the numerous claims and 
pretensions of this Government were to fall into
As late as October 1817, Malhar Rao Holkar continued to regard 
the Peshwa as his sovereign and to importune Elphinstone for 
permission to receive investiture from him. The Raja of Berar 
continued to maintain an unofficial vakil at Poona despite the 
Treaty of Poona. After the burning of the Residency at Poona, the 
Regent of Holkar's State, Tulsibai, proclaimed her obligation to 
obey 'the orders of her master' ( i . e . ,  the Peshwa) to rise  against 
the British. The Raja of Berar, Appa Saheb pleaded a similar 
excuse of obedience for his attack on the British Residency at 
Nagpur. Sindhia was only restrained from moving for fear of 
risking the immediate annihilation of his army. (P .R .C . , V o l .x i i i ,  
p .3 8 2 .)
the hands of an active and warlike Peshwa, who 
would attend to the improvement of his army, 
conciliate his Jageerdars, and encourage the 
former great feudatories to look on him as their 
chief. It is obvious that in the present state 
of India there are fine materials for a powerful 
confederacy under such a l e a d e r ; . . .  94
In  justify ing  the annexation of Maharashtra, Lord Hastings was even 
more emphatic on the danger to British  interests inherent in the 
o ffice  of Peshwa.
The re-establishment of Bajee Rao upon any 
conditions [His Lordship declared], must appear 
to every one to have been utterly incompatible 
with our honour and security. . .whether we selected 
Chimnajee A p p a ,.. .o r  brought forward Amrut Rao, 
the mischief was inevitably the same. We have 
had full and most serious proof, that no distinction  
of obligation w ill prevent a Peishwah from secretly 
claiming the allegiance of the other Mahratta 
sovereigns; and irrefragable evidence has shown, 
that the implicit obedience recognised as due to 
the mandates of such a head of the Mahratta empire, 
w ill  operate in violation of every solemnity of 
pledge to us; nay, in despite of the individual's  
feelings of attachment to us. There must, then, 
be no Peishwah. 95
Thus Maharashtra was annexed in 1818 because its downfall had become 
essential to the stability  of the British Empire in India. This 
stability  was firmly assured by the extension of British suzerainty  
over Rajasthan which occurred simultaneously with the annexation of 
Maharashtra.
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T .E . Colebrooke, L ife  of Mountstuart Elphinstone, V o l .i , p .292. 
(Emphasis m ine.)
95
P .R .C . » V o l .x i i i ,  p .414. The Marquis of Hastings to the Court 
of Directors, 20 June 1818. (Emphasis m ine.)
Chapter 3 
RAJASTHAN AND BRITISH SUZERAINTY
The extension of British political control over the Rajput 
States in 1818 was, by and large, the by-product of the Pindari war.
It  was yet another example of how a sense of insecurity engendered 
by prevailing political instability  in neighbouring native States 
made it  impossible for the Government of India to adhere to its 
avowed policy of non-intervention in the affairs  of the Indian States.
Between the second Maratha war (1803-1805) and the Pindari 
war (1817- 1818), the formation of new alliances, especially with the 
petty States of Hindustan, was regarded as a source of weakness and 
danger rather than of strength. Opponents of Lord W ellesley1s policy  
maintained that such alliances would involve the Government of India  
in unnecessary wars and conquests. The aversion to further territorial 
acquisitions which existed at this time was partly due to the feeling  
that the Government of India had neither the means nor the men to 
rule a vast empire. The c ivil service was inadequate to the complex 
tasks of administration; and it was feared that while the Government 
of India  might govern a part well and ensure the affection and loyalty 
of the natives, it could only govern the whole subcontinent badly and 
incur the hatred of its people. Already there was growing concern 
about defects in police organisation and about the complexity and 
inefficiency  of the judicial system. These were causing considerable
argued that besides antagonising the m ilitary and ruling classes,
the extension of British dominion had a tendency towards lowering
3
the status of the higher classes and levelling Indian society. For
hardship and resentment among the people of India. It was also
2
See the remarks made on the Zillah Courts in the petition written  
by Meer Ally Gholaum Meeriyam dated about 14 March 1807 and addressed 
to Lord William  Bentinck, Governor of Madras, on behalf of 'the  
ancient Landholders, Puttiels , and Ryots of every description, 
natives of or resident in  the districts of the Bara Mahl, and other 
dependencies of the Sircar of the Company'. (Parliamentary Debates 
1813-1814, V o l .x x v ii , C o ls .1118-1119.)
See also Lord M into's Minute of 24 November 1810 and letter of
29 May 1810 on the state of lawlessness created in Bengal by the 
Dacoits and the inability  of the police to protect the people.
(R. Dutt, Economic History of India under Early British Rule,
Seventh Edition (London, 1950), p p .314-315; Parliamentary Debates 
1813-1814, V o l .x x v ii , C o l .1128.)
Also see Sir Henry Strachey's answers to the Court of Directors' 
Queries about the judicial system in India, (Dutt, o p .c it . , p .316 ); 
W .K . Firminger ( e d .) ,  The Fifth Report from the Select Committee of 
the House of Commons on the Affairs of the East India Company, 28 
July 1812 (Calcutta, 1917), V o l .i i ,  p p .591,592,604,611,636.
In his evidence before the House of Commons in 1813, Sir Thomas 
Munro stated that though the great mass of the Indian population 
was contented with British  rule , there were 'many chiefs and men 
of rank who held situations under the old Government, who cannot 
be expected to remain contented under any European Government by 
which they are themselves excluded from all high situatio ns '.
(Oriental Herald (London, 1828), V o l .x v ii i , p p .39-40 footnotes.)
In  a letter of protest to Lord Hastings about the policy of inter­
vention and annexation of native States, Sir Thomas Munro argued 
that even if  the extension of British  power over the whole of 
India could be achieved without the risk  of internal convulsions, 
it would st ill  be undesirable as it would result in the debasement 
of the natives. He observed: 'The effect of this state of things 
is observable in all the British provinces, whose inhabitants are 
certainly the most abject race in India. The consequence, therefore, 
of the conquest of India by the British arms would be, in place of  
raising , to debase the whole people. There is perhaps no example of 
any conquest in which the natives have been so completely excluded 
from all share of the government of their country as in British India.
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this reason and the danger of possible uprising against the British, 
the policy of interference in the affa irs  of the native States was 
condemned.
From about 1810 onwards, however, the policy of 'ring-fence' 
pursued by the Governors-General, Sir George Barlow and Lord Minto, 
endangered the security of the Government of India. During the 
Nepalese war, an increase in the violence and frequency of the predatory 
attacks on British territories coincided with a steady deterioration in 
Anglo-Maratha relations and a display of hostile intentions by Sindhia 
and Ameer Khan. The remarkable coincidence of these events aroused 
a deep suspicion that the freebooters of India were merely a facade 
for a carefully organised Maratha conspiracy against the Government 
of India. To combat this danger, the Court of Directors relaxed its 
opposition to intervention in the Indian States. To extirpate the 
freebooter system and to extinguish the smouldering ambition of the 
restless Marathas, Lord Hastings decided to deprive them of the 
resources of Rajasthan by establishing the overlordship of the 
Government of India over the helpless Rajput States.
'Among all the disorders of the native states, the field  is open 
for every man to raise himself; and hence among them there is a 
spirit of emulation, of restless enterprise and independence, 
far preferable to the servility of our Indian su b jec ts .' (Quarterly  
Review, (London, 1858) V o l .104, pp .273-274.
i. Political structure and condition of Rajasthan in the 18th
and early 19th century.
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The religious bigotry of Aurangzeb alienated the loyalty 
and support of the Rajput rulers whose valour had helped to stabilise  
the Mughal power in the past. His death in 1707 became the signal for 
a renewed effort by the Rajputs to regain their independence. At a 
meeting held at Udaipur in 1710, the rulers of Udaipur (Mewar), Jodhpur 
(Marwar) and Jaipur (Amber) concluded a triple alliance ' in which they 
ratified  on oath the renunciation of all connexion, domestic or 
p o litical, with the em pire '.^  A further step towards independence
In the contest among the sons of Shah Jahan for the throne of their 
aged father, Jaswant Singh of Jodhpur (Marwar) had espoused the 
cause of Prince Dara. When Aurangzeb eventually succeeded to the 
throne, he found it d iffic u lt  to conciliate the loyalty of the 
leading Rajput rulers. He ultimately contrived to have Jaswant 
Singh and Jai Singh murdered and then began a religious persecution  
of the Hindu race by imposing on them the Jizya . Rana Raj Singh of 
Udaipur (Mewar), in the name of the whole Hindu race, addressed a 
letter of Remonstrance to Aurangzeb. Besides, the Rana provided 
sanctuary for the infant heir of Jaswant Singh (whom the Emperor 
wished to liquidate). He also thwarted the Emperor's marriage to 
the Princess of Rupnagar (a junior branch of the house of Udaipur).
All these acts provoked the Emperor's wrath against Udaipur and in 
about 1678, he invaded it with a formidable army. (W. Crooke ( e d .) ,  
Tod's Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan or the Central and Western 
Rajput States of India (three volumes, London 1920), V o l .i , p p .439- 
445; V o l .i i ,  p p .980-984.)
Crooke (e d .) ,  o p .c it . , V o l .i ,  p .465. Jaipur and Jodhpur were deemed 
to have contaminated their blood by their matrimonial connection 
with the Mughals formed since the days of Akbar. They had therefore 
forfeited the privilege of marrying princesses of the house of Udaipur 
which had preserved its racial purity. But to cement the newly 
formed triple Alliance and emphasise the identity of interest of 
the Rajput States against their common foe, the ban was lifted  on 
the understanding that the female issues of such marriages should 
never again be dishonoured by marriage to the Mughals.
was taken when, shortly before his death in 1716, Rana Amra Singh of
Udaipur obliged the Mughal Emperor to remit the Jizya and to allow
'a l l  places of Hindu faith to be rebuilt, with perfect freedom of
religious w orsh ip '. The Emperor was further obliged to confirm the
Rana's control over the ancient feudatories of his dynasty and to
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restore all districts sequestrated. The repeal of the jizya  was 
confirmed by Emperor Mohammed Shah whose accession marked the beginning 
of the dismemberment of the Mughal empire. For a time, the steady 
disintegration  of the empire seemed to augur well for the ultimate 
independence of the Rajput States. However, the northward expansion 
of the Marathas, and more particularly the conquest of Malwa in 1732, 
introduced an entirely new feature in the politics of Hindustan.
The conquest of Malwa provided the Marathas with a convenient 
base for the extension of their influence into Hindustan. In April 
1734 they attacked Bundi. The alarm created by this attack caused 
Sawai Jai Singh of Jaipur to summon a conference of all Rajput rulers 
in October 1734 to concert measures of common defence. A confederate 
army was established of which the Rana of Udaipur was appointed 
commander.^ Unfortunately, when the crisis  arrived with the entry of
6
Crooke, o p .c it . ,  V o l .i , p .470 (footnotes).
 ^ Crooke, o p .c it . , V o l .i , p .482. This confederacy was formed at
Hurra, a town in the State of Udaipur (Mewar) on the Ajmer frontier. 
Note: The Capitals of the Rajput States are used interchangeably 
with the name of the States in the text.
Peshwa Baji Rao into Udaipur (Mewar) in 1736, the confederacy quailed 
and crumbled. There were 'too many discordant particles - too many 
rivalries and national antipathies' among the Rajputs to permit the 
successful operation of a Rajput confederacy similar to that of the 
Marathas. The claim of Jodhpur and Jaipur to equality with Udaipur
g
made them loath to 'submit to the control required to work it o u t , . . . . '
When the Peshwa entered Mewar, the terrified  Rana welcomed
him at Udaipur and agreed to a treaty which stipulated the payment of
9
an annual tribute. The collapse of the all-Rajput confederacy proved 
to be a tragedy.
Unity of interests [says Tod], was the chief 
character of the engagement, had they adhered to 
which, not only the independence, but the aggrandise­
ment, of Rajasthan, was in their power, and they 
might have alike defied the expiring efforts of Moghul 
tyranny, and the Parthian-like warfare of the Mahrattas.
They were indeed the most formidable power in India  
at this ju n c t u r e ;...  10
Throughout the eighteenth century, the Rajputs continued to evince 
an almost pathological inability  to unite to resist the oppression of 
their common foe. This factor is important in understanding the ease
Crooke, o p .c it . , V o l .i ,  p .483.
Crooke, o p .c i t . ,  V o l .i , p p .493-494. The tribute was R s .1 ,6 0 ,0 0 0 .  
To cover it , the Rana mortgaged the Banhada pargana. The treaty 
remainded in force for ten years and was then set aside by the 
Marathas.
^  Crooke, o p .c it . , V o l .i ,  p p .482-483.
with which the Marathas consolidated their power over Rajasthan in 
the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. It also helps to explain  
British policy towards the Rajput States during this period.
The chronic inability  of the Rajput States to unite against 
their common oppressors was the result of a number of inherent factors 
in the Rajput polity. Among these were weak rulers, endemic clan 
feuds and inter-state rivalries .
The form of government in the Rajput States was somewhat 
patriarchal. The dominant political group in each State belonged 
to one clan, the members of which claimed consanguinity with the ruler. 
In Udaipur (Mewar), for instance, the chief vassalage of the country 
comprised two great sub clans and their numerous branches with their 
own separate t itles . These two great sub clans were the Chundawats 
and the Saktawats, descendants of former Ranas and members of the great 
Sesodia clan. The Chundawats were the descendants of Chunda, the 
eldest son of Rana Lakha, who renounced his right to the throne in 
favour of his younger brother Mokal in the fifteenth century. In 
renouncing his right, Chunda reserved the privilege to advise the Rana 
on all important matters of State. He also reserved for himself the 
principal place in the Council of the Rana. The Saktawats were the 
descendants of Sakta Singh, brother of Rana Pratap Singh. Both were 
descendants of Rana Udai Singh founder of the city of U d a ip u r .^
Crooke, op. c i t . , V o l .i ,p p .193, 323-324.
137.
Among the chief vassals were nobles of the blood royal - offsets of
the younger branches of the reigning Rana's own family within a certain
period. These had appanages bestowed upon them. To this class belonged
12
the Rajas of Shahpura and Banera who were 'too powerful for subjects '.
In Jodhpur (Marwar) the relationship between the ruler and his
nobles was more complicated. The State grew out of several petty
States whose ancient possessions formed a kind of allodial estate system
under the dynasty of Jodhpur. As in most Rajput States, the nobles of
Jodhpur generally resented the ru ler 's  claim to exercise effective
authority over their estates which had been conquered by their ancestors
13
with little  or no assistance from the central authority. Thus in  
several of the Rajput States, there were powerful chiefs who tended to 
look upon themselves as joint owners of the State with their ruler.
In every State [observes S .C . Dutt], the ruling  
class belongs to one particular c la n .. .  The 
humblest members of the clan considered themselves 
along with the ruler as the sons of the same 
father enjoying their patrimony by the same right 
as the ruler him self. The latter was thus nothing 
but a primus inter pares. . .  The State in fact did 
not belong to the ruler - it belonged to the clan 
as a whole. 14
Crooke, o p .c it . ,  V o l .i , p . 168.
A .C . Barnejee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, 
(Calcutta, 1951) p .251.
Quoted in A .C . Barnejee, o p .c it . , p p .246-247.
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This idea of joint ownership of the State by the clan was underscored 
in the complaints made by the chiefs of Marwar against the oppression 
of Raja Man Singh. In their complaint, the chiefs declared:
Sri Maharaja and ourselves are one stock, all 
Rathors. He is our head, we his servants: . . .
When our services are acceptable, then is he 
our lord: when not, we are again his brothers 
and kindred, claimants and laying claim to the 
land. 15
Such a theory of government naturally imposed several disabilities  on 
the power of the Rajput rulers and m ilitated against the emergence of 
a strong central authority capable of imposing unity and enforcing 
discipline  on all subjects.
An additional restraint on the power of the rulers of Rajasthan  
was the existence of a hereditary prime m in is t e r .^  In Jodhpur (Marwar), 
the hereditary prime ministers were always 'mill-stones round the necks 
of their p r i n c e s ' . ^  In Udaipur (Mewar), during the three decades
See Crooke, o p .c it . ,  V o l .i ,  p p .228-229. (Emphasis mine.)
A similar idea was forcefully expressed in the remonstrance of 
the sub-vassals of Deogarh in Udaipur (Mewar) against their chief. 
They declared: 'When Deogarh was established, at the same time 
were our allotments: as is his patrimony, so is our patrimony. . .
Our rights and privileges in his family are the same as his in the 
family of the Presence [ i .e . ,  the Rana].' (Crooke, op. c it . , V o l .i . ,  
pp .231- 232.) (Emphasis mine.)
According to Barnejee, the office  was hereditary in Udaipur but 
not always so in the other States. (See Barnejee, o p .c it . , 
pp .248, 2 5 8 .)
17 Crooke, op.cit., Vol.i., p.218.
before the alliance with the British, the office  was held by the Rawat 
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of Salumbar, leader of the Chundawat clan, who dominated the 
council of Rana Bhim Singh. As the military minister charged with the 
political affairs  of the f ie fs , and backed by a powerful body of 
retainers always at his command, he possessed unbounded prestige and 
authority over the m ilitary classes. He also had great influence over 
the inferior officers of the State. The peculiar constitutional  
position of the Rawat raised serious problems. His powers and 
privileges were ill-defined and he was irremovable. For generations 
the Rawats and the Ranas remained on bad terms. To counterbalance 
the power of the Rawats, the Ranas often supported the Saktawats in  
their feuds with the Chundawats.
The position of central authority in the Rajput States was
further undermined by the custom which denied the ruler the right to
command the direct services of sub-vassals. 'The s o v e r e ig n ,. . . '
says Tod 'has nothing to do with those vassals not holding directly
from the crown; and those who wish to stand well with their chiefs
would be very slow in receiving any honours or favours from the general
19
fountain-head.' The sub-vassal's first loyalty was to his immediate
During the negotiation of the Anglo-Udaipur treaty of 1818, the 
Rana's agent who was a relative of the Rawat of Salumbar tried  
in vain to introduce a clause confirming the Rawat's position as 
hereditary prime minister of Udaipur. Charles Metcalfe, aware of 
its implications, frustrated the request.
19 Crooke, op.cit., Vol.i, p.183.
chief; and according to Tod, there were numerous instances of whole
20
clans devoting themselves to their chief against their sovereign.
Efficiency  could only be imparted to a Government so shackled
by an unusual display of energy of mind and body on the part of the
ruler. ' I f  he re la x ,' says Tod, 'each part separates, and moves in
21
a narrow sphere of its ow n .' During the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, Rajasthan seems to have possessed rulers of considerable
ab ility . Rana Sangram (1508- 1527), for instance, appears to have
exercised the power of resumption and of transfer of vassals from 
22
estate to estate. In  other words, the fiefs  of the great chiefs
were at this time not hereditary. During this period, the energetic
rulers of Jaipur and Jodhpur succeeded in u tilis in g  the power which
they derived from their connection with the Mughal court to strengthen
23
their position at the expense of their feudal chiefs.
This trend towards a strong centralised government, however, 
proved to be short-lived. Owing to the confusion caused by the long 
wars waged against Aurangzeb and his successors, the authority of 
the rulers of Rajasthan fell into decay. In Jodhpur (Marwar), the
Crooke, o p .c it . ,  V o l .i ,  p . 183.
Crooke, o p .c it . , V o l .i ,  p . 174.
Crooke, o p .c it . , V o l .i ,  p p .191-192.
Crooke, o p .c it . , V o l .i i ,  p . 965; V o l .i i i ,  p . 1351.
war with Aurangzeb removed all restrictions on the nobles and the 
r u le r 's  power became practically non-existent for a quarter of a 
century. In  Udaipur (Mewar), the infrequency of attendance at court 
by the nobles, together with their privileges, obscured the marks of 
their subordination. Their estates became fixed and ultimately hereditary, 
and could only be resumed at great peril to the stability  of the State.
The Rajput rulers of the eighteenth and early nineteenth
century were not destined to retrieve the authority of the central
government from the decay into which it had fallen . By a remarkable
and an unfortunate series of coincidences, the Governments of the
leading States were, for the greater part of the eighteenth century,
in the hands of minors and imbeciles. Rana Bhim Singh (1778-1828) was
the 'fourth  minor in the space of forty years who inherited Mewar'.
He was 'defective  in energy and impaired by long misfortune' and
24
'continued to be swayed by faction and in trig ue '. Sawai Pratap
(1778- 1803), the contemporary of Bhim Singh, succeeded to the Jaipur
gadi at the age of thirteen. He was an imbecile who 'used to dress
himself like  a female, tie bells to his ankles and dance within the
harem. His time was mostly devoted to drinking and attending songs
25
and d a n c e s . . . '  In Jodhpur (Marwar), the last years of Bijay Singh
(1752-1792) were 'engrossed by sentimental folly with a young beauty
Crooke, o p .c it . , V o l .i ,  p . 511. Bhim Singh was only eight years 
of age when he became ruler.
Barnejee, o p .c it . , p .352.
of the Oswal tribe, on whom he lavished all the honours due to his
26
legitimate queens' to the disgust of his nobles.
To counterbalance the power of the indigenous nobles and to 
prop up their precarious authority, the Rajput rulers of the eighteenth 
century introduced foreign nobles into their States. Besides, they
2
created standing armies composed of foreign (often Muslim) mercenaries.
These measures tended to antagonise the indigenous nobility and to
widen the gulf between them and their rulers. Feuds and factional
2 8
strife  were the result.
Crooke, o p .c it . , V o l .i i ,  p . 1075.
In Jodhpur (Marwar), Raja Man Singh had a corps of 3 ,5 00  foot and 
1,500  horse with 25 guns. Besides monthly pay, 'lands to a 
considerable amount' were granted to them. At one time the Raja 
of Jodhpur is said to have had a mercenary force of 11 ,000  men in 
his service. In Jaipur, in 1803, the foreign army numbered 13 ,000  
strong. In Udaipur (Mewar), ' the Rana could command four thousand 
Rathors holding lands on the tenure of service' from the estate of 
Ghanerao held by a Rathor noble. (See Crooke, o p .c it . , V o l .i i ,  
p . 1119; Also see Barnejee, o p .c it . , pp .247, 2 6 7 .)
In Jaipur, a section of the nobles waged a war of succession  
against Raja Pratap Singh between 1778 and 1803. In Jodhpur 
the years 1750-73 saw c iv il war between Raja Ram Singh and the 
family of his powerful uncle Bakht Singh. The latter 's  son 
inherited the conflict after his father 's  death. From 1790-1793, 
Bijay Singh 's infatuation with his Oswal concubine embroiled him 
with his nobles and led to a veritable reign of terror, poison 
and murder. Bhim Singh's entire reign (1793-1803) was engrossed 
by the seige of Jalor where his cousin and rival Man Singh had 
taken refuge. In Udaipur, the years 1754-1791 saw the wars of 
succession between Ari Singh and Ratan Singh as well as the 
intensification  of the Chundawat-Saktawat feud. (Banerjee, o p .c it . , 
p p .287-290, 318, 319, 320-22, 3 5 2 .)
Minority and im becility of the Rajput rulers and endemic 
domestic feuds were not the only curse of Rajasthan. Continual inter­
state wars added to the po litical and social confusion. The long­
standing rivalry between Jodhpur and Jaipur for pre-eminence at the 
Mughal court, survived the decay of the Mughal empire. The result of 
this disastrous rivalry and of the disputes which arose from the
29
matrimonial clauses of the triple  alliance formed by Rana Amra Singh
was that the leading Rajput powers became involved in a state of
perpetual warfare. Between 1740 and 1773 Jaipur was continually at
30
war with one or other of her neighbours. Thus Rajasthan was in a 
state of political decay when the Marathas arrived on her soil. Her
One of the stipulations of the triple alliance was that the male 
issues of the marriages between Udaipur (Mewar) princesses and the 
princes of Jaipur or Jodhpur (Marwar) should enjoy priority of 
succession by being invested with the rights of primogeniture.
In 1743, on the death of Sawai Jai Singh, Madho Singh (his younger 
son by a princess of Udaipur) with the support of his uncle Rana 
Jagat Singh of Udaipur, attempted to enforce this stipulation to 
the prejudice of the claims of Isari Singh, the eldest son of 
Sawai Jai Singh. This led to war between Udaipur and Jaipur.
Between 1743 and 1750 and again between 1761 and 1773, Jaipur was 
involved in war with Udaipur. On the former occasion the war 
was caused by the attempt to place Madho Singh on the Jaipur gadi. 
(See footnote above.) On the latter occasion, the war was caused 
by the support given by Jaipur to Ratan Singh (the alleged post­
humous son of Rana Raj Singh and a pretender to the gadi of 
Udaipur). In 1741 and again in 1750, Jaipur was at war with 
Jodhpur - on the former occasion in support of Bikaner (a junior 
branch of Jodhpur) and on the latter occasion in support of Ram 
Singh in the civil war between him and his uncle Bakht Singh. On 
the defeat of Ram Singh, Jaipur offered him sanctuary and often  
threatened to restore him to the Jodhpur gadi by force. Between 
1729 and 1761, Jaipur fought a long drawn out war with the Haras 
of Bundi and Kota with a view to compelling them to acknowledge 
her as their overlord.
Barnejee, o p .c it . ,  p p .287-88, 317-318, 347.
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clans were at war with one another; her leading States were engaged
in interminable rivalry ; her rulers lacked the ability  to give
effective leadership to their subjects. In Tod's picturesque language,
'Rajputana was on the verge of collapse from within while the Marathas
31
were knocking at the gates from without1.
The Marathas found the distracted condition of Rajasthan very
favourable to the extension of their influence. On several occasions,
the Rajput States, either severally or individually, made feeble and
ephemeral attempts to expel the Marathas only to recall them on the
32
next occasion to interfere in their domestic quarrels. The impact
31
Barnejee, o p .c it . , p .246.
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i . In  1744 Isari Singh invoked the aid of the Marathas against
Kota which he wished to convert into a vassal State of Jaipur,
i i .  In 1747-1748 during the c iv il  war between Isari and Madho 
Singh Holkar was invited by the Rana of Udaipur to espouse 
the cause of the latter for the sum of 64 lacs of rupees.
In appreciation of Holkar1s aid , Madho Singh later ceded to 
him four districts (Tonk, Rampura, Torah and Pottah), and 
promised to pay an annual tribute of R s .350 ,000 .
i i i .  In 1752 and again in 1754, the Marathas invaded Jodhpur in 
support of Ram Singh1s cause against his cousin Bijay Singh. 
After defeating a Jodhpur-Jaipur coalition, the Marathas 
obliged Bijay Singh to promise to cede Ajmer.
iv. In 1769, Sindhia besieged Jaipur with a view to installing  
Ratan Singh on the gadi. He only raised the siege on the 
promise of the payment of R s .6 3 ,0 0 ,0 0 0  for which extensive  
lands were mortgaged.
v. In 1791, the Rana unable to restrain the Chundawat-Saktawat 
feud which had been raging since 1784, invited Sindhia to 
expel the former from Chitor. For the next eight years, 
Ambaji Inglia took up residence in Udaipur and became the de 
facto ruler. His authority was maintained by 10 ,000  Deccani 
cavalry and four battalions of trained infantry. During his 
eight years governorship, he accumulated £ 2 ,000 ,000 . (See 
Barnejee, op. c it . , p p .290-291; Sir John Malcolm, A Memoir of 
Central India including Malwa (two volumes, London 1832),
Vol. i , p .154; Crooke, op .citT", V o l .i , pp .494-495.)
on Rajput society of local disorders and of Maratha oppression was 
disastrous. In the forty years between the first Maratha invasion  
in 1736 and the death of Rana Hamir Singh in 1778, the Marathas 
extorted a total of R s .1 ,8 1 ,0 0 ,0 0 0  (nearly £ 2 ,000 ,000 ) from the Ranas 
of Udaipur. This amount did not include individual contributions 
levied on chiefs , ministers and other persons. The Rana Hamir Singh
33
himself estimated contributions levied up to his time at £ 5 ,000 ,000 .
By the end of the eighteenth century, the Rajput polity was fast 
approaching dissolution.
The agriculturist, [says Tod] never certain of the 
fruits of his labour, abandoned his fields , and 
at length his country; mechanical industry found 
no recompense, and commerce was atthe mercy of 
unlicensed spoliation. In a very few years Mewar 
lost half her population, her lands lay waste, the 
mines were unworked, and her looms, which formerly 
supplied all around, forsaken. The prince partook 
of the general penury; instead of protecting, he 
required protection; the bonds which united him 
with his subjects were snapped, and each individual 
or petty community provided for itself  that defence 
which he could not give. Hence arose a train of 
evils : every cultivator, whether fiscal or feudal, 
sought out a patron, and entered into engagements 
as the price of protection. Hence every Rajput 
who had a horse and a lance, had his clients; and 
not a camel-load of merchandise could pass the 
abode of one of these cavaliers without paying 
fees. 34
At this stage, the Rajput rulers realised that their only hope of
33
Crooke, o p .c it . , V o l .i ,  p .510.
34 Crooke, op.cit., Vol.i, p.515. (Emphasis mine.)
re lie f  was an alliance with the Government of India. From the end 
of the eighteenth century they made repeated overtures to the British  
for protection.
i i .  First Anglo-Rajput Alliance ends in disillusionment.
The Maratha dominion of Rajasthan reached its apogee in the
last decade of the eighteenth century. Between 1791 and 1799,
Ambaji Inglia , the agent of Sindhia, was m ilitary dictator of Udaipur.
In June 1790, De Boigne (a French m ilitary adventurer in Sindhia 's
service) avenged Sindhia 's  discomfiture in  the battle of Lalsot (1787)
by in flicting  a crushing defeat on the Jodhpur-Jaipur coalition.
After this defeat part of the Jaipur territory was ravaged and brought
35
under Sindhia 's  control. In September 1790 De Boigne completed the
subjugation of the Rajputs when he defeated Bijay Singh at the battle
of Merta. Bijay Singh was fined R s .6 0 ,0 0 ,0 0 0  (c £600,000) and forced
to cede Ajmer 'which, lying, as it did, half way between Jaipur and
36
Jodhpur, was the key of the country '. For the next ten years the 
Marathas experienced no resistance from the Rajputs.
In this prostrate condition, the Rajput rulers appealed to 
the Government of India for protection. In June 1794 J. P illet , a
Barnejee, o p .c it . ,  p .353. 
Barnejee, o p .c it . ,  p .320.
French m ilitary adventurer in the service of Jaipur proposed a 
protective alliance between Jaipur and the Government of India. In 
a letter to Colonel John Murray, M ilitary Auditor-General in Bengal, 
he stated that he saw
nothing except a well formed alliance between 
the Jaipur Rajah and the Government of His Britannic 
Majesty and the East India Company - if  they see 
their interest in it - that can avert the deluge 
ready to descend on the Rajah 's  head, already preceded 
by a frightful tempest.
P illet  assured Colonel Murray that if  the alliance was formed, the
Raja would be able to support the Government of India with 50 ,000
cavalry besides the resources of his country 'without asking for any
return save a firm protection on the part of the Company and full
37
liberty to enjoy his dominions in peace '.
The Maratha victory at Khardla in the following year increased
the anxiety of the Rajput rulers for British protection. The Rajas
of Jaipur and Kota appealed to Major Palmer for aid and declared their
38
'readiness to enter into engagements of mutual defence '. But 
although the Government of India did not wish to see the Rajput States 
lose their independence, it withheld its protection and recommended 
self-help. In his reply to P illet , Colonel Murray stated that 'the
Quoted in Barnejee, o p .c it . ,  p .356. 
Quoted in Barnejee, o p .c it . ,  p .357.
Northern Rajahs ought to be held up in their independence of the 
Marathas as a counterpoise.. . but this is chiefly to be effected by 
the Rajahs, through their own wisdom, by uniting to resist encroachments 
and by resolution to guarantee each other in their respective dom inions'.
The indifference of the Government of India to overtures for 
alliance  from the Rajput rulers contrasted sharply with the anxiety  
with which it sought the alliance of the Marathas about this time.
The cornerstone of the Government of In d ia 's  foreign policy in the 
eighteenth century was the French threat to British interests in India. 
The object of the diplomacy of Lord Wellesley, especially of his 
subsidiary alliance system, was to establish British ascendancy in 
the major native States which were potential allies  of France. The 
friendship and cooperation of these States were sought by the Govern­
ment of India to defeat French intrigues and to render the resources 
of the major native States available to the British in the event of 
an Anglo-French encounter. Rajasthan in her condition of extreme 
political weakness and depleted resources posed no threat to the 
British . It was obvious that an alliance with the Rajput States would 
be a lia b ility  rather than an asset, and therefore did not have a 
place in the policy of the Government of India.
Furthermore, from 1798 t il l  1802 Lord Wellesley was engaged 
in negotiations which aimed at bringing the Marathas into the subsidiary
Quoted in Barnejee, o p .c it . ,  p .356.
alliance  system. From 1800 the minds of o ffic ials  of the Government 
of India were haunted by the fear of a possible clash with the 
Marathas. By the subsidiary treaty of 1800 concluded between the 
British  and the Nizam, the Government of India had engaged to defend 
him against all enemies, particularly the Marathas. Therefore as long 
as the Marathas remained outside the subsidiary alliance system and 
refused British arbitration in settling their claims on the Nizam, 
the Government of India ran a grave risk of going to war with the 
Marathas in fulfilment of its treaty obligation to the Nizam. It 
was important that nothing should be done to jeopardise the negotiations 
and strain Anglo-Maratha relations. An offer of British protection to 
the Rajput States would certainly have antagonised Sindhia who then 
exercised control over the principal States of Rajasthan and the 
Peshwa's Government. On the other hand, it must have occurred to 
the British that if  an Anglo-Maratha war actually broke out, the 
Rajputs, in their partially  subjugated condition, might furnish an 
instrument for creating a diversion in favour of the Government of 
India . By inciting them to rebellion against Sindhia and Holkar, the 
British  might avoid having to face the united strength of the Maratha 
confederacy. It was in British interests therefore to maintain the 
status quo in Rajasthan and to impress upon the Marathas, and upon 
Sindhia in particular, that it was within the power of the British  
to negotiate an alliance with the Rajput States at any time without 
actually negotiating such an alliance.
Finally , the Government of India had positive orders to 
refrain  from interference in the affa irs  of Hindustan. In a despatch 
to Bengal in 1768, the Court of Directors unequivocally stated that 
they had no desire to become umpires of Hindustan. They declared:
Much has been wrote from you and our servants in 
Bengal on the necessity of checking the Marathas, 
which may in some degree be proper; but it is not 
for the company to take the part of umpires of 
Hindustan. . .we wish to see the present Indian  
powers remain as a check one upon another without 
our interfering . 40
This policy was upheld in 1784 when the British Parliament gave statu­
tory approval to the policy of non-intervention in the quarrels of the 
41
Indian States. For all these reasons, the Rajputs were left to 
rely on their own efforts to resist their Maratha oppressors as best 
as they could.
Nevertheless, events at the turn of the century brought about 
a change in British policy towards Rajasthan. In 1802, the Government
Quoted in P .E . Roberts, History of British In d ia , p . 169. (Emphasis 
m ine .)
Ramsay Muir, The Making of British India 1756-1858, (Manchester, 
1923) p . 174. P it t 's  Act of India 1784, interdicted the Government 
of India from either declaring war or entering ' into any treaty  
for making war, against any of the country princes or states in 
India , or any treaty for guaranteeing the possessions of any 
country, princes or states' without the specific authority of the 
Court of Directors or of the Secret Committee. The only exception 
to the rule was 'where hostilities  have actually been commenced, 
or preparations actually made for the commencement of hostilities  
against the British nation in India, or against some of the Princes 
or states whose territories the Company shall be engaged by any 
subsisting treaty to defend or guarantee'.
of India succeeded in taking advantage of the Peshwa's predicament 
to impose a subsidiary alliance  on his Government. Sindhia, Holkar 
and the Bhonsla were outraged because they regarded the alliance as 
an affront to the Maratha nation. When it became apparent that war 
with these chiefs was inevitable, General Wellesley suggested an 
alliance  with the Rajput States.
In the event of h o stilities  (with the Marathas), 
[he wrote to Lord Wellesley] I propose to dispatch 
proper emissaries to Gohad, and to the Rajput 
chiefs. You w ill  also employ every endeavour to 
excite those powers against Sindhia. I propose 
to guarantee their independence and to secure to 
them any other reasonable advantages which they 
may require. The independence of the Rajputs 
would constitute a power which would form the 
best security to our north-western frontier in 
H industan .. .  42
When war broke out between the British and the Confederate Chiefs,
negotiations were opened and treaties subsequently concluded with
43
Jaipur and Jodhpur in December 1803. Udaipur, the weakest of the
42
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Quoted in Barnejee, o p .c it . ,  p .359. General Wellesley to Lord 
W ellesley, 27 June 1803.
The terms of both treaties were the same. The Company promised 
not to interfere in their internal administration nor demand 
any tribute from them. But i f  the Marathas 'evinced a disposition  
to invade' the Company's territories in Hindustan, Jagat Singh 
and Man Singh were to send the whole of their forces to the aid 
of the Company's forces and exert themselves to expel the enemy. 
During the time of war, or prospect of war, the Princes were to 
act according to the advice and opinion of the commander of the 
British army. They were to exclude all Europeans from their 
service and submit all their disputes with other States to British  
arbitration and award. The treaty with Man Singh was not ratified  
and was cancelled in May 1804. (See Aitchison, Treaties, Engage- 
ments and Sanads, Third Edition (Calcutta, 1892), V o l .i i i ,  p p .94-95, 
143-144.)
Rajput States and the farthest from British possessions, was s ig n ifi­
cantly omitted. These treaties complemented the treaty of Surji-
44
Anjangaon, their object being to constitute the Rajput States into
'a  barrier against the return of the Marathas to the northern parts
45
of H industan '. However, the alliance with the Rajput States proved 
to be short-lived. It  survived the departure of its author by only 
a few months.
Even before Lord Wellesley left India, some of the Company's 
servants had expressed doubts about the wisdom of continuing the 
British  connection with the Rajput States. During the war with Holkar, 
the operation of the alliance  with the petty States of Hindustan did 
not fu lf il  the expectations of the Government of India. One month 
after the declaration of war, it cancelled the treaty with Jodhpur 
because of Man Singh 's assistance to the enemy. The Government of 
India had guaranteed the independence of the Raja of Bharatpur and
By Clause 2 of the treaty of Surji-Anjangaon, (December 1803) 
Sindhia ceded all his forts, territories and rights in the Doab, 
or the country situated between the Jumna and the Ganges, in 
perpetual sovereignty to the British . He also ceded all his forts 
territories , rights and interests in the countries to the northward 
of those of the Rajas of Jaipur and Jodhpur and of the Rana of 
Gohad. But he was allowed to retain possession of his rights in 
the area situated between Jaipur and Jodhpur, and to the southward 
of the former. (Udaipur thus obtained no re lie f  from the treaty.) 
By Article  9, Sindhia renounced all claims on the Rajas with whom 
the Government of India had treaties, namely, Jaipur, Jodhpur, 
Bharatpur and so on. (See C .U . Aitchison, Treaties, Engagements 
and Sanads, Third Edition (Calcutta, 1893), V o l .iv , p .4 1 .)
Quoted in Barnejee, o p .c it . ,  p .324.
granted him additional territory in appreciation of his services in
the war with Sindhia. Nevertheless, he assisted Holkar on the Jumna
and facilitated  his invasion of the Doab. After Holkar's defeat in the
battle of Dig , the Raja offered him refuge in his fortress and thus
46
prolonged the war. The country of the Raja of Jyenagur was considered
by the Government of India as one of the bulwarks of Bengal. But
during the war, Holkar's cavalry as well as his infantry moved through
it unopposed. The country became a v ital link in Holkar's line  of
communication with Malwa. During the war, Captain Sturrock, Resident
at Jaipur, reported his suspicion that the rulers of Rajasthan were
47
w illin g  to form an anti-British coalition.
The depth of the disillusionment of the British with the 
Anglo-Rajput alliance was reflected in a letter from General Wellesley  
to Jonathan Duncan, Governor of Bombay.
I have always been of opinion [General Wellesley  
wrote] that this warfare with Holkar has shown that 
there is no such thing in India as a frontier, 
properly so called, particularly against the 
Mahrattas. In fact, with their horse they can 
penetrate anywhere, excepting across a navigable 
r i v e r ; . . .b u t  Captain Burr says that the Bheels w ill  
defend this frontier, and that by a system of
After the battle of Dig, Holkar took refuge in the fort of 
Bharatpur to which he had been pursued by Lord Lake. Raja Ranjit  
Singh refused to give him up. The fort was besieged but the Raja 
repelled four assaults with a loss of 300 men to the besiegers 
before eventually surrendering the fort. (Aitchison, Treaties  
and Sanads, V o l .i i i ,  p .2 3 3 .)
Barnejee, o p .c it . ,  p p .295-296.
connexion with Oudepoor and different other petty 
Rajahs, we shall have the service of all these 
people. This is another error which this warfare  
with Holkar has exposed. The British Government 
can form no connexion with petty powers of this 
description in In d ia , excepting that of subjection  
on their part and government on ours. Indeed, I 
doubt whether that connexion can be formed; and 
if  I were to choose whether I would connect the 
Company with them or leave them with the Mahrattas, 
I would adopt the latter. Of this I am very sure, 
that I should be much more certain of their 
assistance in the day of need by this system than 
by taking them under the Company. 48
Apart from the disillusionment with the operation of the 
alliance  with the petty Rajas of Hindustan, General Wellesley and Sir 
John Malcolm felt that it was necessary to strengthen Sindhia 's  
Government as a counterpoise to that of Holkar. General Wellesley  
was of the opinion that the Government of India had
weakened Scindiah more than is politic ; 
and that: [it would] repent having established  
such a number of these little  independent powers 
in India , every one of whom w ill  require the 
support of the British government, which w ill  
occasion a constant demand of employment of 
troops, a loss of officers and men, and a claim  
of money. 49
General Wellesley and Sir John Malcolm therefore favoured the continued
48
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Sydney J. Owen (e d . ) ,  A Selection from the Despatches, Memoranda, 
and other Papers relating to In d ia ,o f  Field-Marshal the Duke of 
Wellington (Oxford, 1880), p p .434-435. General Wellesley to 
Jonathan Duncan, E sq ., 14 January 1805. (Emphasis mine.)
Ib id . , p .487. General Wellesley to Major Malcolm, 9 April 1804.
subjugation of the Rajputs to Sindhia 's  authority as one way of strength-
50
ening his Government.
Furthermore, General Wellesley believed that the growth of 
the freebooter system, which he viewed with increasing alarm from 1804 
onwards, was partly attributable to the 'extension of our arms, our 
influence, and our protection: first , by the increase of the number 
of the people, who must and w ill subsist by plunder; secondly, by 
narrowing the scene in which the freebooters may plunder with impunity.' 
He warned that i f  this process continued, British territories could not 
continue to remain immune from the raids of the freebooters. The 
subsequent abandonment of the Rajput States under Barlow's administration  
must have been influenced as much by this consideration as by the 
disillusionment with the Anglo-Rajput alliance and the increase in the 
Company's debts.
Ib id . , p .412, General Wellesley to Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm,
31 July 1806. General Wellesley commented thus on Barlow's policy: 
'The arrangement with Scindiah is precisely that which you and I 
recommended long before, and which I urged, and, I believe, was 
ordered when I was in Bengal in 1804. I thought also at that 
time, and so did you, that the Rajpoots ought to have been subjugated 
to the control of Scindiah 's  government, as the only mode of re­
establishing it ; the state in which it must exist, if  it is to exist 
at a ll . This object might with care and justice have been effected  
at that time, if  the state of Scindiah 's  government had permitted 
it ; and I am not sufficiently  acquainted with all that has passed 
between the Rajpoots and our government since the period of Monson's 
defeat, to be able to decide that we ought not to deliver them over 
to Scindhiah, notwithstanding the favourable change which has taken 
place in the state and dispositions of his c o u n c ils .'
Ib id . , p .467. General Wellesley to Major Shawe, 26 February 1804.
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Under the strain of Lord W ellesley 's  wars, the Company's debts
52
mounted steeply. The alarm caused by the increase in debt led to
his resignation in July 1805. His successor, Lord Cornwallis, went
to India determined to reverse a policy 'which annually calls for
reinforcements of men and for remittances of money, and which yields
53
litt le  other profits except brilliant  G azettes '. He was opposed to 
the extension of the subsidiary alliance system to the petty States of 
India because it would impose upon the Government of India the burden 
of propping up and defending impotent rulers. Lord Cornwallis also 
felt that it would inhibit the emergence of larger and viable States 
which might exercise a stabilising influence in India. His death, 
within three months of his arrival in India, left the implementation 
of this policy to Sir George Barlow, a senior c ivil servant of the 
Company.
Sir George Barlow fully shared Lord Cornwallis' convictions;
and within a month of his succession to the o ffice  of Governor-General,
54
he concluded the treaty of Mustafapur with Sindhia. This was followed
The Company's debt rose from £ 17 ,000 ,000  in 1797 to £ 31 ,000 ,000  
in 1806. (P .E . Roberts, History of British In d ia , p .2 6 1 .)
53
The Directorate of the Chamber's Special Organisation, The British  
Crown and the Indian States (London, 1929), p .27. Letter from 
Cornwallis to Lord Lake, 30 July 1805.
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By the treaty of Mustafapur (November 22 1805), the Government of 
India engaged 'to  enter into no Treaty with the Rajas of Udaipur, 
Jodhpur, and Kota, or other chiefs, tributaries of Sindhia, situated 
in Malwa, Meywar, or Marwar', and 'i n  no shape whatever to interfere  
with the settlement which Sindhia may make with those C h ie fs '.
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by the dissolution of the alliance with Jaipur in July 1806."*' 5 By 
these two measures, Barlow renounced all connection with Rajasthan. 
It was his belief that
with the exception of the defensive alliances  
subsisting between the British government and the 
great powers of India, it was for the interest 
and security of the Company to limit all relations  
with the surrounding states to those of general 
amity; and to trust the safety of its territorial  
possessions to the supremacy of our power, a well- 
regulated system of defence, and a revival of those 
contests and commotions which formerly prevailed  
among the states of Hindustan. 56
To promote the desired contests and commotions, Barlow tried to 
persuade Sindhia to accept the district of Tonk-Rampura in lieu  of 
the R s .400 ,000  promised him under the treaty of Mustafapur. The
Sindhia on the other hand resigned all claims and pretensions to 
dominion over the countries of Bundi, Sumedi, Dholpur, Baree 
and Rajah Kerrah. The river Chambal from the city of Kota in the 
west to the limits of the territories of Gohad in the east, was to 
form the boundary between Sindhia and the British. Sindhia was 
to have no claim on the country northward of the river. (See  
Aitchison, Treaties and Sanads, V o l .iv , p p .57-58; Sir John Malcolm, 
The Political History of India 1784-1823 (two volumes, London, 1826), 
V o l .i , p p .358-359.)
The Jaipur treaty was dissolved on the pretext of breach of treaty.
In lieu of any such pretext in the case of Bharatpur and Macherry, 
Lord Lake was requested to bribe them with lands to agree to release  
the Government of India from its obligation to protect them. (See  
Malcolm, The Political History of In d ia , V o l .i ,  p .373 .)
Malcolm, The Political History of In d ia , V o l .i , p p .361-362.
(Emphasis m ine.)
Governor-General hoped that 'as the territory in question was formerly 
possessed by Holkar, . . . its cession to Sindhia would tend to confirm and 
perpetuate an opposition of interests between those c h ie ft a in s '."^  
Unfortunately, Sindhia rejected the arrangement because he was shrewd 
enough to discern the Governor-General' s motive. As the district was 
too inconveniently situated to be retained by the Government of India, 
Barlow restored it to Holkar.
When Lord Minto assumed o ffice  as Governor-General in July 1807, 
the Government of India had no connection whatsoever with the Rajput 
States. The Maratha threat seemed to have disappeared with the British  
victory over the Confederate Chiefs in the second Maratha war. The 
Peshwa was pre«occupied with domestic issues rather than with foreign  
a ffa irs . Consequently there was no imminent threat to the internal 
security of the British . Externally, however, the perennial French 
menace gave cause for anxiety, and for the first two years of his term 
of o ffice , Lord Minto's attention was diverted from the domestic affairs  
of India.
In January 1808 rumours reached India that a French army was 
advancing towards Persia on its way to India. At the same time, it 
was reported that an advance party of twenty four French military
Ib id . , p .363.
officers had actually arrived in Persia. To provide against any
contingency, Lord Minto informed the Home Government in February of his
intention of sending missions to the States lying on, and beyond, the
Indus for the purpose of negotiating mutual defensive treaties against
any invading army. The Governor-General1s plan was to meet the enemy
'as far beyond our own frontiers, and as near the countries from which
58the enemy is to take his departure, as possible'. Accordingly, 
missions were sent to Persia, Cabul, Sind and Lahore.
Significantly, Lord Minto did not consider enlisting the aid
59of the Rajputs. Without any provocation from the Marathas, he deemed 
it unwise in the prevailing state of emergency to offend them. Besides,
58
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The Countess of Minto (ed.), Lord Minto in India (London, 1880), p.142
If a French army had actually entered India at this time, the Rajputs 
probably would have been brought into an alliance with the Govern­
ment of India. In the heat of the alarm following the signing of 
the treaty of Tilsit (7 July 1807), the Court of Directors sent 
frantic instructions to Minto to foil any French designs by bold 
diplomacy and a show of force. He was directed 'to win the support 
of the Indian princes without seeking to interfere in their domestic 
affairs and to "annihilate" Sindhia and Holkar if they showed fight’. 
To an inquiry from the Directors at this time concerning the 
disposition of the native States towards the British, Minto replied 
on 16 May 1808 that no absolute reliance could be placed on States 
whose political ambitions had been frustrated by the British 
ascendancy; but he was sure that 'with states of another description, 
engagements of co-operation might no doubt be formed, provided these 
engagements should involve obligations of defensive alliance against 
all enemies. Of such alliances there is too much reason to doubt 
the efficiency and policy'. (See V.B. Kulkarni, British Statesmen 
in India, (Bombay, 1961) p.95; Countess of Minto, Lord Minto in India, 
p.107.)
recent experience had convinced the Government of India that the 
Rajput States were a weak and an ineffective barrier against invasion. 
Therefore, during this time, the Government of India continued to reject 
overtures made by the Rajput rulers for alliance. In reply to Jagat 
Singh's appeal in 1808, the Resident at Delhi, Mr. Seton declared that 
'the former treaty had been annulled in consequence of its not having 
been found to produce the expected advantages, and that it was not easy 
to assign a good reason for renewing an arrangement which upon trial had 
proved altogether useless'. He repudiated the argument that the Govern­
ment of India's succession to the supremacy formerly exercised by the 
Mughals imposed upon it the obligation to protect weaker States. He 
declared that 'the British Government did not pretend or wish to be 
considered as the arbiter of the differences between independent States'
and that 'even the exercise of mediatorial interference would be a
60deviation from the system of the British Government'. Thus Barlow's 
policy was upheld by Lord Minto's administration.
Between 1807 and 1811 while Lord Minto's attention was fully
61 62engrossed in foreign affairs, Ameer Khan and Sindhia steadily
Quoted in Barnejee, op.cit., p.366.
Between 1809 and 1811 Lord Minto devoted his attention to the 
conquest of Dutch posts in the Far East which had fallen under 
French control - Amboyna and Java. He also conquered the Isle of 
Bourbon and Mauritius from the French.
Ameer Khan was a Pathan adventurer who entered the service of 
Jaswant Rao Holkar in 1798, with a body of Pathan troops. Between 
1807 and 1810 he gradually made himself the most powerful man in 
central India. In 1810 Holkar's madness made him de facto ruler 
of Holkar's country.
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consolidated their power in Rajasthan. This period represented the
climax of confusion and insecurity in Rajasthan. It saw the revival
and intensification of the rivalry between Man Singh of Jodhpur and
63Jagat Singh of Jaipur for the love of Krishnakumari. It also saw
the war of succession between Raja Man Singh and the Pretender Dhonkal 
64Singh. In April 1807 Ameer Khan took up the cause of the Pretender 
and besieged Jodhpur with the aid of Jagat Singh of Jaipur. A few
Krishnakumari, the beautiful daughter of the Rana of Udaipur (Mewar) 
was first betrothed to Raja Bhim Singh of Jodhpur (Marwar), and 
after his death in 1803, to his successor Raja Man Singh. Man 
Singh, however, incurred the displeasure of the Rana by depriving 
his relative Kishwar Singh of his appanage of Khalirao. As a result, 
the Rana offered the hand of his daughter to Raja Jagat Singh of 
Jaipur. The act rekindled the long-standing rivalry between the 
Kachhwahas and the Rathors. To prevent the celebration of the 
marriage for which the Diwan of Jaipur had sent an army to Udaipur 
(July»September 1805), Raja Man Singh invoked the aid of Sindhia 
who invaded Udaipur in April 1806 and expelled the Jaipur forces.
A compromise was reached by which neither ruler was to marry 
Krishnakumari. The compromise, however, proved to be short-lived.
On the accession of Man Singh to the Jodhpur (Marwar) gadi (1803), 
Sawai Singh of Pokaram, one of the leading chiefs of Marwar, 'put 
himself in hostility' to the new ruler in an attempt to avenge the 
murder of his grandfather by a former Raja, Bijay Singh. Sawai 
Singh set up a Pretender in the person of Dhonkal Singh whom he 
alleged to be the posthumous son of Bhim Singh. In February 1807 
Ameer Khan was induced by a bribe of Rs.100,000 to devastate Jodhpur 
territory. In furtherance of his plans, Sawai Singh prompted Man 
Singh and Jagat Singh to violate their compromise of 1806 and to 
resume their struggle for the hand of Krishnakumari. In April 1807 
a formidable coalition of Jaipur, Ameer Khan, Bikaner and a section 
of the Jodhpur nobility led by Sawai Singh began a siege of Jodhpur. 
Shortly after, however, Ameer Khan defected to the opposite side 
and besieged Jaipur. The price paid by Man Singh for Ameer Khan's 
alliance was the virtual loss of his independence. In July 1810 
Krishnakumari under pressure from Ameer Khan, took poison to avoid 
being married forcibly to Man Singh.
months later, however, he transferred his service to Man Singh and
besieged Jaipur. In the following year Holkar and Sindhia ravaged
Jaipur territory. In his description of the condition of Jaipur at thi
time, Broughton speaks of 'crops all laid waste, the beams and thatch
of the houses carried away, the doors and door-posts broken down, and
6 5of villages smoking in ruins'. In March 1808 Ameer Khan murdered 
Sawai Singh, patron of Dhonkal Singh, and established his power in 
Jodhpur (Marwar). He stationed his garrison in her fortresses such 
as Nagor and Nawa and partitioned the lands of Merta among his follower
Ameer Khan's depredations were not confined to Rajasthan. In 
1809 he subjugated Bhopal which the Government of India regarded as a 
vital link in the line of communication between Bundelkhand and the 
Deccan. In the same year Ameer Khan invaded Berar which was contiguous 
to the Presidencies of Bengal and Madras. It was becoming apparent 
that sooner or later, the Government of India would have to review its 
policy towards the patrons of the predatory system who were endangering 
the peace and security of India. The defeat of Junot at Vimiera by 
Sir Arthur Wellesley and the subsequent recession of the threat of a 
French invasion of India paved the way for the necessary review.
Quoted in Banerjée, op. cit., p. 365.
The patrons of the predatory system in India were the Maratha
chiefs of central India (Sindhia and Holkar), Ameer Khan and the
Pindari chiefs. Sindhia and Holkar were not, strictly speaking, the
sovereign rulers of central India. They were rather military commanders
66in occupation of that country. Nevertheless, since the treaty of 
Bassein, the Government of India had recognised them as independent 
rulers. Their dominion was maintained by force, and their principal 
occupation was to levy contributions from reluctant tributaries at the 
point of the sword. Their courts were held in their camps which were 
perpetually on the move.
The Pindaris were originally Hindu outlaws or freebooters
mentioned as early as 1689. By the eighteenth century, they were no
longer obscure freebooters but powerful and organised banditti. As
the mode of Maratha warfare suited their predatory habits, they were
induced by occasional grants of land or by the prospect of plunder to
attach themselves as irregular cavalry to the armies of Sindhia and 
6 7Holkar. It was the custom of the Pindaris to assemble every year
iii. Extension of the 'Pax Britannica1 to Rajasthan.
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They were military servants of Peshwa Baji Rao I who deputed them to 
take charge of his conquests in Malwa. Their main function was to 
levy the chauth.
Their role was to go ahead of the Maratha armies to plunder (not 
to fight) the enemy. They never enjoyed a reputation for bravery 
as a body. Lee-Warner comments: 'The Pindaris, unlike the Marathas 
or the Sikhs, were united by neither social nor religious ties. They 
were a community of human jackals, who herded together attracted by 
the love of plunder and murder'. Lee-Warner, The Protected Princes 
of India (London, 1894), pp.99-100.
about the beginning of November and set out from their haunts in the
valley of the Narbada on a campaign of pillage, torture and wanton 
destruction.
Ameer Khan was the leader of a body of Pathan adventurers.
The Pathans were a body of paid troops made up of cavalry as well as 
native infantry and artillery. Unlike the Pindaris, they were disciplined 
and regular in their habits. They preyed mainly on the Governments and 
rulers of Rajasthan. Like the Pindaris, nonetheless, they were a lawless 
band in that they werenot amenable to the authority of any settled 
Government.
The potential dangers of the predatory system had been 
foreseen by General Wellesley as early as 1804.
...I think we run a great risk from the freebooter 
system. [General Wellesley wrote.] It is not 
known to the Governor-General, and you can have 
no idea of the extent to which it has gone; and 
it increases daily... Conceive a country, in every 
village of which there are 20 to 30 horsemen, who 
have been dismissed from the service of the state, 
and who have no means of living excepting by 
plunder. In this country there is no law, no civil 
government, and no army to keep these plunderers 
in order; and no revenue can be collected; indeed 
no inhabitant can, nor will remain to cultivate, 
unless he is protected by an armed force stationed 
in his village. This is the outline of the state 
of the countries of the Peshwah and the Nizam. 68
Sydney Owen, Wellington's Despatches, pp.466-67. General Wellesley 
to Major Shawe, 26 February 1804. (Emphasis mine.)
General Wellesley warned that unless something was done to strengthen 
the allied Governments and enable them to maintain law and order in
their countries, the security of the Government of India would be 
seriously jeopardised. In a letter to Colonel Close later in the 
same year (1804) he observed:
There is no longer any power in any of the govern­
ments to restrain the rebellious and discontented 
spirits, and we must expect that they will fly out 
whenever they see a weak or undefended point. The 
only remedy is, to be guarded everywhere, and to 
force our allies to keep up troops for their own 
defence. Till that is effected, our system is 
rotten to the core, and our empire must crumble 
to atoms by the operations of its size and weakness. 69
Thus by 1804, the weakness of the native States had been recognised 
as a potential source of danger to the internal security of the British 
power in India.
In a memorandum which he presented to the Governor-General, 
on the subject of the freebooter system, General Wellesley urged that 
the allies must be compelled to maintain adequate troops as a means of 
providing employment for the military classes in their traditional
Ibid., p.472. General Wellesley to Colonel Close, 27 December 
1804. (Emphasis mine.)
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profession and minimising the danger of the freebooter system.^ If 
this advice had been heeded, the Pindari menace might have been 
nipped in the bud and the Government of India might have been spared 
the expense and anxieties of the Pindari war. Unfortunately, General 
Wellesley's advice was not adopted. The Government of India felt then 
that the maintenance of the forces of the allies in a state of 
efficiency was inconsistent with the purpose of the subsidiary treaties, 
namely, to make the allies dependent upon the Government of India for 
their defence.^
A second remedy suggested by General Wellesley, and later 
adopted by Sir George Barlow, was that there should be no further 
alliances between the Government of India and the remaining States 
of India. He pointed out that the extension of British influence 
tended to aggravate the freebooter system because it increased the 
number of unemployed persons and narrowed the sphere in which they 
might plunder with impunity.
...we have [he observed], within the last 5 years, 
extended ourselves by our policy and our bravery 
over the whole of India, excepting the territories 
of Holkar and the Rajah of Berar; supposing that
70
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Ibid., pp.469-470. Memorandum submitted to the Governor-General 
by Major-General the Honourable A. Wellesley, relative to the 
Freebooter system in India, 2 November 1804.
Ibid., p.468. General Wellesley to Major Shawe, 26 February 1804.
Scindiah should come into the defensive alliance.
In this vast extent of country, in which the 
numbers of the people, with arms in their hands, 
who have no means of living excepting by plunder, 
are so much increased, no man can venture to 
plunder without incurring the risk, at least, of 
being destroyed by a British army. Habits of 
industry are out of the question; they must 
plunder for subsistence, or be destroyed, or 
starve, or be taken into the service of some of 
the allied powers. As we have now narrowed the 
scene so much, we must not expect that our own 
territories will be entirely free from their 
depredations. In fact, if they are to meet the 
Company's troops in all countries, they have no 
choice excepting the richest and best cultivated, 
and those in which they are likely to meet the 
smallest number of these formidable troops. The 
Company's territories answer the description in 
every respect; and there, I think, is the danger 
of our present exalted situation. 72
By and large, this suggestion was adopted two years later when Sir 
George Barlow renounced all connection with the Rajput States and 
virtually designated them and Malwa as areas in which the freebooters 
might operate with impunity. But this measure proved to be no more 
than a palliative. Malwa and Rajasthan became nurseries for the 
freebooters; and from there they began to extend their raids farther 
afield into British territory from 1809 onwards.
Early in 1809 while Lord Minto was still pre-occupied with 
foreign affairs, Ameer Khan and his Pathans invaded Berar. The Raja 
of Berar had no defensive agreement with the Government of India.
Ibid., p.467. General Wellesley to Major Shawe, 26 February 1804. 
(Emphasis mine. )
Nevertheless, Lord Minto offered him the assistance of British troops
to repel the invasion because he appreciated the dangers portended by 
the invasion.
The question [he stated in defence of his action] 
was not whether it was just and expedient to aid 
the Rajah in the defence and recovery of his 
dominions;... but whether an enterprising and 
ambitious Mussulman chief, at the head of a numerous 
army, irresistible by any power except that of the 
Company, should be permitted to establish his 
authority on the ruins of the Rajah's dominions, 
over territories contiguous to those of our ally, 
the Nizam, with whom community of religion, 
combined with local power and resources, might 
lead to the formation of projects for the subversion 
of the British alliance:... 73
The increasing anxiety about internal security caused by 
the activities of the freebooters and the possible renewal of the 
threat of French invasion from the north-west gradually produced a 
change of policy towards Rajasthan. In July 1809 Seton, the Resident 
at Delhi, wrote:
I am very sensible of the political advantage of 
conciliating the Chiefs of the Rajput States to 
the westward of the British possessions, more 
especially those situated towards the Indus. If 
the powerful Rajas of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Udaipur - 
supposing the government of the latter country to 
be once more organised - and the petty Chiefs of 
Bikaner and Jaisalmer and the ruler of Bahawalpur 
were cordially attached to us, a barrier might be 
formed against invasion... 74
73 The Countess of Minto, Lord Minto in India, pp.191-192.
74 Quoted in Barnejee, op.cit., p.367. Political Consultations, 
5 August 1809, No.l.
In May 1810 during Ameer Khan's invasion of Udaipur (Mewar), the 
Resident at Delhi warned that if Ameer Khan was allowed to obtain 
complete control of the country, his power would become very formid­
able.^^ In 1811 Charles Metcalfe, Resident at Delhi, called the
attention of the Government of India to the strategic advantages of
76an alliance with the Rajput States. But although Lord Minto was 
not unaware of the strategic importance of an Anglo-Rajput alliance, 
he was not prepared to inaugurate a new policy on his own initiative 
and responsibility. He therefore told Metcalfe that although he was 
'far from insensible of the actual and prospective evils resulting 
from...the state of affairs in the north-western quarter of Hindustan'
The Resident wrote on 8 July 1810: 'It is greatly to be feared 
that Amir Khan will at length succeed in getting possession of 
Udaipur and thereby putting an end to the sovereignty of the most 
ancient and most venerated of the Rajput Chiefs. The country is 
so strong and so easily defended that, if once the Pathans were 
in possession of the strongholds and passes, it would be next to 
impossible to dislodge them, and in its productiveness they would 
find immense resources. It would, moreover, insure and facilitate 
to Amir Khan the conquest of Jaipur where it would appear the 
greatest alarm prevails.' (See Barnejee, op.cit., p. 301. Emphasis 
mine.)
Metcalfe wrote: 'A confederation of the Rajput States under the 
protection of the Central Government...would deprive the vagabond 
armies of India of their principal resource for ravage and plunder 
The intervention of the Rajputs under our influence would prevent 
any co-operation between those Northern and Southern powers that 
we have reason to suppose ill affected towards us.' (Quoted in 
Barnejee, op.cit., p.368. Secret consultation 12 July 1811, No.l. 
Emphasis mine.)
he was not prepared to 'enter upon the extensive and complicated field 
of military and political operations necessarily involved in the
77adoption' of a policy of intervention.
Though Lord Minto was unwilling to deviate from the policy 
of non-intervention pursued by his predecessor, nonetheless, between 
1809 and 1813, he frequently called the attention of the Home Government 
to the growing dangers of the predatory system. In a Minute dated 1 
December 1809, he called upon the Directors to decide
whether it was expedient to observe a strict 
neutrality amidst these scenes of disorder and 
outrage which were passing under our eyes in the 
north of Hindostán, or whether we should listen 
to the calls of suffering humanity, and interfere 
for the protection of those weak and defenceless 
States who implore our assistance, to deliver them 
from the violence and oppression of an ambitious 
and lawless upstart. 78
In October 1812 Lord Minto informed the Secret Committee that defensive
measures against the freebooters were inadequate and that a complete
79extirpation of the predatory system was imperative and unavoidable.
A few months before he left India, Lord Minto urgently called 
the Directors' attention to the state of insecurity in which the
^  Quoted in Barnejee, op.cit., p.369. Secret Consultations 16 August 
1811, No.2.
78 The Countess of Minto, Lord Minto in India, p.194. (Emphasis mine.)
79 Malcolm, Political History of India, Vol.i, p.484 footnote.
British territories had been placed by the activities of the freebooters
In a secret letter to England he observed:
The situation of these freebooters on the frontier 
of the dominions of Nagpore, in the vicinity of 
those of our allies, the Paishwah and the Nizam, 
and at no very remote distance from our own 
possessions: their augmented numbers, improved 
organisation, and increased boldness, arising 
from the success and impunity with which their 
depredations have been attended; the powerful 
instrument of conquest or devastation which they 
present to the hand of an ambitious or enterprising 
chief, or a foreign invader; and a variety of other 
reflections,... all combined to render the adoption 
c£ an extensive and energetic system of measures 
for their suppression, a matter which presses with 
increased urgency on our attention, and will become 
an early object of our concern. 80
Thus by the end of Lord Minto's term of office, the policy of Sir
George Barlow was becoming outmoded. The numbers of the Pindaris
had increased; and the commotion he ignored, and even sought to promote
81in Hindustan, was threatening to overwhelm British territories.
Lord Minto was succeeded by Lord Hastings (Earl of Moira) 
early in October 1813. Born on 9 December 1754, Lord Hastings was 
the eldest son of Lord John Rawson and his third wife, Lady Elizabeth 
Hastings. Francis Rawdon-Hastings, the future Governor-General of
80
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Ibid., Vol.i, p.409. (Emphasis mine.) Secret letter from Lord 
Minto to Court of Directors 4 February 1813.
In 1811, 1812 and 1813, the numbers of the Pindaris greatly 
increased. In 1813, they passed through Bundelkhand, ravaged 
the vicinity of Mirzapur and threatened the rich province of 
Bihar.
in 1771 at the age of seventeen. After matriculating at University
College, Oxford, young Francis was promoted lieutenant in the 5th
Foot in 1773 and sent to North American to fight in the War of
Independence. He returned to England after eight years of active
and distinguished service and was appointed aid-de-camp to the King.
In 1793, on the death of his father, he succeeded as the second Earl
of Moira in the peerage of Ireland. In 1803, he reached the summit
82of his profession when he was promoted General. Lord Hastings was 
therefore highly qualified by military ability and experience to 
grapple with the disturbed situation in India.
When Lord Hastings arrived in India, the French menace which 
had persistently haunted the imagination of his predecessors had 
receded. Napoleon's power was on the decline. Mauritius, the base 
from which French naval operations against India were directed in 
the past, had been captured. The main task before the Government of 
India was one of social reform. The British nation was slowly becoming 
aware of her obligation to the people of India. In the Parliamentary 
debates of 1813 which preceded the renewal of the Company's charter, 
several speakers pointed out that India was no exception to the rule 
which declared the happiness of the subject to be the end of government.
India, was educated at Harrow and gazetted Enzign in the 15th Foot
Major Ross-of-Bladensburg, Rulers of India, Marquess of Hastings, 
(Oxford, 1900), pp.7-30.
They urged Parliament to make the British dominion in India not only
83valuable to the British nation but also beneficial to the natives.
In response to these appeals, Parliament directed the Governor-General 
to devote Rs.100,000 (about £10,000) annually out of surplus revenue 
to the purpose of education. At the same time it was made easier for 
missionaries to go to India to promote Christianity. These object­
ives naturally required an era of peace, security and order for their 
attainment. Lord Hastings fully realised that there could be no 
personal security, prosperity or social progress as long as the free­
booters were allowed to exist and terrorise the population.
It did not take Lord Hastings long to make up his mind about
the Pindaris. During the first two years of his term, while his
attention was engrossed by the Nepalese war, the predatory powers
caused his Government much anxiety. Ameer Khan approached within
twelve marches of Delhi with about 30,000 efficient fighting men and
about 125 guns. To combat this threatened invasion, Lord Hastings
mobilised 4,500 cavalry and infantry. A force of 1,000 irregular
horse was held in readiness to oppose the Pindaris. To check Sindhia,
who was at Gwalior only three marches from the Doab, five from Delhi
84and five from Agra, troops were assembled at Cawnpur. In the south,
Parliamentary Debates (1813), Vol.xxvi. Cols.516-518, Col.832; 
Ibid., (1813-14), Vol.xxvii, Cols.1103-1104. The speeches of 
William Wilberforce and Robert Rickards.
Major Ross-of-Bladensburg, op.cit., p.68.
the subsidiary corps in the Deccan was strengthened and the whole
disposable force of the army of fort St. George advanced to the banks
85of the Tungabhadra. In spite of these defensive measures, the
Pindaris succeeded in raiding the Madras Presidency. In February 1816,
a party of them, about 23,000 strong, passed near Seroor then south
of Hyderabad and fell upon the unprotected province of Guntur. Th^r
86carried off booty to the\alue of about £1,000,000 sterling.
Early in 1814 and in 1815, Lord Hastings called the attention
of the Home Government to the prevailing state of lawlessness in
India. In March 1814 he suggested that 'the British Government should
become the acknowledged head of a confederacy, the whole strength of
which we should have a right by compact to wield against any invader
87of the public respose.' In a Minute dated 1 December 1815, he 
declared his suspicion that the Pindari raids were instigated by the 
Marathas and assured the Directors that
if there was no choice left, he should prefer an 
immediate war with the Mahrattas, for which [the 
Government of India] should be fully prepared, to 
an expensive system of defence, against a consuming 
predatory warfare, carried on clandestinely by the
Malcolm, Political History of India, Vol.ii, p.cxxxix.
Ramsay Muir, The Making of British India, p.259.
Amales Tripathi, Trade and Finance in the Bengal Presidency 1793- 
1833, (Calcutta, 1956) p.161; C.H. Phillips, The East India Company 
1784-1834, (Manchester, 1940), p.213.
Mahratta powers, wasting our resources, till 
they might see a practicable opportunity of 
coming to an open rupture. 88
The Court of Directors, however, continued to regard the Pindari raids
as an insignificant distraction and prohibited Lord Hastings 'from
making any change in the sys tem of our political relations without
89special authority from home1. Lord Hastings was asked to desist
'from engaging in any plans of general confederacy, and offensive
operations against the Pindaris, either with a view to their utter
90extirpation, or in anticipation of expected danger'.
Quoted in J.C. Marshman, The History of India (three volumes,
London, 1869), Vol.ii, p.312.
89 C.H. Phillips, The East India Company 1784-1834, p.214. 
Buckinghamshire, President of the Board of Control, declared that 
the Home Government 'saw no reason to alter the existing situation 
or treaties... We are not willing to incur the risks of a general 
war for the uncertain prospect of reducing or removing the predatory 
bands... The confederacy which the Governor-General is desirous to 
establish would prove a source of weakness;... it might hazard 
the dissolution of our existing alliances;... it would excite 
jealousies with respect to our policy;... it might lead to a combina­
tion among the native powers by which we might be involved in a 
contest more extensive than any before... We are much disposed to 
discourage that system of minute interference in their internal 
affairs,...' (See Ibid., pp.213-214. Emphasis mine.)
90 Major Ross-of-Bladensburg, op.cit., p.90. Commenting on the 
prohibition, Lord Hastings wrote on 15 April 1816: 'A village 
was surrounded by the Pindaris. The horrors perpetrated by these 
demons at other places made the poor villagers, totally unarmed, 
and incapable of resistance, fly to the desperate resolution of 
burning themselves with their wives and children. The houses were 
all of wood and palm leaf mats; so that most of them being set fire 
to at once, the dreadful sacrifice was immediately fulfilled. Some 
boys who had not the courage to bear the flames escaped, and 
explained the circumstances. All the rest of the inhabitants 
perished; and I am strictly forbidden by the Court of Directors to 
undertake the suppression of the fiends who occasioned this heart 
rending scene, lest I should provoke a war with the Mahrattas.
(See Ramsay Muir, The Making of British India, p.259. Private 
journal of the Marquess of Hastings, Vol.ii, p.112. Emphasis mine.)
Before this despatch arrived in India (April 1816), the
Pindari raids into the Company's territories had become serious.
In February 1816 the Pindaris had made a destructive incursion into
Ganjam in the Northern Sircars. During the eleven and half days that
they were in the Company's territories, they plundered three hundred
and thirty-nine villages and killed one hundred and eighty two people.
In addition, they wounded five hundred and five people and tortured
91three thousand six hundred and three in various ways.
The effect of these raids on the loyalty and confidence of 
the people of the Madras Presidency, where violence on such a scale 
had been unknown for forty years, was alarming.
I speak with full knowledge of the state of 
opinion [wrote Sir John Malcolm to the Governor- 
General] when I assert, that in the south of India 
such has been the consequence of these events, that 
the best disposed of our subjects have had their 
minds shaken in the opinion they before entertained 
of the superiority and permanence of our power, 
while the disaffected and the turbulent rejoice 
in this change of sentiment, and look forward 
with expectation to the further progress of a 
system which revives their subdued hopes of oppos­
ing the British Government, every moment of whose 
forbearance to avenge the deep insult and injury 
it has received is naturally construed by this 
class into inability to meet the danger. At such 
a period, to talk of defensive measures as in any 
way calculated to meet this evil, is to betray a
Ramsay Muir, The Making of British India, p.260. E.I.C. Papers on 
Pindari and Mahratta war 1824, p.54.
total ignorance of the character of our rule, 
and the foundation upon which the British 
government in India rests. 92
Sir John Malcolm feared that unless the Government of India destroyed 
the Pindaris, their example would be emulated in the Deccan; and 
every unemployed soldier with a horse and a sword would rise against 
the British.
The gravity of the danger from the Pindaris made it no longer 
possible for the Directors to persist in their policy of non-intervention. 
In a letter authorising the Government of India to take action against 
the Pindaris, the Directors stated:
...On former occasions parties of the Pindaris have 
extended their incursions with temporary success 
into the British territories; but we have not before 
had to notice an invasion so systematically directed 
against our provinces, so disastrous in its effects, 
and perpetrated with such entire impunity...
The Directors told Lord Hastings that their prohibition of an anti- 
Pindari confederacy was not intended to restrain him from taking measures 
to punish actual outrages on British territory or on British subjects.
The despatch then concluded:
Malcolm, Political History of India, Vol.ii, Appendix iv, p.cxl. 
Sir John Malcolm to the Marquess of Hastings, 17 July 1817.
The dreadful cruelties which, we are informed, were 
committed by these freebooters on the inhabitants 
of the villages have excited our warmest indignation.
To protect these peaceful inhabitants against such 
outrages, is a duty which no apprehension of 
inconvenience can justify us in leaving unperformed. 93
The establishment of British suzerainty over Rajasthan was a direct 
result of the above instruction and formed part of the arrangements 
made for the suppression of the Pindaris. In other words, the extension 
of British political control to Rajasthan was not triggered off by an 
urge for imperial expansion but by the necessity to curb political 
instability in India.
Before the arrival of the above despatch in India, the
Supreme Council had arrived at an unanimous decision 'that the
extirpation of the Pindaris must be undertaken, notwithstanding the orders
of the Court of Directors against adopting any measures against those
94predatory associations which might embroil us with Sindhia'. There
was increasing suspicion that the Marathas were using the Pindaris as
95a cover to carry on guerrilla warfare against the British. Their
93
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95
Ramsay Muir, The Making of British India, p.261. E.I.C. Papers on 
Pindari and Mahratta war, 1824, p.40. Letter dated 26 September 
1816. (Emphasis mine.)
Ramsay Muir, op.cit., p.263. See Marshman, History of India, Vol.ii, 
p.319 for the Pindari raids of 1816-17.
Malcolm, Political History of India, Vol.ii, Appendix iv, pp.clii, 
cliii, clvii. Sir John Malcolm to the Marquess of Hastings, 27 
July 1817. Sir John commented: 'It has been, since the conclusion 
of the war in 1805, a favourite opinion with the Mahrattas, that we 
can yet be opposed by a predatory system of warfare, and that our 
power may be reduced like that of the successors of Aurung Zebe,
extirpation was therefore considered imperative.
Lord Hastings' plan was to root out the Pindaris from their 
haunts which lay in Malwa, approximately north of the Narbada, between 
Ujein in the west and Bhopal in the east. They were to be surrounded 
on all sides - on the north and east from Bengal, on the south from 
the Deccan and on the west from Gujerat. As Sindhia, Holkar and Ameer 
Khan had a stake in the continuance of the predatory system, the 
Government of India anticipated that they might attempt to resist the 
destruction of the Pindaris. Therefore it considered the petty 
independent States of central and northern India which continued to 
be victims of the predatory system, as its logical allies.
The Government of India saw several advantages in an alliance 
with the Rajput States for the projected campaign against the Pindaris. 
First, it would enable the Government of India to command the resources 
and strategic advantages of Rajasthan. From its situation, Kota was 
likely to be within the area of the first operations. In that case,
by the incessant attacks of plunderers, upon our territories and 
resources; and the Pindaries have been for some years past considered 
as one of the great means of accomplishing this object...
...Sindia carries on a harassing war against us, without exposing 
himself to any of the distresses and dangers of that condition.
His troops, most of which are similar in dress, in cast, and in 
habits to the Pindaries, swell the bands of these freebooters, 
when they proceed on their plundering excursions; and the latter, 
when they desire to elude our pursuit take shelter in his country, 
and melt into his army.' (Emphasis mine.) Sir John Malcolm felt 
that a suppression of the freebooter system would paralyse the 
Marathas.
it could not remain neutral in view of its close relationship with
96the predatory chiefs. The Government of India could not afford to
allow Kota1s resources to be employed against the British by the
enemy. Bundi commanded a very important pass into Hindustan which
could be used to intercept the flight of the Pindaris. Second, an
alliance with the Rajputs was necessary to ensure that the Pindaris
97would be deprived of places of refuge or new haunts. Above all, an 
alliance with the Rajput States was necessary to obviate the ultimate
Zalim Singh of Kota farmed extensive districts from Sindhia and 
Holkar. These districts adjoined his southern frontiers. From 
the former, he rented the Panj-Mahals; and from the latter, the 
important districts of Dig, and Pirawa (in the States of Bharatpur 
and Tonk respectively). Zalim Singh also had Maratha Pandits of 
great talent in his administration. Through them no political 
measures of the Marathas escaped his knowledge. As for Ameer Khan, 
he obtained his military stores and supplies of every kind from 
Kota whose castle, Shirgarh, afforded a sanctuary for his family. 
Several Pindari chiefs also held grants of land in Kota. (See 
Crooke, op.cit., Vol.iii, pp.1573-1574.)
Malcolm, Political History of India, Vol.ii, Appendix iv, pp.clix, 
clxvi. In a letter to Man Singh, Raja of Jodhpur (Marwar), on 
the eve of the Pindari war, Chitu, one of the Pindari chiefs, wrote 
'...without a place of refuge and safety for our families, our 
minds cannot be at ease. The Maharajah Sindhia cannot give the 
wished-for place, as his intentions towards us would then be 
obvious to the English; for this reason, considering our necessity 
for a place of refuge, I have hopes that from your favour the 
place you assigned for the residence of Jeswunt Row Holkar's 
family may now be bestowed for the families of your slaves; then 
it will reach your ear to what straits and difficulties I have 
reduced the English, for the whole of their country, even to 
Calcutta, shall be consigned to devastation and plunder. Let 
the Huzoor [i.e., the Presence] have reliance on us, and we your 
slaves shall always be at your command.'
establishment of a Pathan dynasty on the ruins of the Rajput States.
Jaipur, from its proximity to British territories, was of great 
strategic importance to the Government of India. Sir John Malcolm 
warned that its occupation by Ameer Khan and his Pathans
would give them increased means of invading our 
richest provinces in Hindustan, and of maintaining 
a direct and constant intercourse with the most 
turbulent part of the populations of our territories 
in that quarter, who are of the same tribe, and, 
indeed, generally speaking, their near kindred.
He reminded the Governor-General that it was to anticipate this conting­
ency that the Home Government had authorised the renewal of the Anglo- 
Jaipur treaty which was dissolved by Sir George Barlow in 1806. He 
not only felt that without British aid, Jaipur could not survive as 
an independent State, but also that
Contemplating the approaching crisis, the necessity 
of altering our relations to Jypore is too imperative 
to admit of delay. We must command the territories 
of this state both for operations and supplies, or 
they will furnish our enemies with means of attacking 
us in a very vulnerable quarter. 99
The greatest portion of Ameer Khan's troops were stationed in 
Jodhpur (Marwar), and he was contriving to make the extensive 
and valuable tracts of lands usurped from the Raja 'hereditary in 
his family'. He even thought of supplanting the Raja by his son. 
(See Malcolm, Political History of India, Vol.ii, Appendix iv, 
p.clviii.)
Malcolm, Political History of India, Vol.ii, Appendix iv, p.cxlvii. 
(Emphasis mine.)
This opinion was shared by Lord Hastings and Seton, member of the
TOOSupreme Council.
On 20 April 1816 the Governor-General instructed Charles
Metcalfe to negotiate a treaty with Jaipur. To enable the Government
of India to form alliances with Kota, Bundi, Udaipur (Mewar) and
Jodhpur (Marwar), it was necessary to abrogate Article 8 of the treaty
of Mustafapur by which Sindhia's power over those States was recognised.
In September 1817, the Government of India demanded Sindhia's 'cordial
and unqualified support in the Pindari war'. He was warned that
failure to comply would be regarded as an act of hostility. ^  In
the following October the Governor-General informed Metcalfe of his
decision to use the Rajput States as 'a barrier against the revival
of the predatory system or the extension of the power of Sindhia and
Holkar beyond the limits to be assigned to it by the measures then
102(October, 1817) in progress'. Without waiting for Sindhia's formal 
consent, the Governor-General instructed Metcalfe to conclude treaties 
of alliance with all the Rajput States.
Barnejee, op.cit., pp.372,373. Minutes by Lord Hastings and 
Seton dated 13 April 1816 and 17 April 1816, respectively.
Major Ross-of-Bladensburg, Marquess of Hastings, p.108.
Baner.jee, op.cit., p.385. Secret Consultations, 28 October 1817, 
No.13.
Early in November 1817, while Sindhia still hesitated,
British troops secretly advanced towards his territory. Two strong 
corps were posted on the northern frontier of his territories about 
sixty miles apart and scarcely., two marches from Gwalior. About the 
same time, troops from the Deccan blocked his line of communication 
with Maharashtra where the Peshwa was on the brink of a rupture with 
the British. With barely 8,000 troops at his capital, and almost 
surrounded, Sindhia reluctantly signed the treaty of Gwalior on 
5 November 1817. By this treaty, he agreed to cooperate with the 
Government of India in extirpating the Pindaris. The two Governments 
were to 'expel them from their haunts, and to adopt the most effectual 
measures to disperse and prevent them from re-assembling'. In further­
ance of this object, Sindhia agreed to the abrogation of the 8th 
article of the treaty of Mustafapur and thus left the Government of 
India 'at full liberty to form engagements with the States of Odeypoor,
Joudpoor, and Kotah, and with the State of Boondee, and other substantive
103states on the left bank of the Chumbul'.
The nature of the connection which the Government of India 
wished to establish with the Rajput States was one in which their 
rulers would stand in the position of subordinate allies. It was 
hoped that such a relationship would secure for the Government of India
Malcolm, Central India, Vol.ii, Appendix No.xvi, p.396.
discretionary powers which would enable it to control the foreign 
and, where necessary, the domestic policies of the Rajput States.
They will naturally fall into a dépendance upon 
our protection [suggested Malcolm to the Governor- 
General], which will put it out of their power, as 
it ought to be, to reject any engagement that is 
formed on liberal and equitable principles. It 
may be generally observed, that we cannot perhaps 
leave such states, too much at liberty in their 
internal rule, nor limit them too strictly on all 
subjects of foreign policy; they must indeed 
subject their councils on all such points to our 
control, or there can be no safety in the 
connexion. 105
The Government of India did not deem it necessary to annex 
the Rajput States as it had already decided to do in the case of 
Maharashtra. Unlike the Peshwa, the Rajput rulers had no pretensions 
to political supremacy in India and their conduct had never given the 
Government of India cause for anxiety. Nor were they likely to do so 
in the foreseeable future either individually or collectively. The 
Rajputs lacked a national sentiment comparable to that of the Marathas
Commenting on the opposition of the Jaipur Vakils to a clause 
in the first draft of the Anglo-Jaipur treaty, Metcalfe suggested 
that the Government of India should not insist upon it since 
'the exercise of the power of arbitration in all disputes between 
Jaipur and other Powers, and on all claims brought forward on 
that State, was inseparable from the character of protector which 
the alliance would give us, and did not absolutely require any 
specific stipulation'. (See Barnejee, op.cit., p.382, footnote. 
Secret Consultations 2 November 1816, No.l.)
Malcolm, Political History of India, Vol.ii, Appendix iv, pp.cxc- 
cxci. (Emphasis mine.)
and were unlikely ever to produce a national leader of the disposition 
of Baji Rao. Their history showed that there were too many jarring 
interests in their parochial, feudal communities to make them capable 
of community of interest and unity of action. Headed by imbecile and 
dissolute rulers whose authority was held in contempt by their feudal 
chiefs, the Governments of Rajasthan lacked the energy and means to 
defy the British power even if they had the inclination. Furthermore, 
it was unnecessary to annex the Rajput States because it was anticipated 
that they would acknowledge British supremacy more readily than the 
Peshwa or the Nizam. 'Accustomed to own a superior', the Rajput
rulers had shown themselves to be 'proud of dependence on a great
. 106government .
The Government of India was not keen on extending its terri­
torial sovereignty. It was convinced that the ultimate assumption of 
sovereignty over the whole of India was inevitable. But it wished to 
postpone this event for as long as practicable.^^ It was aware that 
it would take a long time for the people of central India and Rajasthan 
to accommodate their habits to the demands and restraints of settled 
government. In the meantime, the Government of India favoured an 
arrangement which would enable it to exercise general control through
Ibid., p.cxlix.
See Malcolm, Political History of India, Vol.ii, Appendix viii, 
pp.ccl^xix-cclxxx. Instructions by Major-General Sir John Malcolm
G.C.B., K.L.S., to officers acting under his orders in central 
India, in 1821.
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its influence rather than the establishment of direct British rule. 
In other words, the Government of India wished to retain the Rajput 
rulers and use them as instruments for maintaining tranquillity in 
Hindustan.
In his instructions to Charles Metcalfe dated October 1817, 
the Covernor-General asked him to conclude treaties with the Rajputs
on conditions which should give to the British 
Government the entire control over their political 
relations and proceedings with each other and with 
foreign States, secure to them the enjoyment of 
their territorial possessions and the independent 
exercise of their internal administration under 
our protection and guarantee, and render their 
resources available for defraying the charge that 
will be incurred in the establishment and support 
of this system. 108
Between December 1817 and December 1818, Metcalfe concluded treaties 
with all the Rajput States on the basis of the above instructions. 
The terms and objects of these treaties were fundamentally the same.
The treaties established 'perpetual friendship, alliance, 
and unity of interest' between the East India Company and the rulers 
of Rajasthan, their heirs and successors. The 'friends and enemies
Quoted in Barnejee, op.cit., p.385. Secret Consultations, 28 
October 1817, No.13. (Emphasis mine.)
Aitchison, Treaties and Sanads, (Calcutta, 1892) Vol.iii; also 
Crooke, Tod's Annals of Rajasthan, Vol.ii, Appendix, pp.927-928, 
Vol.iii, Appendix, pp.1829-1835.
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of one party' were to be regarded as the 'friends and enemies of both'. 
In return for the protection of their States, the Rajput States were 
required to 'act in subordinate co-operation' with the Government of 
India. They were to 'acknowledge its supremacy' and to have no 
'connexion with other chiefs and states'. The rulers of Rajasthan 
were further required to renounce their right to 'enter into negotiation 
with any chief or state without the knowledge and sanction of the 
British Government'. They and their heirs were to refrain from committ­
ing aggression on any one, and were to submit their disputes with any 
State to the arbitration and award of the Government of India. To 
defray the cost of their defence, the Rajput rulers were required to 
pay tribute in perpetuity to the Government of I n d i a . P a y m e n t  of 
tribute to the Marathas or connection with them on that account was 
to cease. In addition to tribute, the Rajput rulers agreed to furnish 
troops according to their means at the request of the Government of
Udaipur (Mewar) engaged to pay ^ of its actual revenue as annual 
tribute for five years; and after that period, 3/8 in perpetuity. 
The tribute to Jodhpur (Marwar) was to be the same as it had 
hitherto paid to Sindhia (i.e., Rs.1,08,000). It was to be paid 
in perpetuity. Kota's tribute, also to be paid in perpetuity, 
was to be the same as it had previously paid to the Peshwa, 
Sindhia, Holkar and Puar (i.e., Rs.2,57,600). Jaipur was exempted 
from the payment of tribute for the first year because of the 
devastation which its territory had suffered. But from the 
second year, it was to pay Rs.400,000 (Dihlee rupees) increasing 
by Rs.100,000 yearly till it reached Rs.800,000 in the sixth year. 
The tribute was then to remain at Rs.800,000 per annum tilj. the 
revenues of Jaipur exceeded Rs.40,00,000 when it was to pay 5/16 
of all revenues in excess of Rs.40,00,000 as additional tribute. 
(See Aitchison, Treaties and Sanads, Vol.iii, pp.9-10, 147, 316.)
India. Finally, the right of the Rajput rulers to exercise absolute
authority in their internal affairs was assured. They were also 
guaranteed against the introduction of British civil and criminal 
jurisdiction into their States.
Lord Hastings' treaties with the Rajput States present an
interesting contrast with Lord Wellesley's subsidiary treaties in
certain respects. Lord Wellesley's treaties were signed at the turn
of the century when the fear of a French invasion dominated the thinking
of British administrators in India. Lord Wellesley's aim was to obtain
permanent military occupation of the allied country in order to overawe
the allies and frustrate any intrigues on their part against British 
112interests. Accordingly, Lord Wellesley's subsidiary treaties
Jodhpur (Marwar) was specifically bound to provide a fixed contin­
gent of 1,500 horse. The contingent proved inefficient in the 
campaign against the freebooters of Nagar Parkar in 1832. As a 
result the provision was commuted in 1835 for an annual payment of 
Rs.1,15,000 towards the cost of the Jodhpur legion which was 
established. (Aitchison, Treaties and Sanads, Vol.iii, p.131.)
The subsidiary treaty with the Peshwa certainly had this object. 
The Peshwa realised this, hence he resisted it for a long time.
In 1801 he agreed to accept a subsidiary treaty on condition 
that 'the troops should be retained within the Company's dominions 
at all times, except when the Peshwa should formally require their 
actual services.' (See Choksey, A History of British Diplomacy 
at the Court of the Peshwas 1786-1818, p.287. Emphasis mine.) 
Commenting on the Treaty of Bassein, Lord Castlereagh, President 
of the Board of Control, stated: 'Whatever we may hold out to 
reconcile the Peshwa to the alliance and however we may profess 
to respect his independence in the management of his own internal 
affairs, we cannot deny that in fact as well as in appearance, 
whilst a British force is at Poona he can be considered in no 
other light than as politically dependent on us'. (See Choksey, 
op.cit., p.299.)
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of specified numbers in the territories of the allies. To ensure
the availability of funds for the regular payment of the subsidiary
force, and to avoid the possibility of constant bickering over the
funds, Lord Wellesley preferred a cession of territory by the allies.
As the ceded territories were placed under the exclusive management
and authority of the Government of India, it had the added advantage
of enabling additional British troops to be introduced into the
territories of the allies if the need arose. Lord Hastings' treaties
with the Rajputs contained no stipulation for the stationing of a
subsidiary force in their States, because the recognition by the
Rajputs of the supremacy of the Government of India rendered such a
113stipulation superfluous. Lord Hastings also demanded a cash
subsidy instead of a cession of territory.
It is also significant to note that Article 9 of the subsidiary 
treaty of Bassein committed the Government of India to make the services
stipulated the right of the Government of India to station troops
In the negotiations of 1816 when the attitude of Sindhia, Holkar 
and Ameer Khan was still uncertain, provision was made in the 
draft treaty with Jaipur for the stationing of a subsidiary 
force in its territory. Article 9 of the draft treaty provided 
that 'the subsidiary force should be stationed at points to be 
hereafter determined in concert and that a fort should be assigned 
for the magazines and depots of the force'. Article 11 provided 
that 'on any invasion of the Jaipur country the British army 
should have admittance into any fort, the occupation of which 
might be expedient for the defence of the country'. (See Barnejee, 
op.cit., p. 380, footnote). At the time of the final conclusion 
of the treaty in April 1818, however, all danger had passed. It 
is significant that these articles were omitted from the final 
treaty.
of British troops available to the Peshwa for the purpose of putting 
down the rebellion of his subjects. This clause became one of the 
main sources of friction between the Peshwa and the British. Lord 
Hastings' treaties with the Rajputs avoided any such definite commit­
ment. The right of the Rajput rulers to British military aid against 
rebellious subjects was reserved for the option and discretion of the 
Government of India.
The establishment of British suzerainty over Rajasthan in 
1818 was clearly a by-product of the Pindari war. The Rajputs were 
placed under British protection because it was clear to the Government 
of India that, unless it exercised a measure of political control over 
the Rajput States, the endemic feuds among their clans and the weak­
ness of their Governments would encourage the revival of the predatory 
system and expose nearby British territories to grave daiger.
The effect of Lord Hastings' treaties of subordinate alliance 
with the Rajput States was to extend British political influence to 
the Sutlej without a corresponding increase in their territorial 
sovereignty. For all practical purposes, the Rajput States became
Under the 3rd Article of the Agreement signed on 1 February 
1840 between Sardar Singh, Rana of Udaipur and his chiefs and 
witnessed by Major Robinson, officiating Political Agent in 
Udaipur, it was stated that: 'The three-eights from the revenue 
collections of the Khalsa lands are paid by the Durbar to the 
British government for the protection of Meywar from foreign 
enemies;... The payment of the tribute as here stated is 
exclusively for the protection of the country against foreign 
invasion,... (See Aitchison, Treaties and Sanads, Vol.iii, p.42.)
part of the British raj; for though their internal autonomy was
guaranteed,^^ their acknowledgement of British supremacy provided
the Government of India with justification for interfering in their
domestic affairs to a greater extent than it had ever ventured to do
elsewhere. From the 1820's, the Government of India interfered
increasingly in the Rajput States to check economic mismanagement
116and ensure their ability to pay their tribute. It was a measure
The only exception was Banswara. Article 5 provided for British 
intervention in its internal affairs. (See Barnejee, op.cit., 
p.406.)
In 1819 Tod was directed to assume full control of the affairs 
of Udaipur so as to ensure the Rana's ability to discharge his 
financial obligation to the Company. This interference was 
withdrawn in 1821 but resumed two years later. The Rana was 
given a daily allowance of Rs.1,000 and certain districts 
reserved for the regular payment of the tribute and the liquida­
tion of the arrears of the tribute. In 1826 Rana Bhim Singh's 
authority was re-established.
In Jaipur the story was not much different. During the minority 
of Jai Singh III, the Government of India appointed an officer 
to reside at Jaipur. He was authorised to interfere in the 
internal affairs of the State 'with a view of guarding the 
interests of Government and securing the payment of the tribute'.
On the death of Jai Singh in 1835, the Government of India assumed 
the guardianship of his infant son, Ram Singh, and set up a 
council of Regency comprising five principal nobles and under the 
superintendence of the Political Agent for whose decision all 
measures of importance were to be submitted.
In Jodhpur, Man Singh's alleged misgovernment led to a military 
occupation of his capital for five months. He entered into a 
personal engagement to ensure good government. A British garrison 
was placed in the fortress of Jodhpur and the controlling voice 
in his administration given to the Political Agent.
In Kota, British forces were sent in 1820 against Raja Kishor 
Singh when he attempted to assume actual control of his Government. 
He was forced to enter into an engagement guaranteeing the 
hereditary control of his administration to Zalim Singh and his 
heirs. (See Aitchison, Treaties and Sanads, Vol.iii, pp.13-14,
85, 154-156, 327.)
of the resignation of the Rajputs to their subordinate status that 
such minute and vexatious interference did not lead to serious tensions 
in Anglo-Rajput relations. For the next two decades general tran­
quillity prevailed in India south of the Sutlej. During this period 
it was Persia and Afghanistan, particularly the latter, which gave 
the Government of India cause for alarm.
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AFGHANISTAN AND THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER
As in Maharashtra and Rajasthan, the first phase of British 
involvement in Afghanistan (1838-1842) reflected the sensitivity of 
the Government of India to political instability in neighbouring 
native States. During the first decade of the nineteenth century, 
central authority in Afghanistan was in decay as it was in Maharashtra 
and Rajasthan. In all these States, the rule of law hardly existed.
Feuds and dissensions made them susceptible to foreign intrigue; 
while the anarchic conditions prevailing in them made British Indian 
subjects who were under a more rigorous administration, chafe under 
the restraints of settled government. Such States were therefore 
a constant source of anxiety to the Government of India and almost 
invariably became victims of British intervention.
In the opening years of the nineteenth century, Afghanistan 
was still a unified country. As such it was regarded by the British 
as a power to be reckoned with. Memories of Zeman Shah's repeated 
attempts to invade Hindustan still lingered in the minds of Indian 
rulers; and it was feared that as long as Afghanistan remained a unified 
State, she might yet vie with the British for the hegemony of northern 
India. Therefore during this time, the policy of the Government of
Chapter 4
India was to checkmate her through Persia. By the second decade of 
the century, however, the fear of an Afghan invasion had receded; for 
Afghanistan stood on the threshold of internal convulsions that were 
destined to culminate in her division into four mutually hostile 
principalities in 1826, namely, Herat, Kandahar, Kabul and Peshawar.
These developments were at first welcome to the Government
of India because they occurred at a time when the British were hard-
2pressed elsewhere. The decay of Afghanistan therefore assuaged their 
anxiety about the north-west frontier and induced a sense of security. 
During this time, 'the strategic connexion of Afghanistan with the 
security of India had not yet crossed the horizon of their conscious- 
3ness'. After 1829, however, the Government of India viewed the internal 
weaknesses and dissensions of Afghanistan not with relief but with
The Anglo-Persian treaty concluded in 1801 bound the King of Persia 
'to lay waste and desolate the Afghan dominions' and to endeavour 
'to ruin and humble the above-mentioned nation' if ever the Durrani 
monarchs attempted to invade India. (See W.K. Fraser-Tytler, 
Afghanistan (London, 1950), p.78.)
In another treaty concluded on 25 November 1814 (and based on the 
extant treaty of 1809), it was agreed in Article 8 that: 'Should 
the Afghans be at war with the British nation, his Persian Majesty 
engages to send an army against them in such manner and of such 
force as may be concerted with the English Government. The expenses 
of such an army shall be defrayed by the British Government, in such 
manner as may be agreed upon at the period of its being required.' 
(See J.W. Kaye: History of the War in Afghanistan (two volumes, 
London 1851), vol.l, p.645.)
This period coincided with the Nepalese war, the Pindari war, and 
the Burmese war.
Fraser-Tytler, op.cit., p.79.
concern. Russia was prowling on the borders of Persia and seeking to 
extend her influence into central Asia. Persia, Afghanistan's western 
neighbour, was willing to become a tool in the hands of Russia.
Smarting under the loss of a large slice of her territory, and 
secretly encouraged by Russia, Persia was seeking to recoup her losses 
at the expense of enfeebled Afghanistan. The proximity of Afghanistan 
to India made it necessary for the Government of India to take steps to 
settle her internal squabbles as a preliminary to encouraging her 
rulers to unite in resisting Persian aggression.
The kind of unity envisaged by the Government of India for 
Afghanistan was at first social rather than political. The Government 
of India had not fully recovered from the fright caused by Zeman Shah's 
projected invasions of India. It was still suspicious of a united 
Afghanistan. It therefore preferred to maintain her political disunity 
in order to be able to balance one principality against the other. In 
fact, all that the Government of India wanted to do was to settle the 
quarrels between the Barukzai and the Sadozai families as well as the 
family quarrel among the Barukzai rulers of Eastern Afghanistan. The 
Government of India hoped that this would suffice to remove the mutual 
distrust and hatred which were driving the Afghan rulers to seek 
Persian alliance against one another. This policy did not envisage 
any political or military commitments on the part of the Government 
of India.
This policy, however, was not enough to win the friendship 
of the Barukzai brothers. Dost Mohammed Khan's obsession was with the 
recovery of the Afghan province of Peshawar from the Sikhs who had been 
enabled to seize it through the treachery of his brother. For the 
purpose of recovering Peshawar and gratifying his revenge towards his 
brother, Dost Mohammed was willing to accept foreign aid from anywhere 
even at the risk of his independence. The Government of India could 
not oblige him because it did not want to jeopardise its alliance with 
the Sikhs; nor did it want to see the rise of a great Mohammedan power 
beyond the Indus. The result of such conflicting objectives was the 
breakdown of negotiations between Dost Mohammed Khan and the Government 
of India. The failure of negotiations was followed by an open avowal on 
the part of the ruler of Kabul that he would seek foreign aid to renew 
his war with the Sikh State. By this avowal, he placed the security of 
British India in danger and so incurred the displeasure of the Government 
of India. Lord Auckland therefore decided to supplant him by a pliant 
ruler who would be willing to subserve British interests.
i. Internal political condition of Afghanistan in the 19th
century.
The kingdom of Afghanistan was founded in 1747 by Ahmad Shah 
Durrani following the death of his master Nadir Shah, King of Persia.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the kingdom extended from 
Herat in the west to Kashmir in the east, and from Balkh in the north 
to Shikarpur in the south. But in spite of its size, it was a very
weak kingdom. It had known little internal stability since the death 
of its founder in 1773. Diversity of race, religious animosity and 
the absence of a settled principle of succession bedevilled the stability 
of the Afghan kingdom.
The kingdom of Afghanistan lacked a homogeneous population.
It consisted of a hotch potch of races - Pathans, Ghilzais, Tajiks,
4Turks and Persians. The Pathans, the dominant race, lived mainly in 
the country lying around the Suleiman Range and around Kabul. The 
leading section among them was the Abdalli tribe of whom the Sadozais 
and the Barukzais were the most important sections. The monarchs of 
Afghanistan came from the former, the viziers generally from the latter. 
Under the Sadozai monarchy, the Abdallis were a privileged class. They 
held the chief offices of State and their lands were exempted from 
taxation. The country of the Ghilzais extended from Kandahar to Gunda- 
muck halfway to Peshawar. They were divided into two sections - the 
Western Ghilzais and the Eastern Ghilzais - which had little intercourse 
with each other. Once rulers of Kabul before the advent of the Durrani 
monarchy, the Ghilzais had become a subject race. They naturally 
resented their supersession by the Durranis. The Persians or Qizilbashes 
lived mainly in Kabul. They were the descendants of a rearguard of 
troops left behind in Kabul by Nadir Shah in 1738 during his invasion
Fraser-Tytler, op.cit., pp.48-60. The Tajiks were a non-nomadic 
race of Persian origin. They lived chiefly round Kabul, in Kohistan 
and the valley of the Panjshir river. The Turks were mainly of 
Uzbeg extraction and lived north of the Hindu Kush.
of Hindustan. The Sadozai monarchs patronised them and relied on their 
loyalty. But after the fall of the monarchy, the loyalty of the 
Qizilbashes to Afghanistan became equivocal.
Not only did Afghanistan lack national cohesion but its 
population was of a turbulent and vindictive disposition. The temper 
of its people had 'never been attuned to peace'. They were 'impatient 
of the restraints of a settled government', and were 'continually panting 
after change'."* They knew 'no happiness in anything but strife'.
Their delight was to 'live in a state of chronic warfare'. Blood was 
'always crying aloud for blood. Revenge was a virtue among them; the 
heritage of retribution passed from father to son; and murder became 
£
a solemn duty'.
Apart from the racial cleavage, and the turbulence of the 
population, a religious antipathy based on sectarian differences existed 
between the bulk of the population and the Qizilbashes. The former were 
Sunnis and the latter Shias. This religious disharmony was often 
exploited for political purposes and was a factor of instability in 
the politics of Kabul.^ Aware of the disadvantage of their numerical
J.W. Kaye, op.cit. Vol.1, p.34.
^ Ibid., Vol.l, p.11.
 ^ Mohan Lai: Life of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan of Kabul, (two 
volumes, London 1846) Vol.i, pp.36-37, 145. In July 1803 this 
conflict led to the deposition of Mahmud Shah and the accession of 
Shah Shuja. In the struggle between Dost Mohammed Khan and his 
brother Sultan Mohammed Khan for the possession of Kabul, the former 
courted the support of the Shias, the latter of the Sunnis.
inferiority, the Qizilbashes contrived to add 'to their strength by 
intrigues around them' . In this they achieved some success; for every 
man of rank in Kabul had a Persian or Qizilbash as secretary who handled 
the home and foreign correspondence. The Qizilbashes thereby wielded
g
considerable influence in the politics of Kabul.
Although Afghanistan was a monarchy, her people exhibited a
predilection for republicanism. Ahmad Shah was shrewd enough to see
the vulnerability of the monarchy in a country lacking national cohesion
or sentiment. He realised that in a country where people's first
loyalty was to their local chieftains, the monarchy could only survive
by respecting the rights of the diverse races and tribes and granting
9them a certain measure of autonomy. Instead of ruling as an autocrat, 
therefore, he ruled through a council of nine principal Sardars 
representing the different sections of his people. His grandsons, 
however, lacked his statesmanship, and their attempt to ignore the great 
chiefs and rule as autocrats weakened the position of the monarchy and 
undermined political stability in Afghanistan.
Parliamentary Papers (hereinafter referred to as P.P. for brevity) 
1859, Session 2, Vol.xxv, p.51. Captain Burnes to W.H. Macnaghten, 
Secretary to the Government of India, 14 October 1837.
For instance, under Ahmad Shah, a portion of the Qizilbashes became 
an organised military body under a Khan who was directly responsible 
to the Shah; but the bulk of the Qizilbashes acknowledged their 
own chief. (See P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.50.)
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Political stability in Afghanistan was further undermined by 
the absence of a settled principle of succession. The succession to 
the throne was not regulated by primogeniture but by intrigue and the 
sword.^ In a country where the Kings were polygamous and consequently 
the number of princes large, the absence of primogeniture was very 
conducive to succession disputes.^ Thrice between 1800 and 1818, the 
sovereignty of Afghanistan changed hands through violent revolutions.
These internal weaknesses inherent in the political structure
of Afghanistan led to civil wars and culminated in the overthrow of
12the Sadozai monarchy in 1818. For eight years after this event, 
confusion reigned supreme everywhere as the Barukzai brothers quarrelled 
among themselves for the lion's share of the sovereignty of Afghanistan.
Ahmad Shah was succeeded by his second son Timur Shah. Timur was 
succeeded by his fifth son Zeman Shah.
Timur Shah, for instance had 23 sons. He failed to nominate an heir.
Zeman Shah executed several of the chiefs on a charge of conspiracy 
for trying to overthrow his unpopular vizier Vafadar Khan. Among 
the victims was Painda Khan head of the Barukzai clan. His eldest 
son Fatteh Khan transferred his allegiance to Shah Mahmud whom he 
assisted to overthrow Zeman Shah. In 1818 Shah Mahmud repeated the 
folly of Zeman Shah and put Fatteh Khan to death. In the ensuing 
feud between the Sadozai and Barukzais the monarchy was overthrown 
and the unity of Afghanistan was destroyed.
After the fall of the monarchy, the Government of Afghanistan was 
divided as follows: Mohammed Azim Khan, the eldest of the brothers 
took over Kabul as the vizier of his puppet King Shah Ayub; Yar 
Mohammed Khan was given Peshawar; Purdil Khan had Kandahar and Dost 
Mohammed Khan took over Ghazni. The death of Mohammed Azim in 1823 
led to a struggle among the surviving brothers for Kabul. (See 
Mohan Lai, op.cit. Vol.i, p. 117; H.H. Dodwell (ed.), Cambridge 
History of India, Vol.v, p.488.)
It was not until 1826 that Dost Mohammed Khan emerged as successor to 
the throne of the Sadozais and head of his family.
Dost Mohammed Khan was the twentieth son of Painda Khan, the
chief of the Barukzai clan. Unlike the majority of his brothers, Dost
Mohammed's mother was not an Afghan but a Qizilbash. At the age of
fourteen, he distinguished himself as a brave soldier and a few years
later, his bravery earned him the title of Sardar from Mahmud Shah. He
was tall and graceful. He possessed a quick understanding and was a
great judge of character. His suspicion was 'so easily excited as to
amount almost to infirmity'. He was cautious and forbearing and 'called
14a spade a spade'. He could not 'be long deceived'.
The partition of Afghanistan among the Barukzai and Sadozai 
clans destroyed its political unity. In Eastern Afghanistan, it failed 
to extinguish the mutual jealousies and suspicions of the Barukzai 
brothers. The assumption of the title of Ameer by Dost Mohammed Khan 
in 1834 and his attempt to enlarge and consolidate his principality of 
Kabul became a source of alarm to his brothers in Peshawar and Kandahar.^
14 P. P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.79. Burnes to Macnaghten, 3 December 1837; 
see also Fraser-Tytler, op.cit., p.127.
^  In 1826 when Dost Mohammed Khan succeeded to the chiefship of Kabul, 
it hardly extended beyond a radius of one hundred miles of the city.
He set about suppressing rebellions in Kohistan and elsewhere.- In 
1832, he added Jalalabad which increased his revenue from Rs.18,00,000 
to Rs.24,00,000. He divided his territory into provincial governments 
and placed his sons in charge. His favourite son, Mohammed Akbar Khan 
replaced his brother the Nawab Jabbar Khan (whose loyalty he suspected) 
in the governorship of the eastern Ghilzai country. He transferred 
the Nawab to a post in Kabul city and kept him under surveillance.
They feared and suspected him and only reluctantly and partially
acknowledged the supremacy of one 'born from a mother of a different
16creed, and not of a high Afghan family'. The continued discord among 
the brothers not only made their country weak; it also exposed them to 
the ambition of their immediate neighbours - the Sadozai Prince Kamran 
to the west and Ranjit Singh to the east.
On the fall of the Sadozai monarchy, Shah Mahmud and his son 
Prince Kamran had taken refuge in Herat. Prince Kamran regarded 
Kandahar as a rebel province of the Sadozai monarchy and constantly 
threatened to recover it by force. By 1837, he had made two unsuccess­
ful attempts and was seeking Persian assistance to achieve his object. 
On the east, Dost Mohammed Khan was threatened by Ranjit Singh aided 
and abetted by Sultan Mohammed Khan, brother of Dost Mohammed Khan and 
former ruler of Peshawar. Sultan Mohammed Khan's enmity towards his 
brother was implacable. Since his defeat in the contest for the 
government of Kabul by Dost Mohammed Khan, Sultan Mohammed Khan had 
been trying to overthrow his brother with the aid of the Sikhs.^ His
He also forged a marriage alliance with the eastern Ghilzais through 
his son Akbar Khan. (See P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.76. Burnes to 
Macnaghten, 26 November 1837.
Mohan Lai, op.cit., Vol.i, p.90.
Mohammed Azim Khan was succeeded in the viziership of Kabul by 
his son Habib-ullah Khan in 1823, but he was soon ousted by 
Sherdil Khan of Kandahar. On the retirement of Sherdil Khan from 
Kabul, a contest for the governorship of the city ensued between 
Dost Mohammed Khan and Sultan Mohammed Khan. The latter was 
favoured by the Kandahar and Peshawar brothers. Ultimately Sultan 
Mohammed Khan evacuated Kabul and retired to Peshawar. (See Mohan 
Lai, op.cit.3 Vol.i, pp.144-146, 165.)
encouragement to Ranjit Singh paved the way for the capture of Peshawar 
by the Sikhs in 1834 while Dost Mohammed Khan was engaged in repulsing 
an invasion of Kandahar by Shah Shuja, a former King of Afghanistan 
(1803-1809) who was in exile in India. In 1835 the Ameer Dost 
Mohammed Khan made an unsuccessful attempt to recover Peshawar. The 
loss of the territory rankled deeply in his mind and he resolved to 
retrieve it at all cost with foreign aid. To this end, he wrote 
letters in 1836 to Russia, Persia, and Bokhara.
Thus by 1836, the political situation in Afghanistan was
becoming a source of anxiety to the Government of India. The small
principalities which had replaced the Sadozai monarchy were in disarray.
Each was pursuing an independent foreign policy aimed at injuring the
other or aggrandising its power and safeguarding its own position.
Blinded by the feud between their clans, the Barukzai brothers of
Kandahar and the Sadozai Prince of Herat were committed to a policy
of mutual destruction. Both looked to Persia for the support of their
pretensions. In Eastern Afghanistan, the Barukzai ruler of Kabul, Dost
Mohammed Khan, was trying to mount a religious war against the Sikhs
in an attempt to retrieve Peshawar and safeguard his position against
1 g
his treacherous brother Sultan Mohammed Khan. Like the rulers of
After the capture of Peshawar, Sultan Mohammed Khan and his brothers 
accepted the overlordship of Ranjit Singh and were provided with 
jagirs in Peshawar. They continued to plot the overthrow of their 
brother in Kabul.
Kandahar and Herat, his main instrument of policy was Persia. In their 
obsession with their individual security, the Afghan rulers seemed 
unperturbed by the fact that it was Persia's ambition to gobble up all 
of them. Their disunity, the oppressiveness of their fiscal policy 
which was geared to a state of continuous war, and the equivocal 
loyalty of the Qizilbashes to Afghanistan were all favourable to the 
success of a Persian invasion. The establishment of Persian ascendancy 
in Afghanistan could only be the forerunner of Russian influence.
Besides, a religious war against the Sikhs might awaken the slumbering 
fanaticism of Indian Muslims and sow the seeds of sedition among them.
It was therefore considered necessary by the Government of India to 
intervene in Afghanistan not only to prevent the establishment of 
Persian and Russian influence, but also to curb the frenzy of religious 
fanaticism that was being fostered along the Indus and so ensure the 
tranquillity of the north-west frontier.
ii. Burnes' mission to Kabul.
Until 1829, the Government of India was not unduly alarmed 
at the fratricidal war which rocked the once powerful Durrani kingdom.
Its attention was engrossed in events on the Indian mainland and else­
where. Between 1814 and 1828 the Nepalese war, the Pindari war and 
the Burmese war followed one another in quick succession. The political 
decay of Afghanistan was therefore a welcome relief. Moreover, Great 
Britain was on friendly terms with Russia. Both of them were cooperating 
on the Eastern Question. Russia could therefore 'hardly be expected to
harbour any inimical designs towards the possessions of a friendly
19power in the East1. From 1830 onwards, however, the Government of 
India felt its security jeopardised by the prevailing disunity among 
the rulers of Afghanistan, which was encouraging Persian and Russian 
intrusion into the politics of the north-west frontier of India.
Contemporaneously with the civil wars in Afghanistan, Russia
had steadily been encroaching upon the possessions of Persia as a
step in her attempt to extend her influence into central Asia. In
1801 she appropriated Georgia and a few years later Armenia. From
the treaty of Gulistan (1813) which ended the Russo-Persian war of
1811-1813, 'Russia gained very important additions to her territory on
the shores of the Caspian on which Persia was to keep no more armed
20vessels'. Henceforth, for all practical purposes, the Caspian Sea
21became a Russian lake. After an uneasy peace of thirteen years the
war was renewed and Persia once more defeated. By the treaty of
Turkomanchai (February 1828) she ceded the khanates of Erivan and
Nakhichevan and consented to the recognition of the line of frontier
22as drawn by Russia. Besides, Persia paid a war indemnity of nearly
Lajpat Rai Nair: Sir William Macnaghten's Correspondence relating 
to the Tripartite Treaty, Punjab Government Record Office Publi­
cations, Monograph No.20 (Lahore, 1942) p.5.
20 H.H. Dodwell (ed.), The Cambridge History of India (Cambridge, 1929), 
Vol.v, p.489.
21 Sir Henry Rawlinson: England and Russia in the East (London, 1875), 
p.33; Lajpat Rai Nair, op.cit., p.7.
22 Kaye, History of the war in Afghanistan, Vol.i, p.145.
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use the resources of the Persian State in furtherance of its own ends,
without overtly taking possession of them, and thus bringing itself
24into collision with other powers'. Persia showed a willingness to
become the tool of Russia. She not only resented Britain's breach of
25her treaty obligations during the Russo-Persian war of 1826-1828,
but she also wished to seek compensation for her territorial losses
at the expense of Afghanistan. She laid claim to Afghan territory as
2 6far as Ghazni. After a successful expedition against Khorassan 
during 1831-32, the Crown Prince of Persia, Abbas Meerza, projected 
an invasion of Herat which was only interrupted by his death in the 
autumn of 1833.
£4 million. After the treaty, it became 'the object of Russia to
23
24
25
26
Lajpat Rai Nair, op.cit., p.7.
J.W. Kaye, op.cit., Vol.i, p.149.
By the Definitive Treaty with Persia concluded at Teheran on
25 November 1814, the British Government agreed 'that in case of 
any European nation invading Persia, should the Persian Government 
require the assistance of the English, the Governor-General of 
India, on the part of Great Britain, shall comply with the wish of 
the Persian Government, by sending from India the force required, 
with officers, ammunition, and warlike stores; or, in lieu thereof, 
the English Government shall pay an annual subsidy, the amount of 
which shall be regulated in a definitive treaty to be concluded 
between the high contracting parties; it is hereby provided that 
the amount of the said subsidy shall be two hundred thousand 
(200,000) tomauns annually' on condition that Persia was not the 
aggressor. (See Kaye, op.cit., Vol.i, pp.643-46 (Appendix).) On 
the outbreak of t h e -  Russo-Persian war in 1826, the British 
excused their non-fulfilment of the above terms by alleging that 
Persia had provoked Russian aggression. (See Kaye, op.cit., Vol.i, 
p.148.)
Ibid., Vol.i, p.155.
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Against this background of Russian and Persian designs, the
applications of the Afghan rulers for Persian intervention in their
domestic quarrels took on an ominous significance. They were a clear
indication that the country was without a master and was consequently
likely to become subservient to dangerous foreign influences. Therefore
instead of neutrality and indifference, 'the Government of India, smitten
by the dread of the Russian invasion, showed greater anxiety to learn
about the geographical conditions and topography' of the countries beyond 
27the Indus. The Government of India's information was derived mainly
from English adventurers whose journeys were in some cases 'undertaken
with the knowledge and approval of the Indian Government, if not with
, 28its actual support .
The concern of the Government of India about the internal 
squabbles in Afghanistan was reflected in the fact that Lord William 
Bentinck (Governor-General from 1828-1835) condoned the countenance
Lajpat Rai Nair, op.cit., p.5.
Ibid., p.5. In 1830 Arthur Conolly started from Tabriz for Khiva 
to get some information about the military strength of the country; 
but he was captured and escaped to India by way of Kandahar. In 
the same year, Lt. Alexander Burnes was deputed ostensibly to 
convey a present of English horses to Maharaja Ranjit Singh, while 
his real aim was to gather political and geographical information 
about the territories on the banks of the Indus. In 1832, the 
same officer was sent by the Government of India to Kabul and 
Bokhara in order 'to survey the possible route of an advance towards 
India and to test possible friendships which the British might form 
in that region'. (See H.H. Dodwell (ed.), The Cambridge Shorter 
History of India, (Cambridge, 1934) p.649.)
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given to Shah Shuja's expedition of 1834 by Captain Claude Wade,
. 2 9Political Agent at Ludhiana. That Captain Wade escaped censure was 
evidence of the Governor-General's secret longing for the restoration 
of unity and stability in Afghanistan. Before departing from India the 
Governor-General wrote a minute which reflected his anxiety about the 
situation in Afghanistan.
The only real danger with which we may be threatened 
[his Lordship observed], must come from the north­
west, and consequently to that important line of 
operation our main attention should be turned...
The present state of Afghanistan presents no cause 
for alarm to India. The success that attended the 
wretched army that Shah Shuja had under his feeble 
guidance affords the best proof of the weakness of 
the Afghan power. The assumption of the supremacy 
by Dost Muhammad Khan may possibly give greater 
strength and consolation (sic) to the general 
confederacy. It is much to be desired that this 
state should acquire sufficient stability to form 
an intermediate barrier between India and Persia. 30
Lord William Bentinck also feared that the humiliation felt 
by the Afghans at the loss of Peshawar might be skilfully exploited 
by Russia to secure Afghan goodwill and support in the event of a 
Russian invasion of India. His Lordship thought that if the Russians 
invaded India, the Afghans 'probably would make a virtue of necessity 
and join the common cause, receiving in reward for their cooperation
Lajpat Rai Nair, op.cit., p.10.
Ibid., p.10. Minute by Lord William Bentinck, Governor-General and 
Commander-in-chief, 13 March 1835. (Emphasis mine.)
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the promise of all the possessions that had been wrested from them
31by Ranjit Singh...' This minute foreshadowed Lord Auckland's
Afghan adventure. It became clear to the Government of India that 
steps must be taken to settle the internal squabbles of the Afghan 
rulers so as to impart strength to them. It was also necessary to 
smooth the differences between the Afghans and the Sikhs and promote 
good relations between them.
Lord Auckland formally assumed office as Governor-General
of India on 4 March 1836. His father was a Tory lawyer but he himself
was a Whig. An industrious and conscientious public servant, Lord
Auckland was essentially a man of peace. He was often given to
32irresolution and was rather impressionable. Lord Auckland had
hardly spent six months in India when occurrences on the north-west
frontier led him 'to think that the period of disturbance is nearer
33than I had either wished or expected'.
A few months after Lord Auckland's departure for India,
disquieting letters were received in England by Lord Palmerston from
34Mr. Ellis, British envoy in Persia. Goaded by a spirit of revenge
31 Ibid., p.11.
32 J.W. Kaye, op.cit., Vol.i, pp.162, 337.
33 Lajpat Rai Nair, op.cit., p.12. Lord Auckland to Metcalfe, 
September 1836.
34 P.P., 1839, Vol.xl, p.328. Letters from Mr. Ellis to Palmerston, 
dated 25 February 1836 and 1 April 1836.
towards the murderer of their father, the Barukzai rulers of Eastern
Afghanistan had made overtures to the Shah of Persia for the conquest 
and partition of the territory of the Sadozai ruler of Herat. Mr. Ellis 
was certain that the Shah's own designs on Herat would incline him
to countenance any scheme which may facilitate 
the accomplishment of a favourite object of his 
ambition, encouraged as he will doubtless be by 
the Russians to extend his influence, and through 
him their own, in the countries bordering upon 
our Indian possessions. 35
The Court of Directors took fright and instructed Lord Auckland to
counteract the progress of Russian influence 'in a quarter which,
from its proximity to our Indian possessions, could not fail, if it
were once established, to act injuriously on the system of our Indian
alliance, and possibly to interfere even with the tranquillity of our 
36own territory'. The Governor-General was told that if Mr. Ellis' 
fears should later be confirmed by his own agents or those of Mr. McNeill 
on his arrival in Persia, then 'some interference might doubtless be 
requisite, either to prevent the extension of Persian dominion in that 
quarter, or to raise a timely barrier against the impending encroachments
Quoted in William Habberton, Anglo-Russian Relations concerning 
Afghanistan 1837-1907. Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, 
Vol.xxi, No.4. Published by the University of Illinois at Urbana 
1937, p.10.
Fraser-Tytler, op.cit., p.90; W. Habberton, op.cit., p.10. Secret 
Committee of the Court of Directors to Lord Auckland, 25 June 1836.
of Russian influence'. The best manner of dealing with this problem
was, however, left to the discretion of the Governor-General. Lord
Auckland's way of dealing with the matter was to send Captain Burnes
38to Kabul, nominally on a commercial mission.
37
Captain Alexander Burnes who was an ardent Russophobe like
Palmerston was 'a man of endless activity and gallantry...with a
Scotchman's ambition to "get on" and a gambler's recklessness in
39taking chances'. Burnes' mission left India in November 1836 and 
arrived at Kabul on 20 September 1837. Three months later, Persia 
began the siege of Herat, a city of great strategic importance in 
central Asia. The prevailing disunity and mutual distrust of the 
Barukzai rulers of Eastern Afghanistan caused Burnes to have fore­
bodings of danger.
37
38
39
William Habberton, op.cit., p. 10.
Burnes' instructions required him to furnish information 'upon the 
present condition, the internal government, the revenue, the 
military establishment and resources, and the power of the chiefs 
and the disposition of the people in each country that you may 
visit, and, as far as may be, in the countries contiguous; and you 
will particularly learn what has been the degree of recent connexion 
with Persia, and by what agents it has been conducted, and what 
would be the probable result of Persian attack upon Herat. You 
will observe the general feeling towards the British and the Russian 
Governments, the impression prevailing of the power and resources of 
either, the degree in which the supposition is entertained of an 
intimate union between the Persian and Russian Governments, and in 
which that supposition is likely to have influence; and you will 
gather all the information in your power on the commerce of Russia, 
and on the measures adopted by that power with the object of 
extending her influence in Central Asia.' (P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, 
p.24, W.H. Macnaghten to Captain Burnes, 15 May 1837.)
Lajpat Rai Nair, op.cit., p.17.
As the country was without one head, it lacked unity of
policy. Nor were its rulers capable of acting in concert. The Kandahar
Sardars cared more about their own quarrel with Herat than about Dost
Mohammed Khan's quarrel with the Sikhs. They regarded Prince Kamran
as the enemy of the Barukzai family while Ranjit Singh was 'only the
40enemy of all the Mussulmans'. The Ameer, on the other hand, was so
engrossed in his war with the Sikhs over Peshawar that he could not
spare money or men to assist his brothers in the defence of Kandahar.
In the absence of aid from Kabul, they came to the conclusion that their
safety lay in conciliating Persia. Therefore while Dost Mohammed Khan
was eagerly awaiting the arrival of Burnes' mission and hoping to use
British mediation to regain Peshawar and secure himself against his
brother Sultan Mohammed Khan, the Kandahar Sardars were holding secret
consultations with Persia in the hope of securing her aid against their
enemy in Herat. On the arrival at Kandahar of Kambar Ali Khan, the
envoy of the Shah of Persia, the Kandahar Sardars turned down the Ameer's
invitation to send one of their number to Kabul to participate in his
negotiations with Burnes. They felt that 'any conference there [ie.,
Kabul] could only have reference to Peshawur, a restoration of which
41might not benefit themselves' but aggrandise the power of the Ameer.
P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.83. Burnes to Macnaghten, 4 December 1837. 
P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.35. Burnes to Macnaghten, 9 September 1837.
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Consequently, they declared their readiness to join Persia against
42Herat and 'keep aloof from all friendship with the English nation'.
Burnes' task was a difficult one. It was to wean these 
bickering Afghan rulers from their alliance with Persia without disturb 
ing the political status quo of Afghanistan. The Governor-General 
thought that an explanation to the Afghan chiefs of the grave risk they 
ran by their mutual hostility would suffice to detach them from Persia. 
A settlement of their differences would then follow. It did not, 
however, take Burnes long to become convinced that nothing could be 
accomplished without first settling the Ameer's quarrel with the Sikhs 
over Peshawar.
Since 1834 Dost Mohammed Khan had been trying to dislodge 
the Sikhs from Peshawar which they had seized in that year as a result 
of his brother's treachery. The recovery of Peshawar mattered a great 
deal to him. He wanted to secure possession of it as an insurance 
against the avowed enmity of his brother who wanted to overthrow him 
with the support of the Sikhs. It was not so much Ranjit Singh as his 
brother Sultan Mohammed Khan that the Ameer dreaded. If Peshawar was 
restored to his brother, the Ameer feared that it would become a 
rallying point for all those who were disaffected towards him. With 
a supply of funds from Ranjit Singh to corrupt the Kabulis and the 
support of malcontents based in Peshawar, Sultan Mohammed Khan would
P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.36. Burnes to Macnaghten, 9 September 1837
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have a good chance of overthrowing him. He was therefore opposed to
the restoration of Peshawar to Sultan Mohammed Khan. In fact he would
rather let Peshawar remain in the hands of the Sikhs than have it
restored to his brother. Besides, the Ameer wanted to possess Peshawar
in order to increase his pre-eminence among his co-rulers and enable
43him ultimately to assert his overlordship. Finally, Ranjit Singh's
religious intolerance towards the Ameer's co-religionists on the left
44bank of the Indus offended the religious prejudices of the Afghans.
Despite the recent victory of the Afghans in the battle of
45Jamrud, Dost Mohammed Khan had no illusions about the inferiority of 
his military power to that of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. He therefore 
wished to rely on the Government of India to prevail upon the Maharaja 
to surrender Peshawar as it had intervened to prevent him from seizing
43
44
45
Dost Mohammed Khan's long-term policy was to resume Kandahar and 
Herat as successor to the throne of Kabul. For instance, he told 
Burnes that 'the Afghans had no sympathy with Persia, and if 
Herat fell into the hands of that kingdom, of which there now 
appeared a great probability, it was time to unite their strength, 
or to take measures which would place the resources of Kabul and 
Qandahar in one hand'. (Fraser-Tytler, op.cit., pp.94-95.)
The Maharaja refused the Mohammedans permission to pray aloud and 
kill cows. (P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.148.)
In an attempt to consolidate their position in Peshawar, the Sikhs 
tried to build a fort called Fattehgur near the Khyber Pass. The 
Afghans of Khyber under Mohammed Akbar Khan, the Ameer's son, laid 
siege to the fort and a battle was fought on 1 May 1837 in which 
the Sikh General Hari Singh was killed. The Sikhs prepared 
to retaliate with an attack on Jalalabad; but when Burnes arrived 
at Dera Ismael Khan the opposing armies suspended hostilities.
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to propitiate Ranjit Singh. He was willing to send his son to Lahore
to ask for the Maharaja's forgiveness and to offer to pay him tribute
if he restored Peshawar to him. The Ameer was also willing to excuse
the past treachery of his brother in Peshawar and to guarantee the jagir
47which he enjoyed under the Maharaja. In return for the mediation
of the Government of India to secure the restoration of Peshawar to him,
the Ameer was willing to pledge himself 'to forward its commercial and
48its political views'. He assured Burnes that the Persian Envoy then
at Kandahar would not be allowed to come to Kabul. He wrote letters to
his brothers in Kandahar imploring them to break off their relations
with Persia. The Ameer was even ready to compel them to comply if 
49necessary.
By the terms of his instructions Burnes had no authority to 
make any replies that might commit his Government. His duty was merely 
to transmit any proposals which seemed to him to be reasonable to his 
Government through Captain Claude Wade, Political Agent at Ludhiana.
In making his reports, Burnes emphasised the importance of first settling 
the dispute over Peshawar. Until that was done, he thought that the
Shikarpur from the Ameers of Sind. Dost Mohammed Khan was willing
P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.42. Burnes to Macnaghten, 5 October 1837.
47 P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, pp.43-44, Burnes to Macnaghten, 5 October 1837.
48 P.R, 1859, Vol. xxv, p. 41, Burnes to Macnaghten, 5 October 1837.
49 P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.59-60, Burnes to Macnaghten, 31 October 1837. 
P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.38, Macnaghten to Burnes, 11 September 1837.
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Ameer would not abjure an alliance with Persia and Russia.
In a settlement of the Peshawar affair [he wrote], 
we have, as it seems to me, an immediate remedy 
against further intrigue, and a means of showing to 
the Afghans that the British Government does 
sympathise with them, and at one and the same time 
satisfying the chiefs, and gaining both our political 
and commercial ends. 51
Burnes pointed out that it was Ranjit Singh's attack on Peshawar which 
had brought about the dangerous situation on the north-west frontier of 
India. It would not be out of place therefore for the Government of 
India to put pressure on the Maharaja to expedite the settlement of the 
Peshawar dispute. If this was done Burnes hoped that a united Afghani­
stan under Dost Mohammed Khan could emerge to resist aggression from 
the west. He pointed out that as Herat was
not likely to strike a decisive blow at any part 
of the Afghan dominions, but Candahar;... if the 
ruler of Cabool is freed from his fears of the 
Sikhs, that chiefship will not only be secure 
against the inroads of Kamran and his family, but 
Herat itself, now threatened from the west, may 
be united to Cabool. 52
In Burnes' opinion the alliance between Kandahar and Persia was the 
result of the sense of insecurity felt by the Ameer's brothers. 
Therefore until a settlement of the Peshawar dispute was effected and
EP., 1£59, Vo 1.xxv, p.101, Burnes to Macnaghten, 23 December 1837. 
BE, 1859, Vo 1.xxv, p.79, Burnes to Macnaghten, 26 November 1837.
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the Ameer placed in a position to protect Kandahar, Persian and Russian 
influence could not be eliminated from Afghanistan.
Burnes did not think that it would be difficult to persuade
the Maharaja to restore Peshawar to Afghan rule. He stated that the
territory was 'a complete drain on the finances of the Maharaja, from
53which,...his Highness would now willingly withdraw'. The Envoy
endeavoured to disillusion the Governor-General about his belief that
54Kabul stood in grave danger of conquest by the Sikhs. On the 
contrary, he thought that the Ameer had nothing to fear from the Sikhs, 
and warned that 'a trial would,... prove disastrous to the Maharaja, 
and lead Dost Mahomed Khan into measures which, with all his proffers 
of assistance, have never yet entered into his contemplation'.“^
Burnes pointed out that the power of the Sikhs west of the Indus was 
confined to the plains. On the mountains it could only be enforced 
by the presence of troops. From Attok to Kala Bagh, the Khuttaks and 
the Sagree Afghans successfully resisted the Maharaja's authority. In 
view of this, Burnes expected the Maharaja to consent to the restoration 
of Peshawar to Afghan rule subject to the payment of tribute to Lahore.
53 PjE, 185^  Vol.xxv, p.26. Burnes to Macnaghten, 22 August 1837. See 
also p.31, Burnes to Macnaghten, 8 September 1837.
54 Lord Auckland wished to foster this impression and suspend it, as 
it were, like the sword of Damocles over the Ameer's head throughout 
Burnes' negotiations at Kabul. By convincing the Ameer that he 
was doomed without British intercession with the Maharaja on his 
behalf, the Governor-General hoped to frighten the Ameer into 
acquiescence in the British demands.
P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.102. Burnes to Macnaghten, 23 December 1837.
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Captain Burnes preferred to see Peshawar restored to Sultan
Mohammed Khan instead of the Ameer. He shared the common fear that if
the Ameer got Peshawar, it might stimulate his appetite for more territory
east of the Indus. Nonetheless, he was convinced that the Ameer's dread
56of his brother's treachery was not groundless. Therefore as a com­
promise, Burnes recommended a suggestion by the Nawab Jabbar Khan that 
the treaty which the Maharaja had once entered into with the Ameer and 
his late brother Yar Mohammed be revived. This treaty envisaged the 
division of Peshawar and its tribute between the two brothers. The 
Envoy thought that if Peshawar was jointly held by the Ameer and the 
Sultan Mohammed Khan it might mollify the fears of the former. Burnes 
added:
In the event of this arrangement being also rejected, 
it does certainly appear to me that we are bound, 
in some way, to protect the Ameer from the cabals 
of Peshawur and Candahar, without which this country 
will become a scene of strife, injurious alike to 
our commerce and our politics. 57
Like McNeill, Burnes preferred to see Afghanistan united again 
under a single ruler as the surest way of strengthening her and ensuring
Even before he entered Kabul, Burnes writing from Peshawar on 22 
August 1837 stated: '...Sultan Mahomed Khan has not concealed from 
me his differences with his brother of Cabool, and his opinions of 
being able to injure him by means of Runjeet Sing.' On 9 September 
Burnes reported that envoys from Lahore in the persons of Sultan 
Mohammed's son and an agent of the Maharaja had been sent to the fend aha r 
Sardars to solicit their cooperation in overthrowing the Ameer. On
10 February 1838, Burnes again reported details of a plot by the 
Maharaja to overthrow the Ameer. (See P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, pp.27,
36, 149.)
P.P. , 1859, Vol.xxv, p.134. Burnes to Macnaghten, 26 January 1838. 
(Emphasis mine.)
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her integrity. He did not believe that a unified Afghanistan would 
be a source of danger to the security of India as it had been in the 
days of Zeman Shah. He cautioned his Government against relying too 
much upon the Sikh alliance which might not survive the death of the 
Maharaja.
58
As things stand [he wrote], I maintain it is the 
best of all policy to make Cabool in itself as 
strong as we can make it, and not weaken it by 
divided power; it has already been too long divided. 
Cabool owed its strength in by-gone days to the 
tribute of Cashmere and Sinde; both are irrecover­
ably gone, and while we do all we can to keep up 
the Sikhs as a power east of the Indus, either 
during the Maharaja's life or afterwards, we should 
consolidate Afghan power west of the Indus, and 
have a King, and not a collection of chiefs. Divide 
et imp era is a temporising creed at any time, and 
if the Afghans are united, we and they bid defiance 
to Persia,... 59
Burnes pointed out that it was possible that after the death of the 
Maharaja the Afghans might inherit a portion of a disintegrated Sikh 
State. In that case, they might exercise no small influence over the 
Punjab and probably over British India. Moreover, he felt that 
important as the Sikh alliance was, it could not hold back the Russian 
menace. Burnes therefore wished his Government to conciliate the Ameer,
58
59
Even before he entered Afghanistan, Burnes favoured the unification 
of Afghanistan. Commenting on the negotiations between Persia and 
Kandahar, he stated in a letter to McNeil: 'If matters go rightly, 
we shall be able to neutralise the power of the Candahar chiefs, or 
at all events place them in complete subjection to Dost Mahomed Khan: 
whose influence increased daily.' (See J.W. Kaye, op.cit., Vol.i, 
p.182; P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.218, Burnes to Macnaghten, 24 March 
1838. For McNeill's view, see Kaye, op.cit., p.293.)
P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.252. Burnes to Macnaghten, 2 June 1838. 
(Except 'Divide et impera', emphasis mine.)
He believed that if half of what the Government 'must do for others 
were done for him [i.e., the Ameer], and offers made which he could see 
conduced to his interests, he would abandon Persia and Russia tomorrow.'
The Ameer's request and Burnes' views were considered by the
Government of India to be incompatible with its line of policy. Lord
Auckland's policy was merely to try to settle the differences among
the rulers of Afghanistan which were facilitating the establishment of
Persian and Russian influence in Afghanistan. He sought to bring about
a settlement of these differences through friendly persuasion. His
policy was to limit his endeavours 'to gradually influencing the proceed
ings of the several states by their own sense of their real and mutual
61interest, and to the tenders of a friendly mediation'. It was not 
part of this policy to upset the balance of power in Afghanistan, or 
impair the existing British alliance with the Sikhs. Lord Auckland 
also did not wish to assume any political or military responsibilities 
for Afghanistan. The Ameer's policy seemed to his Lordship to be 
inconsistent with all these principles.
The Government of India was opposed to the restoration of 
Peshawar to the Ameer partly from the fear that it would aggrandise 
his power to the detriment of the other rulers of Afghanistan. Lord
fïCl IIP., 1859,Vol.xxv, p.252, Burnes to Macnaghten, 2 June 1838.
P.P., 1859,Vo 1.xxv, p. 122, Macnaghten to Burnes, 20 January 1838.61
Auckland believed that the Ameer's 'scheme of obtaining possession, on
any terms, of the Peshawur territory for himself' was proof that he
62had sinister motives. Burnes was therefore told that the Government
of India would not approve of 'an arrangement which should give to any
one chief an undue preponderance: which for instance, should enable Dost
Mahomed to subdue Candahar, or to aid Persia in the subjugation of 
, 63Herat . With regard to Burnes suggestion that Afghanistan should 
be united under a single ruler, Lord Auckland was of the opinion that
there could be no state of affairs in Central Asia 
more favourable to the interests of British India 
than the present division of power among the several 
rulers of Afghanistan, provided that each state 
possessed independence within itself, and were 
willing to maintain social relations with its 
neighbours. 64
It was therefore the policy of the Governor-General to uphold the title
65of the Sadozais to Herat and of the Barukzai Sardars to Kandahar.
Another reason why the Government of India opposed the 
restoration of Peshawar to the Ameer was its fear that it might redress 
the balance of power between the Afghans and the Sikhs. If that
P.P. ,1859,Vol.xxv,p. 123, Macnaghten to Burnes, 20 January 1838.
P. P. ,1859,\fol.xxv, p. 75, Macnaghten to Burnes, 2 December 1837. (Emphasis 
mine.)
P. P. , 185$ VoLxxv, p. 284 (footnotes). Lord Auckland to the Secret 
Committee of the Court of Directors, 8 February 1838.
P.P., 1859,VoLx?y, p.284 (footnotes). Lord Auckland to the Secret 
Committee, 8 February 1838.
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happened it might enable the Ameer to challenge the power of the Sikhs 
and probably encourage an Afghan incursion into the countries south of 
the Indus, especially after the Maharaja1s death. The Government of 
India could not contemplate such an eventuality with equanimity as it 
would disturb the consolidation of the Sikh alliance which exercised 
a stabilising influence in India. The Sikh alliance therefore had to 
be preserved at all costs. It was argued that it would be suicidal 
for the Government of India
with a well-organised Government like that of 
Runjeet Sing in advance, and our own immense 
resources in the rear, to labour under such an 
incubus of alarm from the half-famished multi­
tudes of Persia, and the headlong violence of 
Russia, as to resign that policy which is demon­
strated both by reason and expediency to be the 
safest, the wisest, and the best suited to our 
situation, to oblige the Amir. 66
Burnes was required to tell Dost Mohammed Khan unreservedly that 'under
any circumstances', the Government of India's 'first feeling must be
that of regard for the honour and just wishes of our old and firm ally 
67Runjeet Singh'. He was to tell the Ameer also that the Governor- 
General did not think that the Maharaja would be willing to restore
fl fl P. P. , 1859,Vol.xxv, p209. C.M. Wade to Macnaghten, 21 March 1838. In 
a letter to Hobhouse, Lord Auckland stated: 'In his pressing needs, 
he [i.e., the Ameer] has courted Persia, he has courted Russia and 
he has courted us. But it would be madness in us, though we may 
wish to see his independence assured, to quarrel with the Sikhs 
for him.' (See Lajpat Rai Nair, op.cit., p.17 footnotes.)
fi 7 P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.38, Macnaghten to Burnes, 11 September 1837.
Khan was to be told that the utmost that the Government of India could
do for him was 'to endeavour to induce Maha Raja Runjeet Singh to
69refrain from prosecuting further hostilities against him' . The 
Governor-General tried to impress upon the Ameer that he had no chance 
of recovering Peshawar and so he must reconcile himself to its loss 
and 'thankfully' accept the good offices of the Government of India 
'for the peace and security of his remaining territory'.^
Lord Auckland strongly censured Burnes for promising pecuniary
aid to the Kandahar Sardars.^ He told Burnes that the Government of
India had never contemplated 'positive engagements to assist opposition
72to actual invasion from the westward, by arms or subsidies'. The
Peshawar to him on the terms proposed by him. Further, Dost Mohammed
P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.75. Macnaghten to Burnes, 2 December 1837.
69 P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.123. Macnaghten to Burnes, 20 January 1838.
^  P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.123. Macnaghten to Burnes, 20 January 1838.
71 The Kandahar Sardars had agreed to aid Persia against Herat in the 
hope of obtaining possession of it on its fall. On the approach of 
the Persian army, however, they became suspicious of the Shah's 
ulterior designs on their own chiefship. Accordingly they refused 
to ratify their treaty with Persia. It was at this juncture, 
December 1837, that they appealed to Burnes for aid. The Envoy on 
his own responsibility promised that if on the fall of Herat, 
Kandahar should be threatened, he and the Ameer would come to its 
relief. Subject to proof of their attachment to the Government of 
India, Burnes promised the Kandahar Sardars that the expenses of 
repulsing the Persians would be defrayed by the Government of India. 
(P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.97, Burnes to Macnaghten, 23 December 1837.)
72 P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.122. Macnaghten to Burnes, 20 January 1838.
Governor-General reminded Burnes that such a promise would be a breach
73of the treaty of Teheran. Besides, the assumption of obligations at
a distance so remote from the seat of its power would be inconvenient
to the Government of India. He was therefore inclined to leave that
decision to the judgement of the Government in England. Lord Auckland's
policy was to confine the British line of defence to the Indus. Even
if Herat fell and Persia threatened to invade Eastern Afghanistan, he
did not 'contemplate any immediate direct interference by arms or money
74to arrest the enterprise'. It was his belief that the weakness of
Persia itself coupled with the religious antipathy between Shia and Sunni
would make Persian rule over Afghanistan 'most precarious and transitory,
and in the end attended with serious risk of injury to herself' Lord
Auckland intended to use force against Persia only if she 'should succeed,
against all reasonable anticipation, in acquiring a state authority in
Afghanistan, and manifest a disposition to interfere with the territories
7 6along the course of the Indus'.
Burnes was required to impress upon Dost Mohammed Khan that if 
he allied himself with Persia or Russia, he would be regarded as an
By Article 9 of the treaty of Teheran 1814, it was agreed that in 
the event of war between Persia and Afghanistan, England was not to 
interfere. She was to use her good offices to effect peace only at 
the request of both States. (J.W. Kaye, op.cit., Vol.i, p.646.)
P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.289, Auckland to Secret Committee, 8 February 
1838.
P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.289. Auckland to Secret Committee, 8 February 
1838.
P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.289. Auckland to Secret Committee, 8 February TCT8.
dread would not be an invasion only by the Sikhs, but such an invasion
undertaken under all the influence of our declared displeasure with an
alienation from him'.^ Burnes was asked to state these views frankly
to the Ameer and to tell him that 'whatever may be his own trust in his
independent means of defence, the British Government can deal with him
78on no other understanding'.
The clash of views between Burnes and Lord Auckland is remark­
able. With Russian aggression in mind, Burnes recommended the consoli­
dation of Afghanistan under a single ruler as the best way of warding off 
danger to the security of India. On the other hand, Lord Auckland was 
unable to divest his mind of memories of Zeman Shah's attempted invasions 
of India. He considered the political disunity of Afghanistan as an 
insurance against Afghan designs on India, and so wished to perpetuate 
it. Burnes recommended the restoration of Peshawar to Afghan rule as 
a prerequisite to the detachment of the Barukzai rulers from their 
friendship with Persia and Russia. Lord Auckland wanted the restoration 
to be consequent upon the Ameer's renunciation of all dealings with 
Persia and Russia and of all claims to the territory on his own behalf. 
Burnes wanted the Ameer to be conciliated; Lord Auckland wanted to
enemy of the Government of India. In that case 'what he might have to
P. P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.123. Macnaghten to Burnes, 20 January 1838. 
P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.123. Macnaghten to Burnes, 20 January 1838.
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intimidate him into compliance with his demands. It was as though 
the Governor-General was determined to contradict his Envoy at every 
turn and to reap without sowing.
On 23 February 1838 Burnes went to deliver the Governor-
General' s message to the Ameer. Dost Mohammed Khan's disappointment
was great. Three months after Burnes' arrival in Kabul, a Russian
Agent, Captain Vickovich, had also arrived with offers of aid to the
80Ameer. But confident in his expectation of British mediation in his 
favour, the Ameer had paid little attention to him. Dost Mohammed Khan 
was irritated by a hint in the Governor-General's letter that he should
In a letter to Burnes stating the essential principles of the 
Government's policy, Macnaghten wrote: 'Dost Mohomed is now 
essentially dependent upon our good offices for the removal of his 
apprehensions from the Sikh power,...his own applications to every 
quarter open to him for succour against this danger manifest the 
alarm which he himself entertains; and his Lordship thinks that there 
is no room for doubt, that although it might be hazardous and 
unprofitable to the Maha Raja to seek to retain possession of a 
country so difficult, yet in the immense resources at his command, in 
his wealthy treasury, and numerous and disciplined army, and with so 
much of weakness and distraction in the Cabool territory, he has the 
means of over-running it, when he may determine to make the effort 
and of consumating at least the ruin of its present ruler. You 
ought to proceed, in all your intercourse with Dost Mahomed Khan, 
on this understanding, that the boon which he obtains in consequence 
of our interest in his favour is no less than safety from the probable 
destruction of his authority; and representations of the danger which 
he would incur ought to be made stronger, if dissatisfied with such 
mediation as we are willing to tender, Dost Mahomed Khan should 
attempt to form any other political connexions through Persian or 
Russian agents;...' (P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.122. Macnaghten to 
Burnes, 20 January 1838.) (Emphasis mine.)
Captain Vickovich carried an offer of Russian aid in arms and money 
for the recovery of Peshawar, Multan, Derajat and Sind. (P.P., 1859, 
Vol.xxv, p. 101. Burnes to Macnaghten, 23 December 1837; p.137,
R. Leech to Burnes, 18 January 1838.)
send presents to Ranjit Singh. To the Ameer, it implied subservience
to a ruler 'who had never subdued him, which he certainly did not
81understand'. He resented the low opinion which the Governor-General
seemed to have about his power and usefulness. He scorned the offer
of the Government of India to prevail upon the Maharaja not to invade
Kabul because he believed that it had never been the intention of
82Ranjit Singh to attack Kabul. Dost Mohammed Khan therefore did 
not consider the British offer as commensurate with the loss of his 
external autonomy which the British demands involved.
Nonetheless, the Ameer endeavoured to reach a compromise with
the Government of India. After consultation with his brothers, he put
forward certain proposals. He agreed to give up his claim to Peshawar
on his own behalf. But to obviate possible future collision and to
relieve his fears, he asked that all Sikh troops be withdrawn from
Peshawar. He wanted Sultan Mohammed Khan or an Afghan to be left free
83to govern the territory in conformity to the Maharaja's instructions.
The Ameer further agreed to write to Ranjit Singh through the Governor-
General 'and to do anything short of sending him horses, which he flatly
84refused to do. He also arranged for the departure of Captain 
Vickovich and promised to refrain from further communication with Persia
P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.167, Burnes to Macnaghten, 23 February 1838.
8p P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.217, Burnes to Macnaghten, 24 March 1838.
P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, pp.187-188, Burnes to Macnaghten, 5 March 1838.
P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.222, Burnes to Macnaghten, 19 April 1838.84
The Kandahar Sardars on their part agreed to recall Allahdad their Agent 
who had accompanied the Persian Envoy. They agreed to join their brother 
in making friends with the Government of India if it would give a
85direct pledge to protect Kandahar and Kabul against Persian attack.
As this request was inconsistent with the Government of India's policy, 
it was rejected by Burnes. At this juncture it was clear that the 
negotiations had reached a stalemate. Therefore on 22 April 1838 Burnes 
asked for leave to return to India.
In granting Burnes leave to retire from Afghanistan, the 
Ameer expressed regret at the failure of their negotiations; and made 
no secret of his determination to achieve his objectives with aid from 
some other power.
As my hopes on your Government are gone [he told 
Burnes], I will be forced to have recourse to other 
governments. It will be for the protection of 
Afghanistan to save our honour, and, God forbid, 
not from any ill design toward the British.... In 
making friendship with any government my object 
will be to save and enlarge Afghanistan... All the 
Afghans will be grateful to the Government which 
obliges them. ...I expected very much from your 
Government and hoped for the protection and 
enlargement of Afghanistan. 86
8 5 P. P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.229. Burnes to Macnaghten, 25 April 1838.
P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.233. Dost Mohammed Khan to Burnes, 23 April
1838. (Emphasis mine.)
Burnes left Kabul on 26 April 1838. The failure of his
mission placed Lord Auckland in a quandary. Herat was in imminent danger
of being conquered by a Persian army aided by Russian engineers. In
his note to Burnes the Ameer had not equivocated about his intention
to seek foreign aid to renew his war against Ranjit Singh, the 'old and
faithful ally' of the Government of India. Captain Vickovich had taken
advantage of Burnes' departure to promise everything the Ameer wanted,
and had subsequently left for Kandahar on his way to Persia accompanied
87by a trusted Envoy of the Ameer. In India itself the repercussions
were serious. The political atmosphere became charged with anxious
expectation as people waited for something to happen on the north-west:
frontier. Many people began to bury their valuables; while the Muslim
88newsheets teemed with sedition. Besides sedition at home, war with
Ava and Nepal seemed imminent. The latter had sent emissaries all
over India presumably to incite a general feeling of hostility against
the Government of India. Unrest was also simmering in Baroda, Indore,
Jaipur and Kota. 'In short', wrote Lord Auckland, 'in almost every
direction we seemed to be surrounded by undisguised foes or doubtful
89friends'. It was amid these circumstances that the Government of
iii. British military intervention in Afghanistan.
87 P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.246. Burnes to Macnaghten, 25 May 1838.
88 Lajpat Rai Nair, op.cit., p.21; Sir Auckland Colvin, Rulers of India 
John Russell Colvin, (Oxford 1895) pp.100-1.
P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.306. Lord Auckland to Secret Committee,89
13 August 1838.
India decided to intervene in the affairs of Afghanistan. In Lord 
Auckland's view, this was necessary not only to secure tranquillity on 
the north-west frontier, but also to save the Sikh alliance by anticipat­
ing the Ameer's plans of crushing Ranjit Singh with foreign aid.
In May 1838, following the return of Burnes' mission, Lord
Auckland saw three alternative courses of action before him. It was
open to him to confine his defensive preparations to the Indus and leave
Afghanistan at the mercy of Persia. Or, he might attempt to conciliate
the Barukzai chiefs by giving them assistance against a Persian attack.
Lastly, he might encourage the Maharaja to invade Kabul 'under counsel
and restriction, and (as subsidiary to his advance) to organise an
90expedition headed by Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk'. The Governor-General
rejected the first two alternatives. He thought that the first would
open the door for the introduction of Russian intrigues to the Indus.
As for the second he feared that it would place military power in the
hands of the Afghans which might be turned against the Sikhs whom the
91Afghans hated more than the Persians. He therefore adopted the third
Lajpat Rai Nair, op.cit., p.25. Lord Auckland's Minute, 12 May 1838. 
MSS Records 122/123.
The Governor-General felt that 'armaments and subsidies to Dost 
Mahomed Khan and his brothers, would, especially while such pre­
tensions were advanced as regards Peshawur, have been attended with 
the absolute certainty of wholly destroying the cordiality of our 
alliance with the most powerful and valuable of our friends,
Maharajah Runjeet Sing, while they would have involved us in 
responsibilities that could in no degree be compensated by any aid 
from chiefs so weak, and divided by so many jealousies and distrac­
tions.' (P.P., 1839, Vol.xl, pp.210-211.) The Ameer himself 
declared that he and his people would rather be conquered by 
Mohammed Shah of Persia 'who was a kind of a Mahomedan' than by the 
Sikhs. (P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.217.)
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alternative, which he believed would 'conciliate the feelings of the
Sikh ruler and bind the restored monarch [i.e., Shah Shuja] to the
92support1 of British interests.
A few days after taking this decision, Mr. W.H. Macnaghten
was issued with instructions and sent on a mission to Lahore. Mr.
Macnaghten, who was at this time secretary to Government, first entered
the service of the East India Company in 1809 as a cadet of cavalry on
the Madras establishment. He later distinguished himself as a great
Oriental linguist at the College of Fort William. On leaving College
he became an Assistant in the office of the 'Register' of the Saddar
Diwani Adawlat. In 1818 he took up the duties of a Magistrate but was
soon recalled to Calcutta and appointed 'Register' of the Saddar Diwani
Adawlat. In 1833 he was placed in charge of the Secret and Political
Department of the Government Secretariat. He proved himself to be an
expert Secretary possessing 'an extensive acquaintance with all the
93practical details of government'. On 31 May 1838, Macnaghten began 
a conference with the Maharaja which resulted in the Tripartite Treaty. 
This treaty settled the relations that were to exist between the 
Government of India, Shah Shuja and the Maharaja after the Shah 
became King in Kabul. By this treaty the Government of India sought 
not only to establish British influence at Kabul but also, rather
Lajpat Rai Nair, op.cit., p.24.
J.W. Kaye, op.cit., Vol.i, pp.301-303.
uniquely, a condominium of the British and Sikh Governments over
94Afghanistan's foreign policy.
The Government of India had no misgivings about the success
of its policy to overthrow Dost Mohammed Khan. To replace one ruler by
another in a country which had transferred its allegiance eight times
within the preceding forty-five years did not seem to be a formidable
task. Above all, the internal situation in Afghanistan furnished ample
material for the promotion of British objectives. Disaffection towards
the Barukzai brothers was rife and only awaited exploitation. It was
believed that by aligning himself with Persia, the Ameer had offended
the religious susceptibilities of the bulk of his people. It was also
believed that burdensome taxation, arrears of salary, unrewarded services
and arbitrary confiscations had effaced memories of the oppression of
95the Sadozai rulers from the minds of the Afghans. Some powerful
J.W. Kaye, op.cit., Vol.i, pp.319-322. Among the other terms of 
the treaty signed by Ranjit Singh on 26 June 1838, Shah Shuja agreed 
to renounce for himself and his heirs all right to territories 
lying on either bank of the River Indus and in the possession of 
Ranjit Singh, namely, Kashmir, Peshawar, Dera Ismael Khan, Multan 
and their dependencies. On the Shah's establishment on the throne, 
he was to send certain articles annually to the Maharaja. This 
arrangement was to be reciprocated by Ranjit Singh. The Maharaja 
was to furnish the Shah, upon requisition, with an auxiliary force 
composed of Mohammedans and commanded by one of his principal 
officers. It was to accompany the Shah as far as Kabul. After 
becoming King, Shah Shuja was to pay the Maharaja two lacs of 
rupees annually from the date on which the Sikh troops might be 
sent to assist in his re-instatement and in consideration of a force 
of 5,000 men to be stationed by Ranjit Singh in Peshawar ready for 
the Shah's service.
95 P. P., 1859, Vol.xxv, pp.261, 268. Lt. R. Leech to Burnes, 1838.
Kaker wished to become a servant of the Government of India and avowed
96his willingness to avenge himself on the Ameer.
The Qizilbashes had ceased to look up to the Ameer since 1834
when he assumed the title of Ameer. He had lost their support by his
open contempt for their creed and his reduction of the number of
97Qizilbashes in his service as well as their salaries. Burnes
confidently expected the Kohistanis who formed the bulk of the Ameer's
infantry to come over to Shah Shuja. Such a defection was expected to
weaken and demoralise the Ameer's army which did not exceed 15,000 men.
Shah Shuja's forces were therefore not expected to encounter any stiff 
98opposition. Even the Nawab Jabbar Khan, the Ameer's brother who was 
closely associated with him in the government of Kabul, was willing to 
betray him. In an interview with Burnes on the morning before he left 
Kabul, the Nawab asked the Government of India 'to view him as an 
adherent of it in Cabool, ready to do anything that was asked of him, 
be it to assist in the removal of the Ameer, or to forward any scheme
chiefs like Haji Khan Kaker were alienated from the Ameer. Haji Khan
96 P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.269. R. Leech to Burnes, 1838. Haji Khan 
Kaker who was said to be capable of raising a force of 80,000 men 
was dismissed from the Ameer's service and deprived of his jagir 
for suspected intrigue with the Sikhs.
97 P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, pp.50-51. Burnes to Macnaghten, 14 October 1837, 
In December 1837 the Qizilbashes offered their services to the 
Government of India. See Ibid, p.85.
98 P. P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.257. Burnes to Macnaghten, 20 June 1838.
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which received the approval of the British Government'. No wonder 
the Government of India felt confident about the success of its Afghan 
adventure.
During August 1838, the Governor-General's policy underwent 
some modifications. In May he had decided to use the Sikh army as the 
main instrument of his Afghan policy. By August, however, he had made 
up his mind to rely mainly on the Government's own forces to obviate 
any 'hazard of failure, and of serious detriment to the reputation of 
the British name among the Afghan p e o p l e ' . T h e  Governor-General 
also became converted to Burnes' view that a united Afghanistan was to 
be preferred to a weak and disunited Afghanistan. 'The Barukzie chiefs,' 
he wrote to the Secret Committee, 'from their disunion, weakness, and 
unpopularity, were ill fitted, under any circumstance, to be useful 
allies, or to aid us in our just and necessary views of resisting encroach­
ment from the westward.' In justifying this change of policy Lord 
Auckland told the Secret Committee that the restored Sadozai monarchy 
would be placed
under immediate British influence in all its 
important political relations, and that, therefore, 
the objections which might otherwise have been 
entertained to supporting a consolidated Mahomedan
99
P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.237. Burnes to Macnaghten, 30 April 1838.
~Pr.~P%, 1859, Vol.xxv, p. 307. Lord Auckland to the Secret Committee, 
13 August 1838.
P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv, p.306. Lord Auckland to the Secret Committee,
13 August 1838.
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power in that quarter, will not be applicable to 
the state of things which will exist after the 
successful termination of the present operations. 102
The Secret Committee of the Court of Directors approved this policy but
warned that it must not be allowed to result in a permanent occupation
103of any part of Afghanistan.
On 9 September 1838 the siege of Herat was raised. The 
Russian menace seemed to have receded. Nonetheless, Lord Auckland 
decided to go ahead with his plan to depose the Barukzai rulers and 
forestall potential upheavals on the north-west frontier arising from 
their rivalry and ambition. Mr. Macnaghten was appointed 'Envoy and 
Minister on the part of the Government of India at the Court of Shah 
Soojah-ool-Moolk'. Burnes' mission to Kabul was formally terminated on
1 October 1838. From that date he assumed a new role 'under Mr. Mac­
naghten' s directions, as Envoy to the chief of Kelat and other states'. 
On 1 October the famous Simla Manifesto was issued in vindication of 
the Governor-General's policy. It declared that the welfare of British 
possessions in the East required that the Government of India should 
have on its western frontier 'an ally who is interested in resisting 
aggression, and establishing tranquillity, in the place of chiefs
P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv., p.307. Lord Auckland to the Secret Committee, 
13 August 1838.
P.P., 1859, Vol.xxv., p.328. Secret Committee to Lord Auckland,
13 September 1839.
J.W. Kaye, op.cit., Vol.i, p.353.
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ranging themselves in subservience to a hostile power, and seeking to 
promote schemes of conquest and aggrandizement'.^"*
In December 1838 a British Army left Ferozepur for Afghanistan 
after it had been reviewed by Lord Auckland and Ranjit Singh. In April 
1839 it was joined at Quetta by a contingent from Bombay and by Shah 
Shuja's specially recruited army. The Shah entered Kandahar unopposed 
at the end of April 1839. The capture of Ghazni unnerved Dost Mohammed 
Khan and led to his flight from Kabul. On 6 August, Shah Shuja re­
entered Kabul after an exile of thirty years. Captain Wade with his 
motely army of Hindus, Sikhs and Afghans arrived at Kabul from Peshawar 
on 3 September accompanied by Prince Timur, the Shah's son. A portion 
of the British force returned to India. The rest, reinforced by a 
small Sikh force, garrisoned Jalalabad, Ghazni, Kandahar and Kabul. A 
small contingent was sent to Bamiyan to watch the passes over the main 
ridge for the movements of the Ameer. 'For the first and last time in
history the British were in actual physical occupation of the great
106north-western frontier of their dominions'.
In the autumn of 1840 the Ameer crossed the Hindu Kush and 
appeared in Kohistan forty miles north of Kabul. However, he despaired 
of success and surrendered himself to the British. On 12 November, he
Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan, p.110. Declaration on the part of 
the Honourable the Governor-General of India, Simla, 1 October 1838.
106 Ibid., p.112.
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began his journey into exile in India. In spite of these early successes, 
the Afghan campaign was doomed to failure not only because 'there was 
a canker of injustice at the core1 but also because of the anomalies
in the British position. The British occupation was planned as a 
temporary measure but was allowed to develop all the features of a 
permanent occupation without the relevant precautionary measures being 
taken. The British defrayed the cost of the Shah's administration but 
were bound by an agreement not to interfere. They provided the force 
to back the Shah's measures which often ran counter to their own 
political predilections. In the exercise of their role as agents and 
advisers of the Shah the British functionaries could not often help 
acting as though they were his masters. The Shah resented the restraints 
placed on his exercise of power; the policy of economic retrenchment
108inaugurated by the British in 1841 gave offence to the Afghan chiefs; 
while inflation and the traffic in women between the city and the 
cantonments outraged the honour of the Afghan men. In 1841 sporadic 
risings occurred in the districts west and east of Kabul.
On 2 November 1841 disaffection erupted into revolt in Kabul. 
Alexander Burnes was hacked to pieces at his house in the city.
J.W. Kaye, op. cit. , p. 371.
108 By the spring of 1841 the cost of the occupation of Afghanistan 
was causing much anxiety in Calcutta and London. It was costing 
£1-^  million a year. Retrenchment became imperative. The victims 
of this policy were the chiefs in and around Kabul - Kabulis, 
Ghilzais, Kohistanis and also the Qizilbashes. (See Fraser-Tytlerf 
op.cit., p.115; J.W. Kaye, op.cit., Vol.i, pp.619-620.)
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Macnaghten survived him by only seven weeks and then shared his fate. 
After protracted negotiations the British were allowed to evacuate 
Kabul in December under the terms of a treaty that guaranteed them 
safe-conduct. On 6 January 1842 the British army began its retreat to 
India. A few days later it fell victim to the implacable fury of the 
eastern Ghilzais. Only one man, Dr. Brydon, reached Jalalabad to report 
the tragic end of his comrades to Sale's brigade. In the autumn of 
1842 a British army re-entered Kabul by way of Kandahar and Peshawar 
to exact retribution for the massacre of their comrades. The bazar was 
burned down. After that the British army returned to India and Afghani­
stan was left alone. On 20 January 1843 Dost Mohammed arrived at Lahore 
on his way to Kabul to resume his Government.
British intervention in Afghanistan was inspired by the 
necessity to curb the prevailing political instability in that country. 
The collapse of the Durrani monarchy in 1818 left Afghanistan without 
a unity of political control or policy. The four principalities which 
replaced the Durrani Empire were bedevilled by racial and religious 
disharmony among their people and by feuds and hostility among their 
ruling families. While the Sadozai ruler of Herat sought to conquer 
Kandahar with Persian aid, the Barukzai brothers of Kandahar showed 
anxiety for a Persian alliance for the purpose of avenging the murder 
of their father by Prince Kamran of Herat. In eastern Afghanistan, Dost 
Mohammed Khan was engaged in war with Ranjit Singh and Sultan Mohammed
Khan, former ruler of Peshawar and brother of the Ameer. The Barukzai 
brothers in Kandahar who dreaded the ambition of Dost Mohammed were 
inclined to favour Sultan Mohammed Khan in his quarrel with the Ameer.
This unsatisfactory situation in Afghanistan could not be 
overlooked by the Government of India. The feud between Kandahar and 
Herat, and the solicitude shown by these rival Afghan principalities for 
the friendship of Persia exposed Afghanistan to possible Persian conquest. 
In view of the close understanding between Persia and Russia, a Persian 
conquest of Afghanistan would have led to the establishment of Russian 
influence on the north-west frontier of India. The fear of Russian 
invasion apart, the prevailing instability in Afghanistan could have 
had a dangerous impact on British interests in India if it had been 
allowed to continue. Dost Mohammed's war with the Sikhs, apart from 
hampering the promotion of British commerce in the countries along the 
Indus, might have proved harmful to the power of the Sikhs whose alliance 
with the British exercised a stabilising influence on the Indian political 
scene. Moreover, since that war had a religious bias, it had a tendency 
to re-kindle the smouldering religious fanaticism of Indian Muslims.
In these ways the situation in Afghanistan posed a threat to the 
security of the British in India.
To safeguard its interests against external or internal 
enemies, it was essential for the Government of India to intervene in 
Afghanistan to end the prevailing state of instability. To achieve 
this objective it was up to the Government of India either to unify
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Dost Mohammed and Prince Kamran and reassure the Kandahar Sardars by
guaranteeing the independence and integrity of each principality.
Eventually the Government of India decided to unify eastern Afghanistan
under a single ruler and forge close links between him and Ranjit Singh,
Since it was believed that peaceful co-existence between Dost Mohammed
Khan and Ranjit Singh would be impossible as long as the Sikhs kept
Peshawar, the Government of India supplanted the Ameer by the exiled
Sadozai monarch, Shah Shuja. The Tripartitie treaty between the Shah,
Ranjit Singh and the British established a Sikh and British condominium
109over Afghanistan's foreign policy. Apart from this, the role of the
Government of India as guarantor of the punctual payment of an annual
subsidy of Rs.2,00,000 by the Shah to Ranjit Singh afforded it a pretext 
for interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.^^
The failure of Lord Auckland's Afghan adventure alienated the 
Afghans and sowed the seeds of bitterness in their minds. Four years 
later this bitterness was given expression in the assistance which the 
Afghans gave to the Sikhs in the battle of Gujrat.^^ From then until
the country under the rule of one man, or to restrain the ambitions of
Lajpat Rai Nair, Sir William Macnaghten's Correspondence relating 
to the Tripartite Treaty, p.87. Article 18 of the Tripartite 
Treaty; see also J.W. Kaye, op.cit., Vol.i, pp.322-323.
Lajpat Rai Nair, op.cit., p.80. For the article of the Tripartite 
Treaty relating to the guarantee, see Ibid., pp.86-87 (Article 15); 
in Kaye's work (op.cit., Vol.i, p.322) the Article appears as the 
16th; P.P., 1839, Vol.xl, p.30 (Article 15).
Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan, p.122.
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of India were marked by a 'sullen quiescence on either side, without
112offence but without good will or intercourse'. As for Dost Mohammed
he lived to purge himself of the unjust imputations cast on his character
113and to retrieve his reputation for good faith. On the Indian domestic
front the Afghan debacle added fifteen million crores to the Indian 
114debt. Besides, it exploded the myth about the invincibility of the
British army. In this way, it is believed to have contributed indirectly 
to the great crisis of 1857.
1854 relations between the Ameer Dost Mohammed Khan and the Government
Ibid., Lord Dalhousie's Minute, 14 March 1854. On the eve of the 
Crimean war, diplomatic relations were resumed with Afghanistan as 
a precautionary measure against possible Russian moves in Central 
Asia.
113 Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan, pp.124-125.
Allen's Indian Mail (London 1858), Vol.xvi, p.52. Mr. J.H. Crawford's 
Speech, Debate at East India House, 15 January 1858. See also J.W. 
Kaye, op.cit., Vol.ii, p.668.
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CONCLUSION
For the most part, the impetus for British intervention in 
Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Afghanistan between 1811 and 1844 originated 
in India itself. The intervention was a direct response to the 
prevailing instability in those States caused by the collapse of their 
political systems. The impact of European rivalry for empire in the 
East reinforced the argument for British intervention. But indepen­
dently of the fear of an invasion of India by an European rival, the 
manner in which political crises in Maharashtra, Rajasthan and 
Afghanistan tended to undermine the general stability of the sub-con­
tinent and endanger British interests would still in itself have been 
sufficient reason for British intervention in those States.
Territorial aggrandisement or economic exploitation was not 
the primary motive for British intervention in those States in the 
period under review. No pressing economic necessity existed at the 
time for acquiring additional territory. Free trade and colonisation 
did not become a significant factor in British expansion in India 
till after 1833. The Directors of the East India Company did not 
visualise big European-owned plantations for large scale agricultural 
production before the 1840's. Till then, export of Indian sugar and 
cotton into England received little encouragement. During this period, 
Britain looked to North America and Brazil for her supplies of these 
agricultural commodities. In fact, between 1805 and 1841 the Government 
of India disavowed any desire for additional territory.
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In the seven years of his administration, Lord Wellesley 
had brought more territory under direct British rule than the Directors 
of the Company desired. The Carnatic, the ceded districts of Mysore, 
Bundelkhand and the frontier province of Oudh swelled British possessions 
in India. The alarm caused by this rapid political expansion led to 
the termination of Lord Wellesley's governor-generalship in July 1805 
and to the reaffirmation of the policy of non-intervention or 'ring-fence'. 
It was not till after 1841 that this policy was superseded by one of 
deliberate annexation aimed at increasing British territorial possessions 
and revenue.
As political intervention in the native States almost invariably 
led to wars and often to conquest, the Government of India resisted the 
temptation to interfere in the internal affairs of the Indian States. 
Between 1805 and 1811 it tried to overlook the disputes between the 
Peshwa and his Southern Jagirdars even though it was under an obligation 
to assist the Peshwa to chastise his rebellious subjects. In 1806 the 
Government of India dissolved its connection with the last of the 
Rajput States. During the next decade, it turned down repeated requests 
from the Rajput States to be taken under British protection. Not even 
the offer of tribute could influence it. In 1808 Shah Shuja who was 
reduced to desperate financial straits offered to rent Sind to the 
Government of India. The offer was rejected. Shortly after, the Shah 
offered to cede Sind in return for an annual payment. The offer was
denounced and Elphinstone rebuked for recommending it. In January 
1812 the Government of India turned down an offer by the Raja of 
Kolhapur to cede his country to the British in return for a pension.
Why then did the Government of India intervene in Maharashtra,
Rajasthan and Afghanistan between 1811 and 1844 with a view to bringing
them within the scope of its political control? The answer lies to a
great extent in the political crises which beset those States during
this period and in the anxiety over their possible repercussions on
the general tranquillity of India. After 1809 the external threat
posed by the French receded into the background. In its place the
Government of India had to contend with a threat to its security which
emanated from within India itself. The extent of British concern
about the internal security of their rule became manifest in the
Parliamentary debates which preceded the renewal of the Company's
Charter in 1813. Several of the speakers betrayed an anxiety over the
internal security of the Indian empire and advocated caution in the
2formulation of policies for India. The evidence given before the 
Committee of the whole House of Commons in 1813 by Sir John Malcolm 
and Sir Thomas Munro, two of the Company's leading servants, reflected 
similar concern about the internal security of the British Indian empire.
T.E. Colebrooke, Life of the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, 
(London, 1884) Vol.i, pp.218-221.
Parliamentary Debates, 1813. Vol.xxvi, Cols.1017, 1021-23, 1037, 
1050-51, 1080-81. Speeches of Sir T. Sutton, Mr. Marsh and Mr. 
Forbes in the debate on the East India Company's Charter Bill,
1 July 1813.
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Sir Thomas Munro believed that the Mohammedans were waiting for an
3opportune moment to rise against the British. This concern persisted 
4till the 1830's. Charles Metcalfe echoed it when he warned that a
small crisis was all that was required to trigger off an uprising against
5British rule in India.
The exclusion of the former ruling classes of India from the 
higher levels of the Civil Service and the army was a major cause of 
grievance among the Indians. The exclusion, reinforced by differences 
in race, religion and culture, created a social and political gulf 
between rulers and ruled. The rulers had no means of ascertaining the 
true feelings of their subjects towards them. The uncertainty filled 
the British with anxiety and forebodings. The fear of an uprising was 
enhanced by the fact that the Indian army, the main instrument of 
British power, was overwhelmingly native in composition. Under these 
circumstances, the Government of India was anxious to guard against the
Parliamentary Debates, 1813. Vol.xxv, Col.781. Minutes of evidence 
before the Commons on the East India Company's Affairs, 12 April 1813. 
For Malcolm's evidence, see Ibid., Col.628. Minutes of evidence 
before the Commons on the East India Company's Affairs, 7 April 1813.
See also Oriental Herald, 1828. Vol.xviii, p.39.
In the 1820's Sir John Malcolm cautioned: 'The only safe view that 
Great Britain can take of her empire in India is, to consider it (as 
it really is) always in a state of danger, and to nominate persons 
to rule it competent from their knowledge of its interests, and from 
superior energy of character, to meet every emergency that can arise;... 
The dangers which assail our empire in India from internal weakness 
are much greater than we can ever apprehend from external power;...'
(Sir John Malcolm, The Political History of India, Vol.ii, pp.76-78. 
Emphasis mine.)
See Edinburgh Review, January 1858, Vol.cvii, No.ccxvii, p.4.
In safeguarding the peace of India several expedients were adopted. The 
freedom of the Press was curtailed till 1836. Intemperate zeal in 
proselytising met with official disfavour. The Government of India 
hesitated about using its agency for the spread of western learning, 
western culture and Christianity. Sati was tolerated. But above all, 
the Government of India became sensitive to political unrest in 
neighbouring native States.
From 1811 onwards, political weaknesses and instability in the 
native States could no longer be tolerated owing to the fear of a 
contagion of unrest in adjacent British territories. As early as 1804 
General Wellesley forecast that the source of future danger to British 
rule in India would shift from Europe to India itself. In August 1805 
Lord Cornwallis lamented the deplorable condition of the Governments in 
the native States. They had no funds or troops on which they could 
depend. Anarchy and disaffection were prevalent. The Government of 
India was faced with the choice of interfering to exercise an authority 
that its general policy made it disinclined to exercise or of allowing 
the integrity of those States to be destroyed. This was the problem 
which engaged the attention of the Government of India with regard to 
Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Afghanistan between 1811 and 1844. The 
interlocking of this dangerous situation in India with rivalries in 
Europe led to British intervention in the domestic affairs of these 
States. The purpose of the intervention was to curb disorder, strengthen
remotest contingency which could disturb the internal peace of India.
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the Governments and turn them into reliable allies. In the pursuit 
of this policy, the Government of India became inextricably involved 
in the domestic politics of those States.
In Maharashtra the political crisis was a long-term result 
of the decay of the Mughal regime. The separatist tendencies in the 
State which Shivaji had suppressed in his time, revived under the stress 
of war against the Mughal Emperor. Grants of jagirs were offered to 
military commanders to induce them to sustain the Maratha war of 
Independence. Gradually the Maratha State grew into an Empire through 
conquests. The unity of the Empire, however, did not last long. As 
a result of the Peshwa's usurpation of power from the Raja of Satara 
in 1750, the military chiefs who ruled territories outside Maharashtra 
began to defy the Maratha Government based at Poona. By the end of the 
eighteenth century the Empire had become a loose Confederacy of which 
the Peshwa was only the titular head. At the turn of the century, the 
Peshwa's authority reached its very nadir. While Sindhia and Holkar 
contended for the control of his Government, the feudal chiefs within 
Maharashtra itself not only tried to throw off their allegiance but also 
to encroach upon his estates. It was partly to deal with potential 
disorders from this decay of central authority in the Maratha Confederacy 
that the Government of India devised the Treaty of Bassein. On the 
other hand, it was to extricate himself from the crisis in Poona and 
to recover his authority that the Peshwa accepted British alliance.
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The full extent of the impotence of the Peshwa's Government 
was revealed only after 1803. By the beginning of 1804 his authority 
hardly extended beyond five miles radius of Poona. His country was 
overrun by marauding bands. It became imperative for the Government 
of India to intervene to avert the dissolution of the Maratha State 
and to preserve the tranquillity of British territories in neighbouring 
Mysore. For the latter reason, the Government of India could not 
permit the Peshwa to attempt to dispossess the Jagirdars by force of 
arms. Therefore it imposed its own settlement - a settlement which 
seriously encroached on the Peshwa's internal autonomy guaranteed by 
the Treaty of Bassein.
The encroachment of the Government of India on the Peshwa's 
internal autonomy produced a reaction on the part of the Peshwa. He 
regretted his acceptance of the Treaty of Bassein and from then on 
tried to extricate himself from its shackles by every conceivable 
artifice. He tried to regenerate the Maratha Empire with the connivance 
of Sindhia, Holkar and the Bhonsla. He asserted his suzerainty over 
these Chiefs and his right to invest them with their khillat of office. 
He tried at the same time to revive his influence outside Maharashtra 
by claiming sovereignty over certain territories in Hindustan, the 
Deccan and Gujerat. These pretensions of the Peshwa threatened to 
disturb the stability of large districts of India since he lacked the 
power to enforce them. The more he advanced his claims, the more the 
Government of India interfered with his Government. But the efforts 
of the Government of India to restrain him by threats, remonstrances
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and even harsh treaties were of no avail. The more it tried to restrain 
Peshwa Baji Rao, the more recalcitrant and vindictive he became. In 
view of the suspected hostility of several of the native powers, this 
disposition of Baji Rao jeopardised the security of the Government of 
India.
Similarly, British intervention in Rajasthan was the result 
of the deplorable political situation which prevailed in the Rajput 
States. Endemic disorders arising from inter-clan feuds, from inter­
state wars, from the feudal structure of Government and from the imbecility 
of the Rajput rulers, made Rajasthan very unstable. The climax of the 
confusion and insecurity was reached between 1807 and 1811. Slowly the 
Rajput States were approaching disintegration. Their immense resources 
and strategic advantages were in danger of passing into the control of 
the predatory bands in India who had a stake in disorder and anarchy.
From Rajasthan, the Pathans and the Pindaris gradually extended their 
raids into British territory. By 1816 the Government of India, and 
even the Court of Directors, could no longer ignore the disorders in 
Rajasthan especially in Jaipur which lay in close proximity to British 
territories in Hindustan.
In Afghanistan the situation was not much different. Though 
it lay further from British territories than Maharashtra and Rajasthan, 
events in Afghanistan always came within the ambit of Indian politics 
because of its strategic position and the religious affinity between 
its people and the former ruling classes of India. From 1829 onwards
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the Government of India became increasingly worried about the political 
unrest in Afghanistan. The disunity and squabbles among the various 
Afghan rulers and their appeals for outside intervention portended 
danger to the security of British India. The concern of the Government 
of India about the political situation in Afghanistan was borne out 
by the fact that, although on his assumption of office Lord Auckland 
rejected overtures from Dost Mohammed for intervention in his disputes 
with his brother and Ranjit Singh over Peshawar, the Governor-General, 
nevertheless, offered British mediation a year later for the settlement 
of the same disputes.
Thus although it cannot be denied that European rivalries 
and other developments in Europe influenced British political expansion 
in India during the first half of the nineteenth century, it is clear 
that the role played in this expansion by weaknesses in the political 
systems of the native States has not been sufficiently emphasised.
The evidence suggests that in Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Afghanistan, 
political decay had an intrinsic importance as a factor in the British 
expansion. Put in another way, British political intervention in those 
States between 1811 and 1844 would have taken place independently of 
the contemporary rivalries among European powers for empire in the east.
In each of the three areas under discussion no imminent threat 
of an external invasion existed at the time of actual British inter­
vention. The danger from France had receded by 1811 when the stage
251.
was set for intervention in Maharashtra and Rajasthan. Even in 
Afghanistan the military occupation of the country occurred, not at the 
height of the alarm about the Russian-inspired invasion of Afghanistan, 
but after the danger had passed with the raising of the siege of Herat. 
The intervention was no doubt undertaken to anticipate a repetition of 
the Russian threat. But there is equally little doubt that it was 
undertaken partly to save the Sikh alliance and to curb the spirit of 
religious fanaticism and jihad which was being fostered in Afghanistan 
and along the left bank of the Indus. With the geographical advantages 
of his country backed by Russian arms and money, Dost Mohammed Khan 
might have been enabled to sustain his war with the Sikhs to the possible 
detriment of the Anglo-Sikh alliance which the Government of India valued 
so much. Besides, the prevalence of a spirit of jihad along the Indus 
gave rise to considerable sedition among Indian Muslims in the months 
following the failure of Burnes' Mission. This dangerous situation in 
India had to be ended. British intervention in Maharashtra, Rajasthan 
and Afghanistan between 1811 and 1844 was therefore largely attributable 
to the dangers arising from the political situation in those areas 
themselves.
The extent and nature of the control which resulted from the 
intervention was also influenced by peculiar local circumstances. These 
included the calibre and disposition of the native rulers as well as 
the inherent strength of the political institutions in those States. In 
Maharashtra a strong sense of kinship and nationality existed. The 
Marathas had a proud historical past and cherished visions of a Maratha
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Empire on the ruins of the Mughal regime. They resented the British 
intrusion on the Indian political scene which had shattered their 
dreams of supremacy in India. They looked upon the Peshwa as the symbol 
of Maratha unity and aspirations. Even in the last days of the Peshwa- 
ship, the occupant of the office still enjoyed considerable respect and 
moral influence. In 1817 Baji Rao could still command the obedience of 
Sindhia, Holkar and the Bhonsla. As long as this embodiment of Maratha 
nationality existed and the Peshwa enjoyed any measure of political power, 
the revival of the Maratha Confederacy as a rival of the British for 
hegemony in India was a possibility. Therefore the abolition of the 
office of Peshwa and the annexation of Maharashtra became indispensable 
to the unchallenged supremacy of British power in India.
In Rajasthan, by contrast, no comparable national sentiment 
existed among the Rajputs. The feudal and clan organisation of their 
States militated against the emergence of a powerful confederacy in 
Rajasthan. Disunity had always bedevilled the Rajput States even in 
the face of a common foe. The Rajput States had at no time in the 
recent past had pretensions to political supremacy in India, and were 
not likely to do so in future either individually or severally. The 
attitude of the Rajputs was still parochial, and they were ruled by 
dissolute and imbecile rulers who looked to the Government of India 
for protection against their powerful vassals. Moreover, as a result 
of their long submission to the Mughal regime, the Rajput rulers had 
become accustomed to a subservient role in politics. They were therefore
253.
unlikely to consider the British yoke as a humiliation. Hence annexation 
was unnecessary. Instead, they were required to recognise the supremacy 
of the Government of India and pay it tribute in return for protection.
On the basis of this relationship, the Government of India established 
a right of interference in the internal affairs of the Rajput States.
In Afghanistan it is hard to say what the nature and extent 
of British political control would have been in practice if Lord 
Auckland's adventure had succeeded. The remoteness of Afghanistan from 
India and the difficulty of communication precluded the extension of 
the subsidiary alliance system to that country. Nevertheless, the 
control over Afghanistan's foreign policy secured under the Tripartite 
treaty, the role of the Government of India as guarantor of the agree­
ments between Shah Shuja and Maharaja Ranjit Singh under the same treaty, 
and the weakness of the Shah, would have enabled the Government of India 
to exercise considerable control over Afghanistan's internal affairs.
Just as the collapse of the Khedive's regime in Egypt provoked 
British occupation in order to safeguard British interests in Egypt and 
the Middle East, so the collapse of stable politics in Maharashtra, in 
the Rajput States and in Afghanistan between 1811 and 1844 necessitated 
the establishment of a measure of British political control over those 
States to ensure the security of British interests in India. Thus 
weaknesses in the political structure of the Indian States were a 
vital factor in British political expansion in India during this period.
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The expansion was carried on by successive steps. Every stage was 
regarded as an end until intervals of anarchy and confusion forced 
the Government of India to advance a stage further. With the exception 
of Maharashtra, the Government of India shrank from outright annexation 
and decided upon a compromise between the reality and the semblance 
of conquest. In this way it grasped at the advantages, and evaded 
the responsibility, of conquest. Through measures which left the 
external paraphernalia of sovereignty intact, the British grasped the 
substance of power and left its shadow in the hands of native rulers.
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